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Abstract 
Whether there are prospects for a liberal-communitarian philosophy with aims and objectives 
that enhance Karl Popper’s project of the open society I here argue in the affirmative. Such a 
philosophy promotes both self-determination by individuals and community enhancement of 
individual well-being. My argument for a liberal-communitarian philosophy develops out of 
Popper’s critical rationalism, exploiting the fact that in Popper’s philosophy, science and 
politics are intertwined and each is defined by both individual and social elements.  In 
particular, Popper’s politics of liberalism are derived from the ethical and epistemological core 
of his critical rationalism, the latter originating in his philosophy of science, the former 
preceding it. Individuals become socially embedded with others as they engage in mutual 
criticism that is based upon a rational understanding of mutual respect, unity, and tolerance. I 
defend ontological claims about the social nature of the self and normative claims about the 
value of community which together make intelligible the idea that the self cannot exist outside 
of the context of community. This implies that the very consciousness of the self is constituted 
by interaction, interconnectedness and interrelationship with others. How well a philosophy 
that upholds individualism marries with the idea of the community, I show that Popper’s critical 
rationalism fruitfully addresses. Society must protect the individual’s capacity for rational 
criticism. Rational criticism is mutualistic. Critical rationalism as regards both science and 
politics is implicitly communitarian. Although Popper’s politics of liberalism are overtly 
individualistic, they also are implicitly communitarian.  Popper’s ideas offer a basis for rational 
engagement with non-liberal ideologies that emphasise social and community togetherness. 
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Preface 
Karl Popper was systematic in his emphasis upon criticism, deriving from that orientation not 
only a philosophy of science but also a political philosophy and a philosophy of life. The 
present evaluation of Popper considers with what philosophy people might best address 
contemporary political problems. Problems in politically very troubled parts of the world are 
of concern to me. In this dissertation I argue not that Popper provided the best philosophy, but 
that he almost did. Ideas of Popper’s own are used here in order to save Popper from some of 
his own mistakes. When this is done, a political philosophy eventuates that I believe is best. To 
address contemporary problems, even, or perhaps especially, in very troubled parts of the 
world, I know of no better philosophy.   
To advance towards my own sympathetic but critical reconstrual of Popper’s philosophy, chief 
among the materials that I have used are his The Logic of Scientific discovery (1959) and his 
two political philosophical books The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and The Poverty 
of Historicism (1957). The Open Society and Its Enemies went through five editions: the last 
edition was published in 1966. There are two editions of The Poverty of Historicism, the last 
of which was published in 1961. I have referenced both works with their original years of 
publication, The Open Society and Its Enemies 1945 and The Poverty of Historicism 1957, 
because Popper’s revisions did not alter in any significant way the original ideas from their 
first appearance. 
Karl Popper: After the Open Society: Selected social and political writings (2008b), edited by 
Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner, assembles some of Popper’s unpublished drafts and 
personal letters so as to present what may be referred to as the “later Popper” in social and 
political philosophy. Some scholars, such as Katrina Forrester, who reviewed that book, 
suggest that in it Popper is to be viewed as changing from liberal to neo-liberal in his outlook, 
from the liberal who advocated piecemeal social reform to a neo-liberal advocating limited 
government intervention both in free market relations and in the freedom of individuals to think 
independently and to act in any non-criminal way. In other words, Forrester reads the later 
Popper as situated in the camp of the new right. If this were the case, then it would appear that 
the piecemeal social engineering Popper described in The Poverty of Historicism and favoured 
in The Open Society and Its Enemies has suffered abandonment. Piecemeal social engineering 
seems incompatible with a system such as neo-liberalism that is associated with “extreme risk 
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and massive reward, but also social inequality and potential market failure” (Forrester 2012: 
42). Forrester derives support for her position from a letter that Popper wrote in 1956 in 
response to Henry Hazlitt, the American journalist who was a defender of classical liberal 
economic ideas and a founding member of the Mont Pe’lerin Society (Shearmur and Turner 
2008b:196). Popper defended himself against Hazlitt’s criticism of Marxism in The Open 
Society and Its Enemies. Hazlitt thought Popper had over-emphasised in the same way that 
Marx had done the signs of the increasing misery that results from laissez faire capitalism. In 
the course of defending himself against Hazlitt, Popper retracted some of the ideas he had 
expressed in The Open Society and Its Enemies, and admitted that he sounded uncritical, for 
instance, in his demand for state interventionism in preventing unemployment and in his 
concerns for taxation. In his subsequent views, Popper asserted that “all state intervention 
contains grave dangers” (Shearmur and Turner 2008b:198). Accordingly, the open society now 
seemed to Popper to be too Keynesian in nature, while, at the same time, he no longer wished 
to be associated with the idea of social equality. Although Popper still advocated the idea of 
negative utilitarianism (which is the principle of ameliorating suffering and fighting the 
greatest and most urgent evils of society, and includes but is not limited to ameliorating 
“starvation, pain, humiliation, injustice, exploitation”) (Shearmur and Turner 2008b:119), he 
had stopped pursuing the goal of increasing equality. Popper’s revised view was that freedom 
is more important than equality, and that the aspiration of an egalitarian society is no more than 
a beautiful dream (Popper 1974: 36). 
Shearmur himself published a rejoinder to Forrester in the London Review of Books. 
Shearmur’s letter (2012) states: 
Katrina Forrester reads Popper as if he was a proponent of market 
liberalism, or ‘neoliberalism’ (LRB, 26 April). But this isn’t the case. 
Popper certainly valued liberty and markets; but within the broad 
commitments of the ‘open society’ he was willing to accept considerably 
more government involvement than neoliberals – or any conservative, for 
that matter – would. Any account of Popper’s views is complicated by the 
fact that he found admirers on the left as well as on the right. But today 
there is no reason to think that support for liberty and (well-regulated) 
markets alone entails any particular position on the liberal spectrum. Part 
of the interest of After ‘The Open Society’, the collection of Popper’s 
writings that Forrester reviews, which I co-edited, is that it shows the 
extent to which Popper never fully joined with Hayek and other 
neoliberals. For example, late in his career he proposed that the state take 
a 51 per cent share in all public companies (but not an active role in 
management). His attention to the problem of overpopulation and his 
(curmudgeonly) worry about the effects of mass market television, also tell 
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against a neoliberal interpretation of his views, especially when a more 
consistent social democratic interpretation is available. Popper was 
explicitly critical of ‘free market ideology’. But the main contribution of 
his political philosophy was towards the defence of the widely shared 
liberal commitments of the ‘open society’, within which more specific 
policy prescriptions may be worked out through trial and error. 
To assess Shearmur and Turner’s account of the “later” views of Popper in the After the Open 
Society, I seek in this dissertation to evaluate how Popper’s “later” views continue to reflect 
the exciting and original ideas that Popper expressed in The Open Society and Its Enemies and 
The Poverty of Historicism. Though there are certain views that the later Popper expressed that 
appear to move him to the position of a neo-liberal, this appearance is deceptive; one can come 
to a good appreciation of the richness and the worth of his position by examining the liberal 
outlook as contained in The Open Society and Its Enemies in light of the wider doctrines of 
Popper’s own sophisticated critical rationalism. The focal concern of this thesis is to 
demonstrate this. In order to challenge and critically redress the large-scale utopian planning 
and central economic planning which affect many democratic as well as non-democratic states, 
it is important to use Popper’s original ideas in political philosophy. If both liberal and non-
liberal politics are beset by excessive planning, then both are in conflict with Popper’s politics 
of liberalism. To shape worthy criticism of either, the ideas serve perfectly well that Popper 
expressed in all the five editions of The Open Society and its Enemies and in the two editions 
of The Poverty of Historicism.  
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Chapter One: Discovering Karl Popper: A Biographical   Context                                   
If ... harsh words are spoken about some of the greatest among the 
intellectual leaders of mankind, my motive is not ... the wish to belittle 
them. It springs rather from my conviction that, if our civilisation is to 
survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men. Great men 
may make great mistakes; ... some of the greatest leaders of the past 
supported the perennial attack on freedom and reason. Their influence, 
too rarely challenged, continues to mislead those on whose defence 
civilisation depends, and to divide them. The responsibility of this tragic 
and possibly fatal division becomes ours if we hesitate to be outspoken in 
our criticism of what admittedly is a part of our intellectual heritage. By 
reluctance to criticise some of it, we may help to destroy it all. 
                          (Popper 1945a: Preface to the First Edition) 
We must plan for freedom, and not only for security, if for no other reason 
than that only freedom can make security secure. 
                           (Popper 1945b:182) 
Introduction   
Karl Popper (1902-1994) officially esteemed both open criticism of any idea and boldness of 
theoretical thought. As a thinker Popper was himself audacious enough to denounce the highly 
revered Republic of Plato (c.428-c. 348 BCE), to attack the ostensibly “scientific” 
interpretation of history of Karl Marx (1818-1883), terming it unscientific, to question the 
scientific status of the theory of psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)  and of the 
“individual psychology” of Alfred Adler (1870-1937), to upset the verification principle of the 
Vienna Circle and then to stand intellectually opposed to logical empiricism. Popper himself 
boldly advanced new ways to think about the nature of science, about cosmology and whether 
the world is deterministic, about what probability is, about the meaning of quantum mechanics, 
and about the qualities of freedom and security in an intellectually open society. It is well 
known that criticism is the touchstone concept of Popper’s philosophy. Every element of 
human thinking should be open to potential criticism, Popper believed. Likewise Popper 
believed that every element of human practice should be open to potential criticism. Yet, 
however roundly Popper valued the ability to despatch a formerly received way of thinking or 
to invent a bold new form of theoretical thought, he at the same time professed the need to be 
cautious in action. Ambitions that are utopian or revolutionary seemed to Popper always 
unacceptable. We must always be open to reforming our practices, but we must attempt this 
slowly and piecemeal. Every change that we make we must hold open to criticism. It should 
always remain possible for us to judge that some past reform of ours was a misstep. 
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The balance between boldness and caution in Popper is complex. Caricatures of Popper’s 
philosophy either entirely miss the balance or otherwise do not do justice to it. The balance 
must be grasped however in order to fairly assess what Popper’s philosophy is. To grasp the 
balance is essential if we are to register how Popper’s prescription for boldness actually 
esteems a kind of courage.  
The concept of courage is more demanding than that of boldness because courage links to 
settled conviction, to deeply held values. A fearful or insecure person is not apt to act in ways 
that reflect settled conviction or deeply held values. Insecurity will trap a person into inaction 
or into obsequious following. Fear is the emotion that prepares persons quickly to alter not 
merely how they act (if they do) but even the very principles upon which they would normally 
base what they do and are willing to do. By contrast, courageous persons, in some context in 
which courage is called for, while they may quickly alter what they do, will not alter the 
principles upon which they base what they are willing to do (Catton 2010: 5). They act 
courageously by acting in the minute in the face of evident adversity also at the same time from 
deeply held values. Courage is not possible except that reflects very significant conservation 
of values. By contrast the concept of boldness connects with striking out in an unexpected 
direction. A bold person simply oversteps some previously settled way of acting (Catton 2010: 
6). 
To the issue of how boldness can come together as courage, Popper seems to hold an answer. 
However, to judge so, one has to get beyond the basic rhetoric of conjecture and refutation. 
One has to focus on the communitarian dispositions, the anti-revolutionary attitudes, the 
demand that while any one element of current culture may be criticised and rejected it is 
important to do this work piecemeal and carefully. Only then does the audacity or boldness of 
rejecting a seemingly settled view amount to courage: for it reflects also significant 
conservation of values. Popper held that people must be able to be critical, and (piecemeal) to 
be bold in how they experiment and replace some formerly received norm or idea. Popper’s 
point about protecting freedom is that unless you do, you actually do not secure security. For 
in a society that lacks that openness or critical rationality, hijack is possible that effects 
revolution and so is utterly destructive of security. 
Popper’s contribution to the philosophy of science, particularly to scientific methodology, is 
very remarkable. Bryan Magee (1930- ) cited the mathematician and theoretical astronomer, 
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Sir Hermann Bondi (1919-2005) saying that “there is no more to science than its method, and 
there is no more to its method than Popper has said” (Magee 1973: 2). Yet when people know 
only in caricature what Popper’s philosophy of science is, claims like these seem incredible. 
To make the high praise of Popper by Magee or Bondi credible, you need to study the complex 
balance of ideas in Popper’s philosophy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider biographically and in terms of his intellectual context 
how Popper came to have his balanced perspective. I acknowledge that there already exist 
many published materials on the biography of Popper. Popper himself did an excellent survey 
of his life in Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (Popper 1974). The historian, 
Malachi Haim Hacohen (1957- ) provided a very comprehensive account of the life and times 
of Popper in his Karl Popper-The Formative Years 1902-1945 (Hacohen 2000). In addition, 
Jeremy Shearmur (1948- ), in his The Political Thought of Karl Popper (Shearmur 1996), gave 
a historical sketch of Popper while discussing the development of Popper’s political 
philosophy. Additionally, there is a series of expository and encyclopaedic materials on the 
life, times and works of Popper. Despite all this the present chapter aims to do something new. 
Based on discussions that I had with Shearmur when I was for some weeks at the Australian 
National University, I believe I may offer here some ways to correct some mistaken accounts 
of Popper’s biography. In particular I will elaborate on the features of an enduring liberal-
communitarianism in Popper that many commentators upon Popper do not see. The two 
important features are the ideas of freedom (including both individual and social aspects), and 
piecemeal social engineering. These are in my view no less essential to Popper’s philosophy 
of science than they are to Popper’s political philosophy. Events of Popper’s life together 
informed the development of his philosophy of science and his political philosophy. An 
essential balance in both can best be grasped by newly considering Popper’s biography and its 
context. 
Popper, philosopher of science 
Particularly after he moved from the Canterbury University College, Christchurch, New 
Zealand, to the London School of Economics in 1946 as the first Professor of Philosophy of 
Science and Logic, Popper’s primary claim to fame has concerned the philosophy of science. 
His lectures influenced Imre Lakatos (1922-1974), Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), and John 
Watkins (1924-1999) who number amongst the most prominent philosophers of science in the 
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twentieth century. His lectures and books continue to have prolific and significant influences 
on many contemporary philosophers. It is significant to admit that Popper perhaps continues 
to be the most widely recognized philosopher of science by actual scientists. The 
acknowledgements by two pre-eminent scientists, J.C. Eccles (1903-1997) and P.B. Medawar 
(1915-1987) (each a winner, respectively in 1963 and in 1960, of a Nobel Prize) on the 
influence that Popper had on their work helps ensure Popper’s standing as the twentieth century 
philosopher of science most influential upon science. 
To study the origins of Popper’s philosophy of science is partly to consider the key personal 
commitments and life experiences which influenced the development of Popper’s philosophy 
of critical rationalism. Yet, another aspect that is personal to Popper concerns how those 
intellectual experiences helped to shape the moral core of his thinking and helped him to 
balance two critical aspects of his philosophy: the individual and social aspects. Typically 
discussions of Popper’s critical rationalism consider chiefly the individual aspects. However, 
this thesis delves the more into Popper’s enduring communitarianism. With respect not only to 
Popper’s political philosophy but equally his philosophy of science, it is important to 
emphasise that a kind of balanced philosophy, a liberal-communitarian political philosophy 
that is constituted by both individual and social aspects, can be properly called Popperian. 
Popper’s life experiences, such as his encounters with Marxian socialism and the theories of 
psychology of his fellow Viennese Freud and Adler, as well as the intellectual influences on 
him, such as that of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and the 
members of the Vienna Circle, shaped both the individual and social aspects of his critical 
rationalism.  
Popper’s first published book Logik der Forschung (1934) which was later translated into 
English as The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) can be regarded as laying a foundation for 
a deductive method in science (by hypothesis and test) while The Open Society and its Enemies 
(1945) and The Poverty of Historicism (1957) are viewed as relevant only in the political realm. 
Yet it is the ideas in these various books in combination that make up Popper’s critical 
rationalism. According to the philosophy of critical rationalism, it is not only in politics but 
also in science that the individual and social elements are intertwined.  
Popper did centrally consider the individual, both in science and in the political sphere. In both 
science and politics the freedom that he lauded (and demanded that we protect) is that of the 
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individual. An element of the background for this is that Popper lived his formative years 
during what still seemed a heroic age in science. At the early stage of his intellectual life, it still 
seemed that significant discoveries in science proceeded out of the crucible of individual 
minds. This is why Popper is sometimes perceived as shaping his understanding of science 
accordingly, as though the scientific method is one that is wielded by the individual researcher, 
and science ends up being just what a good scientist does, times the number of scientists that 
there are. Such a caricature of Popper on scientific method possesses a grain of truth, but on 
the other hand Popper did recognise both earlier and more deeply than any of his 
contemporaries in philosophy of science the need to acknowledge social or communitarian 
aspects of the scientific process.  
In the next subsection, I consider the issue of Popper within what still seemed a heroic age of 
science. What was science getting to look like when Popper worked, and what were the effects 
of this circumstance upon his thinking?  My discussion of the heroic age of science will lead 
me to consider, via Popper’s contemporary Albert Einstein (1879-1955), also Isaac Newton 
(1642-1727) and the philosophy of Newtonian science that was developed by Kant, a 
philosophy that several intellectual developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries had served to challenge. The context not only for Popper’s work but very much also 
for contemporary logical positivist philosophers was to discover the way to step beyond Kant 
as philosopher of science. I will discuss why Popper disagreed with the logical positivists. The 
philosopher Wittgenstein also reflected this circumstance and I will consider his thinking also 
and why Popper disagreed with it. 
On the Heroic Age of Science 
The question to what extent science really is a heroic activity could be phrased as follows. Is 
science just what a scientist does, times the number of scientists that there are?  (Or rather, 
since some individuals do clearly stand out as superior in their effect, the question should rather 
be phrased: is science just the sum of what individual scientists do?)  Eponymy is a prize in 
science, partly because it suggests that what science is really, is just what the scientist does 
who discovers some eponymous law or effect or anomaly or reaction etc. Sometimes you get 
pairs, for example “Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction” or “Aharonov-Bohm effect”, but one 
scarcely gets more than pairs and most often one gets single solitary names. So, that creates the 
impression that science is what these individual scientists do. Then the impression is that 
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science is what a scientists does times the number of scientists that there are, except that some 
are more significant as scientists than others, so that it’s better to say more blandly that science 
is the sum of what individual scientists do. It is important but not at all obvious that this 
impression is false. 
Popper was born very much into times when this additive, individualistic view of science was 
the prevailing conception. (Notice that the nineteenth-century word ‘scientist’ reinforces this 
conception: the word suggests that scientists are to science somewhat as building blocks are to 
a building, you just add them up, or add their effects up, and you get science.) However, these 
heroic times for science were not going to last. There began to emerge a new stage of science 
which called for “total-system models adequately reflecting the intricate interconnectedness of 
multilevel, multi-goal organisations in which positive and negative feedback processes give 
rise to alternative decision modes”(Marney and Schmidt 1976:191) The change may partly be 
that the heroic image of science was reconsidered. Among others who reconsidered this image 
were historians and philosophers as well as sociologists of science. Eventually all those 
interpreters of science got to think that science has in fact always been a profoundly social 
activity. However, a further fact is that by the present day the social organisation of science has 
significantly changed.  Compared to when Einstein possessed his celebrity status, the social 
organisation of science has changed in ways that remove individuals from the limelight. There 
is not so much eponymous science projected, now. Publications in science generally have a 
great many authors. The times are past when scientific problems could be addressed by bench-
top laboratory work by an individual or by a small number of individual researchers. A lot of 
scientific activity is now very sizeable, in the sense of bringing together very large teams. 
Problems in science typically crumble under a many-sided kind of pressure that is exerted by 
a diverse and very large team of people. No-one expects that another Einstein is around the 
corner: even if science were to change or advance profoundly, people expect that that would 
not be traceable to the intellect of any one individual. 
According to the kind of view of the history of science that certainly was still official in 
Popper’s day, science proceeded into fully fledged existence already in a heroic condition. 
While it was not until the nineteenth century that the term ‘scientist’ had even been invented, 
and also not until the nineteenth century that people mostly used the term ‘science’ to designate 
the intellectual activity that had descended from natural philosophy, it is nevertheless common, 
with hindsight, by backwards projection of the word ‘science’, to trace the onset of up-and-
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running science to the seventeenth century, perhaps to Newton, perhaps to Galileo Galilei 
(1564-1642) or to some other figure or small set of figures such as Nicolas Copernicus (1473-
1543) or René Descartes (1596-1650). The usual pattern is to consider the first defining 
contributions eponymously -- ‘Copernicanism’, ‘Galileo’s law of falling bodies’, ‘Descartes’ 
analysis of the rainbow’, ‘Newton’s crucial experiment showing the composite nature of white 
light’. So, according to the usual view of the history of science, when science first got to be up-
and-running it was already in a heroic condition. For example, saying that Newton marks when 
science began to be an up-and-running concern is to imply that science at its get-go was 
significantly being created by the heroic individual researcher. 
There are reasons to question this official historiography, and to argue to the contrary that just 
as the emergence of science was gradual and inestimably social, so also its gathering operation 
remained dependent more upon interrelationship between individuals than upon the spectacular 
genius of certain great individuals working in some kind of significant solitude. The idea that 
science is a heroic activity nevertheless strongly maintained itself through to Popper’s time.  
That idea was amplified by how scientific achievement was made out eponymously -- “Boyle’s 
law”, “Cavendish’s experiment”, and “Darwinian theory”. 
It is possible to argue either way on the question how affected Popper was by the official 
understanding of science as a heroic activity. He did seem to present as his understanding of 
science a description of a method that could potentially be wielded by an individual researcher. 
Popper no doubt capitalised upon the idea that by wielding this method the individual scientist 
becomes a paragon of critical rationality professionally. It is no wonder that Popper is so 
beloved by scientists, given how far he flattered them in the image he created concerning their 
special worth (as individuals). On the other hand, Popper emphasises rather more than any 
other philosopher of science of the first half of the twentieth century the dependency of science 
upon community. 
Moreover, unlike many early positivists, Popper understood fully and completely that science 
is fallible. An expectation that prevailed for a long while after Newton is that truly scientific 
accomplishments would all be enduring. The idea was that past scientific accomplishments 
could be further accreted to, but they could not be corrected. The idea was that because past 
scientific accomplishments were scientifically established and lawful they were necessary and 
therefore forevermore certain. For example, in the way that Kant endeavoured to explain how 
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Newtonian physics is possible as knowledge, Kant urged that Newtonian physics is final so 
that although it can be further accreted to it cannot be either refuted or superseded. 
Popper may derive inspiration from Kant in important ways, but he of course completely 
dismissed Kant’s expectation that Newtonian science is certainly true or necessarily true. For, 
Popper lived in times that were newly aware of ways in which Newtonian science was false. 
The remarkable thing about eponymous science in Popper’s day was that it almost, in every 
element, overturned significant earlier reaches of science. Whether we consider the theory of 
blackbody radiation of Max Planck (1858-1947), the theory of the atom of Niels Bohr (1885-
1962), or Einstein’s theories of special and then general relativity, all of them eponymous 
contributions, they all represent correction of science that had gone before not accretion to 
former science. 
Einstein and L. Infeld (1898-1968) together wrote a popular book called The Evolution of 
Physics (1938). This book details the way in which the latter half of the nineteenth century was 
a watershed: the old expectation about steady accretion to science met at that time its undoing. 
The new theory of fields just would not satisfactorily resolve itself as an extension of the old 
theories of mechanics. Attempts to bring about unity between Newtonian mechanics and field 
theory were ill fated. Mechanical conceptions of electromagnetic fields were attempted, but 
they could not be made to work. (It is the velocity-dependence of the electric or magnetic forces 
that interferes with making a mechanical ether theory of electromagnetism work.)  As a result, 
from shortly before Einstein, the attempts to reduce electromagnetics to mechanism were 
flipped on their head. For a while, electromagnetic explanations were attempted of mechanical 
phenomena. Yet this programme (called the “electromagnetic world picture”) also could not 
be made to work. To unify physics you needed to shift its concepts, and not simply use the 
concepts that were already about. The change needed to be no mere ‘change within a 
framework’ but rather more considerably to some degree a ‘change of framework’. By the time 
of the writing of the Einstein and Infeld book, significant unifying accomplishments of this 
new kind had been made (by Einstein chiefly) and that had led to new successes in the 
theoretical comprehension of phenomena. Yet the effort was by no means complete and the 
emergence of the quantum theory struck Einstein as a new kind of impasse, an impasse that he 
hoped in vain he could get beyond, by some new shift in concepts. 
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Popper was struck by the readiness of leading scientists such as Einstein to ‘go back to the 
drawing boards’ and quest for better concepts or thus for a better theory. He took their example 
to indicate sharply the fallibility of science. Individual scientists such as Einstein were capable 
of originating veritable breakthroughs in a science. Popper derived enormous inspiration from 
Einstein as a scientist. Popper’s postulation of falsifiability as a criterion of science itself looks 
to what he believes that it is possible for an individual scientist to do. However, Popper 
regarded no such scientific breakthrough as revolutionary. Even the process of conjecture and 
refutation, of trial and error, is a piecemeal method, in Popper’s understanding of it.  That is a 
point of connection between Popper’s critical rationalist conception of science on the one hand 
and his critical rationalist conception of worthy political reform on the other hand. The heroic 
scientist does not dismantle the whole ship (to refer to a metaphor credited to Popper’s 
contemporary, the positivist Otto Neurath, 1882-1945) except perhaps one plank at a time 
replacing each plank as the effort goes on. Every step is as conservative as it is also bold, and 
that alone helps make it courageous. 
Popper’s outlook on science is no doubt significantly individualistic, but there is also a 
communitarian balance.  He emphasised the fallibility of every conjecture and the need for 
inter-subjective criticism and severe testing of every idea that is advanced. One aspect of 
Popper’s communitarianism is his insistence that scientific conjectures are all brought to the 
public domain where peer-review is allowed and is essential.  
Having lived near the end of what was a heroic age in science the significant effect of this on 
Popper’s understanding of the relationship between individual and community can be found in 
his reaction to the current dominant strand of thought of his time, namely logical empiricism. 
Contra logical empiricism Popper developed a different variant of the concept of the unity of 
method. The logical empiricists had argued that science follows one and the same universal 
method across all its sub-disciplines and alone is meaningful. Any other kind of inquiry is 
meaningless, the logical empiricists insisted. However, Popper held that even though 
falsification is a single specifiable method which can be taken as a criterial for the standing as 
a science of all the sciences it does not preclude other modes of inquiry. Popper even held that 
there can be non-scientific, metaphysical inquiry, that later emerges as a mode of scientific 
inquiry. We are not to condemn the metaphysical phase, for that might have been a necessary 
step to get a new science going (Popper 1959: 19, 38, 252., Bartley 1968: 47-54., Popper 1968: 
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93-98., Bartley 1968: 115, 118)1. This is an argument for plurality of methods; and it is social 
in character. 
Kant had in Popper’s view usefully attempted to steer a path between scepticism and 
dogmatism. That is the sort of thing that Popper wished to do. Kant had urged that the certainty 
and necessity of Newtonian science relates not to the way that the world is independently of 
us, but rather to us. Kant attempted to find a middle path between scepticism and dogmatism 
partly by distinguishing ‘phenomena’ from ‘noumena’ and limiting possible human knowledge 
to the former. If we orient ourselves to do science, Kant believed, that is, if we try to set out 
the laws of phenomena, then when we have succeeded at this we are bound to have come to 
think that the world follows the laws of motion and the law of gravitation. Newton did only 
what anyone would have to do, in order to succeed in creating science. Yet by Popper’s day 
Einstein and others had clearly shown this to be false. So Kant’s path between scepticism and 
dogmatism seemed to Popper much in need of revision. Popper was both more realist than 
Kant, dismissing the Kantian distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’ as a mistake, 
and also was more thoroughly fallibilist than Kant. Yet Popper at the same time tried to find a 
middle path between scepticism and dogmatism. 
From this perspective, the development of Popper’s philosophy of science can be said to have 
come as a reaction to some of the doctrines of science upheld at that time. Although his views 
radically challenge many strands of thought in his time, his philosophy is still an offshoot of 
some of them. 
I will argue next that Popper learned significant lessons from Kant concerning the need to 
consider science to be communitarian.  Popper does not let go of individualism entirely, but he 
nevertheless balances this with equal emphasis on the community.  Thus the image that science 
had begun within and still remained within a heroic age, while it was undoubtedly part of 
                                                 
1 Popper had in several of his writings stated that his philosophy of science was not averse to metaphysics. W. 
W. Bartley III has written that Imre Lakatos’s “Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” merely takes 
Popper’s own methodology of metaphysical research programmes and changes the name ‘metaphysical’ to 
‘scientific’.  Bartley’s citations of Popper in that essay defends the claim on Popper as a methodological pluralist. 
See William W. Barley, III, «Theories of Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics», in: Imre Lakatos and 
Alan Musgrave (editors), Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968), pp. 40-64; 
Popper’s reply: Karl Popper, «Remarks on the Problems of Demarcation and of Rationality», ibid., pp. 88-102; 
and Bartley’s reply to Popper: ibid., pp. 113-119. 
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Popper’s intellectual context and influenced his philosophy, by no means completely took over 
Popper’s thinking. 
Some influences of Kant 
Popper had high admiration for Kant. Popper in fact referred to himself as “an unorthodox 
Kantian” (Popper 1974: 82). A Kantian is one who accedes to the principles underlying Kant’s 
philosophy without significant revision. “Unorthodox” is of course a caveat on “without 
significant revision”. His philosophical interest in Kant led Popper to devote an entire chapter 
to Kant in Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Knowledge (1963: 33-59). This strong 
influence of Kant on Popper is discernible both in Popper’s idea of individual freedom and his 
socio-communitarian elements.  
Let us be clear that Kant models balance between individualism and communitarianism. In his 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant viewed the human individual as a 
rationally self-conscious being with “impure” freedom of choice. He considered that for an 
individual will to be regarded as “free”, it must be understood as capable of effecting causal 
power without being caused to do so. Kant himself averred, however, that the idea of a lawless 
free will, that is, a will acting without any causal structure, is unintelligible, and consequently 
unacceptable. Therefore, a free will must be a will that acts under laws that it gives to itself 
(Kant 1785, trans. Ellington 1993: 6). Popper found this Kantian idea of ethical individualism 
to be convincing; and it was a doctrine that Popper developed into his idea of individual 
freedom. So, in one aspect of his political philosophy Popper favoured individual freedom. His 
liberal political philosophy upheld the ultimate freedom, well-being and rights of the 
individual. This individualism that he derived from Kantian ethics permeates all aspects of his 
philosophy — from science to politics. As Anthony O’Hear acknowledges (O’Hear 1995:283), 
Kantian ethical individualism was a presupposition of Popper’s The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery. 
Yet Popper’s ethical individualism is balanced by Kant’s prioritisation of inter-subjectivity to 
subjectivity. Just as there is a socio-communitarian aspect of Popper’s philosophy, there is 
good reason to see this as coming from Kant. Kant’s categorical imperative denotes a moral 
unconditional requirement that all individuals must follow in all circumstances; it is justified 
as an end in itself. Kant (1785 trans. Ellington 1993: 30-43) offers three basic formulations of 
this categorical imperative:  
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1. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law without contradiction.  
2. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.  
3. [A]ct as if [you] were through [your] maxim always a legislating member in the 
universal kingdom of ends. 
Kant held these three formulations to be fully equivalent to one another. In which case, the 
three formulations of the categorical imperative are, in Kant’s view, one principle, namely the 
supreme principle of morality. 
Although the first and the second formulations do not seem broadly concerned with the idea of 
community of agents, the third formulation roundly delivers a socio-communitarian aspect of 
Kantian philosophy. The first formulation of the categorical imperative demands that the form 
of an individual’s action is one that could be universalised. This formulation at first blush seems 
merely formal and in that way devoid of any communitarian import. However, that would be a 
wrong interpretation, if the first formulation really is equivalent to the other two. The second 
formulation narrowly exhibits a communitarian tendency, as it is concerned with the idea of 
the self whose action is considered in relation to some specific other person. The third 
formulation is roundly communitarian. Its moral proposition entails that every individual action 
must be considered in such a way as it concerns the entire community of agents and what it 
would be for that community to harmonise.  
To consider the Kantian backdrop this way helps to make social element in Popper’s 
philosophy comprehensible. The argument can be made that, from Kant’s categorical 
imperative, Popper developed a social element for his liberal politics and in that way curtailed 
his individualism. It can then be averred that the central element of Popper’s critical rationalism 
entails both individual and social aspects. The individual aspect upholds the sanctity of human 
freedom. However, such a commitment to human freedom does not in any way entail a 
disregard to community values of social relation. More importantly, the essentials of both 
individual and social aspects of Popper’s philosophy are grounded in his epistemological and 
ethical arguments of the relational embeddedness of the ‘self’ with others. Elaborate discussion 
on this shall be made in subsequent chapters.  
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What is noteworthy in both elements of Popper’s idea of freedom is the fact that he was 
concerned about securing the community from possible hijack. He averred that we need to 
strengthen our democratic institutions. Although he advocated for modest (piecemeal) state 
interventionism, he warned against increasing the power of the state without being watchful. 
No change through which we would lose our freedom could truly advance us towards being 
more secure. State intervention should be limited to what is compatible with the protection of 
freedom. The consideration that people must be ever vigilant against possible suppression of 
human freedom is a plea for the piecemeal approach to social engineering. It is the basis for 
Popper’s opposition to utopian or holistic methods of social engineering. Only piecemeal 
measures are tractable and compatible with protection of human freedom. Utopian or holistic 
methods of social engineering would suppress freedom and ultimately render every human 
insecure (Popper 1945b: 122). 
The above assertion reveals that Popper balanced against his capability of audacity an anti-
revolutionary tendency. He portrayed a positive regard for security: his philosophy is liberal-
communitarian in how the two poles work together; his individual freedom with a necessity to 
make security secure, and the need to secure in society (the community) with the possibility 
for individual freedom. I have briefly argued in this subsection that these views of Popper’s 
follow the inspiration of Kant. 
Interaction with Wittgenstein 
A second intellectual influence upon Popper which to Popper seems instructive mostly by 
negative example is that of Wittgenstein’s philosophical consideration of language. 
Wittgenstein is notorious for having significantly changed his views, which establishes that we 
need to distinguish “the early Wittgenstein” from “the later Wittgenstein”. However, 
Wittgenstein very much concentrates upon the nature of language in both periods. Wittgenstein 
wants to know the nature of language, how language represents the world and the implications 
of its nature for logic and mathematics. 
In the Tractatus (published in German in 1921), the early Wittgenstein treated philosophy 
simply as an activity for clarification of thoughts through the analysis of language. The ideas 
are centred on a distinction between genuine (atomic) propositions that are meaningful and 
metaphysical propositions that are meaningless. Meaningful atomic propositions describe basic 
facts that can only be verified by experience. They describe ‘possible state of affairs’ or the 
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general state of things that can be verified in the world. However, propositions that do not 
correspond to an actual state of affairs or rather those that cannot be verified by experience 
remain pseudo-propositions; as such, they are meaningless or nonsensical (Wittgenstein 1921: 
18).  
The later Wittgenstein developed a case that no language is possible except that is public and 
shared.  In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein developed his “private-language 
argument” — namely, an argument that no truly private language is possible. Wittgenstein 
continued his examination of what it is for an utterance to be meaningful. In Wittgenstein’s 
view, meaning of language must look beyond the individual sensational understanding of the 
speaker. Language is meaningful in principle only when it is subject to public standards. 
Wittgenstein’s argument is against the possibility of a language in which “words … are to refer 
to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations …” (Wittgenstein 
1953: 243). Such a private language would, Wittgenstein argued, be neither genuinely a 
language nor in any true way meaningful. There could not be such a language. The truth 
function of language is essential to what language is. An utterance truly is linguistic only if it 
bears that kind of relationship to understanding that establishes the possibility of judging the 
correctness of its use, “so the use of a word stands in need of a justification which everybody 
understands” (Wittgenstein 1953: 261). 
It can be clearly interpreted that Wittgenstein’s rejection of a private language may imply that 
language is something which must be shared by both the speaker and the listener. A genuine 
and meaningful language entails an objective/subjective distinction with respect to what is 
communicated and how it is received. The objective/subjective distinction embraces the fact 
that there is no language outside the context of the other speakers of the same language (Pinto 
1999:80). For this reason, one can view Wittgenstein’s reproach of the very idea of a private 
language as an argument which embraces a social dimension to the meaning of language.  
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is of the view that agreement in judgement is 
a condition of possibility of linguistic norms. This seems to suggest a social account of 
language. This perceived social character of language in Wittgenstein denotes that the linguistic 
meaning of words by agreement by all members of a community would provide the basis upon 
which words make meaning within the community. In other words, meaningful language is 
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identified with how it is understood and accepted by public standards. Language is identified 
with how words can connote the same meaning to all members of the linguistic community.  
With Wittgenstein’s interpretative idea of the social character of language one is disposed to 
think that Popper also derived from Wittgenstein, much as he did from Kant, the 
communitarian element of his philosophy. Contrary to such expectation, Popper was very 
critical of Wittgenstein. Popper was contemptuous of Wittgenstein’s fascination for language 
and only language.  
First, Popper was critical of the notion that had emanated partly from Wittgenstein that 
verifiability as a criterion demarcates meaningful statements from meaningless ones. Such a 
view reduces all statements to ones which recount mere observation. Popper’s contention was 
that Wittgenstein’s verifiability criterion of demarcation was an inadequate description of 
scientific statements. To Popper, scientific statements cannot be reduced to some truth-function 
of propositions that somehow derives them from observation (Popper 1963: 39).   
Second, Popper considered that the issues and problems of philosophy should be viewed as 
broader than Wittgenstein had supposed. There is no way to reduce philosophy to mere 
philosophy of language. Popper even deprecated philosophy of language as narrow and mostly 
irrelevant2. Popper’s criticism of Wittgenstein appeared in the preface to the first English 
edition, (1959) of his The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Popper’s position was that it is a 
mistake to assume that there are no genuine philosophical problems, or rather to assume that if 
there are any, they are just problems of linguistic usage (Popper 1959:15). Popper’s response 
to this became widely known as ‘Wittgenstein’s poker3‘ when both philosophers met on 25th 
October, 1946 at a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge where Popper was invited 
to present a paper entitled “Are There Philosophical Problems” (Edmonds and Eidinow 2001: 
340). In the paper, Popper emphasised that there is more to philosophy than mere analysis of 
the meaning of words. One problem, according to Popper, concerned a traditional domain of 
                                                 
2 See Popper on “Language and Mind-Body Problem: A Restatement of Interactionism”. This is where Popper 
rejected the claim that the source of philosophical difficulties is to be found in the misuse of language. 
  
3 While a vehement argument ensued between Popper and Wittgenstein over whether there exist real philosophical 
problems (Popper), or they are merely linguistic puzzles (Wittgenstein), Wittgenstein was said to have used a 
fireplace poker to emphasize the point he was making. So when Wittgenstein challenged Popper to give an 
example of a moral rule, Popper’s answer was “not to threaten visiting speakers with pokers”. Wittgenstein, in his 
characteristic fashion, was noted to have dropped the hot poker immediately and stormed out of the hall. See 
Edmonds, David, and John Eidinow. Wittgenstein’s Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two 
Great Philosophers. London: Harper Collins, 2001.  
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philosophy in which many thinkers in Popper’s day remained interested. This was the problem 
of cosmology (Popper 1963: 40).  
It can be inferred from the above that the fascination and admiration that Popper had for Kant 
was not extended to Wittgenstein. One way to consider this difference would be in terms of 
which philosopher, Kant or Wittgenstein, is deeper. Kant did not limit philosophy to language 
because he considered conditions that there are even on that experience through which people 
could learn a language in the first place. Kant did not limit knowledge to experience, because 
Kant considered conditions on experience also to be knowable. The discussion of Kant’s that 
most directly ‘goes deeper’ than Wittgenstein’s no-private-language argument is in his third 
Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment). There, Kant argued that unless our apprehension 
of beauty possesses significant universality then we would not stand together in epistemic 
community; we could not communicate; we would not be a community of cognisers and so no 
one individual could in the first place count as a cogniser (Kant trans. Meredith 2007: 75).  This 
move of Kant’s completes his critical system. With the third Critique one is far better able to 
understand the other two Critiques and their relationship to one another.  In particular, looking 
to the first Critique, the Critique of Pure Reason, one is in able to understand the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories.  (The categories are concepts that must precede human possession 
of a language, for they inform even that reach of experience though which language could be 
learned in the first place). So, instead of an argument against the possibility of a private 
language, Kant argued for something deeper, since he concluded that inter-subjectivity 
precedes subjectivity even within the experience through which language is learned. The other 
equivalence is Kant’s view of the three formulations of the categorical imperative. This is one 
expression of Kant’s concluding that inter-subjectivity is deeply prior to subjectivity. The 
prioritisation of the community to the individual that Kant emphasised in his formulation of 
the categorical imperative is profound. The emphasis that Kant placed on ends in his third 
formulation is clearly a conception of community among moral agents. 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the social character of language might have served as a basis for 
the communitarian element in Popper’s philosophy. Peter Munz (1921-2006) who was a 
student of both Popper and Wittgenstein has analysed the Popper-Wittgenstein relationship in 
a way that brings to fore the inherent complementary ideas that transcend the Wittgenstein’s 
poker debacle. Munz posited that the meaning of a proposed scientific theory (a conjecture) in 
Popper cannot be known until it is testable. Such a view does require that a conjecture must 
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possess a tentative meaning, in such a sense that Wittgenstein supplied by his discussion of a 
speech community. According to Munz, Popper added needed recognition that if propositions 
are to have such meaning, then first the socio-political order in which they are put forward has 
to be free and open (Munz 2004: 37-43).  Munz’s view is that the social elements in 
Wittgenstein’s idea that meaningful propositions can be generated only within a social order 
and Popper’s insistence upon the importance that the social order be free and open complement 
one another. 
Popper’s critical dealings with Wittgenstein and his contemptuousness of Wittgenstein’s 
concentration upon language relate to Wittgenstein’s attempt to reduce philosophy to mere 
analysis of the meaning of words. I agree with Popper that such attempted reduction is facile. 
(Moreover, Kant would agree with Popper that such attempted reduction is facile.) The 
philosophical question of cosmology (concerning how it is that the universe is comprehensible 
rather than being incomprehensible) or more specific questions concerning space, time, and 
even whether there is a God, are not merely linguistic puzzles. There are metaphysical, 
epistemological and ethical concerns that give meaning to these issues. Indeed what makes 
these questions philosophical has everything to do with how they are not merely linguistic 
puzzles.  
Nevertheless, we may acknowledge, with Munz, that community is necessary for the very 
possibility of speech, and that this point (that is from Wittgenstein, but that also is more deeply 
developed by Kant) duly fosters the communitarian elements in Popper’s philosophy. The ‘self’ 
whose freedom is so important to Popper is inevitably relationally embedded.  This is a 
condition on there being meaningful conjecture or criticism in the first place. Not only the 
social aspect of Popper’s political philosophy but also even the individual aspect of his 
philosophy of science ultimately requires a speech community. It requires that the meaning of 
words follows from commonalities of judgment of thus from a linguistic norm that is to be 
identified within the linguistic community. 
Influence of the Vienna Circle 
The third and most significant philosophical tradition in Popper’s background that I will discuss 
is the one that exerts the most profound influence on the development of Popper’s philosophy 
of science. Yet from this tradition also, Popper learned mostly by its negative example. The 
tradition in question is that of the Vienna Circle, and goes by the name of “logical positivism” 
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or “logical empiricism”. The Vienna Circle progenitors were Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), 
Neurath, and Rudolph Carnap (1891-1970). A somewhat later exemplar of this movement was 
Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997). The verification principle as a criterion of meaningfulness 
importantly defines the Vienna Circle view, although Carnap later changed his orientation from 
‘verification’ to ‘degree of confirmation’, and Neurath later abandoned the conception that was 
normally presupposed, there can be basic or merely observational sentences or statements. The 
logical positivist movement gained worldwide reputation and helped to professionalise the 
study of philosophy of science with a series of conferences in the 1930s. The greatest influences 
on the Vienna Circle were on the one hand Principia Mathematica (1910) by Bertrand Russell 
(1872-1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and on the other hand Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). The logical empiricists used their “verificationist” 
criterion of meaningfulness chiefly to attack metaphysics as meaningless. They claimed that 
statements should be regarded as literally meaningless if they could not be confirmed or 
verified by evidence. Although they exempted the propositions of logic and mathematics from 
verification, they took metaphysical, religious and moral statements to be meaningless and 
nonsensical because they cannot be empirically verified by experience (Hempel 1950: 43).   
There are quite a number of reasons that caused the logical empiricists to arrive on the world 
philosophical stage when they did, just as there are quite a number of reasons why these logical 
positivists believed that their programme of logical reconstruction of science should be 
pursued. Of the various intellectual factors contributing to their emergence, the most 
fundamental one was that Kant’s philosophy had seemingly failed. 
Over a hundred years earlier, Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), had developed a 
conception of mathematical propositions as synthetic a priori. Kant extended his list of kinds 
of synthetic knowledge known a priori to include not only mathematical propositions but also 
other propositions that in Kant’s view help confer the lawfulness of the laws of Newtonian 
science. Kant’s doctrine of the synthetic a priori combines rationalism with empiricism. Only 
by combining rationalism with empiricism, Kant thought, could he explain the foundations not 
only of mathematics but also of physics. Kant argued that various “antinomies” of pure reason 
show up the limitation of knowledge to what can be experienced, while mathematics and 
physics show up the need to acknowledge also that knowledge is possible a priori of the form 
of experience. Euclidean geometry for example concerns the form of possible experience. But, 
Euclidean geometry can be known a priori. Similarly, physics depends, Kant believed, upon 
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the law of universal causality. That law can also be known a priori, as it concerns the form of 
experience, in Kant’s view.  
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry by a number of mathematicians in the beginning of 
twentieth century rebutted Kant. To make matters still worse for Kant, Einstein’s theory of 
relativity showed that physical space is, in fact, non-Euclidean. Through measurements, 
physicists revealed that the true geometry of space-time is not Euclidean but “semi-
Riemannian” (Catton 2004:66). These new propositions concerning space were, of course, not 
a priori since they were discovered through a process of empirical investigation. Consequently, 
thinkers such as Schlick took inspiration from Einstein to run with a new, very radical 
empiricism. Kant’s doctrine of synthetic a priori knowledge seemed discredited. The new 
theory of quantum mechanics also challenged Kant, since it challenged the very supposition of 
universal causality. At the same time, among philosophically oriented mathematicians and 
mathematically oriented philosophers, a more powerful logic had dawned, such as Kant had 
not known about. Russell and Whitehead seemed to have showed that using this logic one could 
explain mathematics as analytic, not as synthetic after all. Russell and Whitehead took 
themselves to have shown arithmetic truths like “6+8=14”, are not synthetic a priori but rather 
are analytic a priori truths. Concerning geometry, Einstein himself summarised the view in his 
essay “Geometry and Experience” (1921). A geometry, according to Einstein, is a “logical 
system” (Kant would not have said this). Insofar as a geometry is certain, it does not apply to 
experience. Insofar as it applies to experience, it is not certain. The only way for a geometry to 
say something about the world is for it to have testable consequences and so to be not certain 
(Einstein 1921:  238) 
The members of the Vienna Circle took inspiration from these considerations to define a new 
programme.  The programme was to be resolutely empiricist, and based on the new more 
powerful logic. They thought then that a new philosophy of science was needed, and that this 
new philosophy of science would actually enhance the qualities and the practical application 
of scientific knowledge. They wanted to develop a philosophy of mathematics that would 
establish logic as the foundation not only for mathematics but also for natural science.  
The empiricists had ample reasons to think (mistakenly as it turned out) that such a new 
programme could succeed. They also had ample reasons to want it to succeed. A rationalist 
philosophy during the nineteenth century seemed to have had unsavoury effects, not only in 
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philosophy (with extremes of seemingly idle metaphysics, such as the Absolute Idealism of 
some nineteenth-century rationalists) but also in the world of politics. The positivists were 
repulsed by political excesses such as Nazism that they blamed on mistaken, rationalist 
philosophy. They partly wanted empiricism to work for reasons of political reform. 
Consequently they adopted the new predicate logic, following Russell and Whitehead, and they 
devoted this new logic, much as Russell and Whitehead had done to mathematics, to the logical 
reconstruction of natural science. To them, natural science was essentially connected to 
observation and experience in a way that logical analysis of it should reveal. Their verification 
criterion of meaningfulness expressed what they expected that logical reconstruction will 
show4. Metaphysical statements had long seemed suspect (so that Kant for example had 
dismissed most metaphysical statements as illusory). This criterion of verification was a new 
way to respond to facile metaphysics: dismiss facile metaphysics as literally meaningless. Only 
sentences that are grounded in potential observation and experience are meaningful. In the 
words of a prodigy logical empiricist, Alfred J. Ayer (1910-1989), “a sentence had literal 
meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable” 
(Ayer 1952:5). So, since emotive, expressive, and figurative statements are neither analytic nor 
empirically verifiable, then they are to be categorised as meaningless. 
The early Wittgenstein’s “picture theory” of meaning strongly influenced the development of 
the verifiability criterion. Wittgenstein had argued in his Tractatus that if sentences are to be 
meaningful they must mirror reality in the same way as a picture does. Like his teacher, Russell, 
who claimed that for sentences to be meaningful they are to correspond to atomic facts, the 
early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus also emphasised that only statements about facts are 
meaningful (Wittgenstein 1921:12). 
Official logical empiricism is foundationalist and reductionist, looking to the meaningfulness 
of directly empirical and in that way synthetic of completely analytic sentences to explain all 
other meaning.  However, these doctrines of foundationalism and reductionism soon came 
                                                 
4 Logic is used in the reconstruction, but is itself not reconstructed. Does logic in that case represent an exception 
to empiricism, an exception to the verificationist stand-point? Carnap has a complicated answer to this question. 
In Carnap, different from other empiricists, logical reconstruction is meant to carry us away from an overly 
verificationist approach – it is meant to show how what ultimately is grounded in experience can link to experience 
obliquely and richly. (See Charles Morris. “Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism”, ed. P.A.Schilpp, The 
Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle and Chicago, Open Court, (1963): 87 – 98) 
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under critical scrutiny even of logical empiricists themselves.  Neurath, for example, later 
challenged the general principle of the verificationist criterion. Neurath rejected the 
foundationalism implicit in the theory of language of the early Wittgenstein and he attacked 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of the relationship between language and reality (Rockmore 2004: 113-
114). Neurath rejected the notion that reality must presuppose singular sentences. In his own 
words, “the fiction of an ideal language constructed of clean atomic sentences is just as 
metaphysical as the fiction of Laplace’s spirit” (Neurath 1932: 204). What Neurath proposed 
was the existence of an ‘actual’ language that would allow a number of possible analyses 
instead of a singular ideal language, in Wittgenstein’s terms, which permits not more than one 
possible analysis. So, under the influence of Neurath, Carnap abandoned foundationalism. He 
shared from Neurath the terminology of ‘protocol sentences’ but felt that Neurath’s protocol 
sentence raised too many practical complexities. Consequently, Carnap adopted a 
conventionalist and pragmatist approach toward protocol sentences. For Carnap, by then 
perhaps under the influence of Popper, any concrete physicalist statement could be used as 
protocol or basic sentence5 (Sarkar and Pfeifer 2006: 612). Also, following after the significant 
criticism of verificationism that Popper mounted, Carnap changed his position once again. He 
took the degree of confirmation for scientific propositions to be something already logically 
rich that connects these propositions to experience. Further discussion on Carnap’s later change 
of ideas from verificationism to the degree of confirmation occurs later in this chapter.  
When Wittgenstein changed his thesis of a “picture theory of meaning” to “language game 
theory”, he had himself become critical of logical empiricism. The later Wittgenstein disagreed 
with the verification principle, claiming that sentences do not have to picture reality. Thus, 
metaphysical sentences do not need to be meaningless according to the later Wittgenstein.  
Nazism flushed the logical positivists out of German speaking lands mostly into English 
speaking lands.  This did not end but rather changed the context for the mid-twentieth-century 
prominence in philosophy of logical empiricism.  Likewise Nazism flushed Popper initially to 
England and then to New Zealand.  He later returned permanently to England and never again 
                                                 
5 Popper mentioned that his discussion with Carnap and the subsequent reading of his unpublished manuscript by 
Carnap significantly influenced the development of Carnap’s idea on Protocol-Sentences. Carnap also was said 
to have acknowledged the views of Popper on procedure B which he regarded as the best available in the theory 
of knowledge. Meanwhile, Neurath held different philosophical views from Popper and never accepted the theory 
of falsification.  See Popper’s Unended Quest pp. 89-90 and also Conjectures and Refutations pp. 40-41, footnote 
5.   
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set himself up in German speaking lands.  If Hegelianism and Marxism had helped to produce 
political effects including the rise of nationalism and social radicalism in Europe, they also 
flushed some of their very significant intellectual critics to far parts of the world. The rise of 
Nazism and its impact on the European Jewish culture had significant consequences on the 
personal lives of the empiricists and logical empiricism as a movement as it also had on Popper. 
The confidence that Popper displayed to robustly challenge the verificationism of the 
empiricists is remarkable, especially since he was indebted to them and was somewhat 
similarly a refugee from the Nazis. The positivists were individuals who wielded significant 
influence during that period within the diverse fields of science and philosophy, from physics 
to mathematics, logic, psychology, social science and economics. It is remarkable how quickly 
and well Popper diagnosed that this influence by the logical positivists was usually not healthy 
for those fields.  Popper’s concerns with concepts such as the unity of method in science and 
with discovering a criterion for demarcating science from non-science are symptomatic both 
of his indebtedness to the logical positivists and of his wanting to separate himself from them. 
Popper shared with the positivists’ significant high regard for the new logic and for logical 
analysis.  
Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934) was published as a critique of logical 
empiricism. Central to this critique was his attack on verificationist criterion of meaning, that 
is to say, the verification principle. Popper replaced verification by falsification not so as to 
explain differently the meaning of sentences but rather just so as to demarcate science from 
pseudoscience. Popper believed that the logical empiricists were mistaken when they conflated 
two quite different philosophical problems, the problem of meaning and the problem of 
demarcation. They had used their verification principle as a solution to both the problem of 
meaning and the problem of demarcation. For Popper, falsificationism is the thesis that a 
hypothesis can be termed scientific only if it has the potential to be refuted. A theory is 
scientific only if it is falsifiable. Popper thus used falsification as a criterion for demarcation to 
distinguish the true scientific attitude from the unscientific. The true scientific attitude, 
according to Popper, is witnessed in Newton’s theory of gravitation as well as Einstein’s 
theories of relativity (so that a contention does not need to be right to be scientific). The true 
scientific attitude differs from that by Marxists toward their Marxism, or by Freudians toward 
their psychoanalysis, or by Adler towards his individual psychology, for by their attitude these 
various thinkers render what they espouse immune from potential falsification.  They are 
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dogmatic rather than critical, so what they offer is mere pseudo-science. But that is not to say 
that it is meaningless, in Popper’s opinion. 
On the demarcation of science 
Marx, Freud and Adler, Popper came to think had insulated their theories in such a way that 
made them answerable only to verification or confirmation. Einstein’s theory, on the other 
hand, has testable elements in it so that it stands at risk of refutation. Popper contended that 
you sometimes cannot consider strictly in terms of logic alone whether a way of thinking is 
falsifiable. Marx’s theory is rendered unfalsifiable by the methodology of its adherents, not by 
its very logic, Popper averred. To grasp a better way to demarcate science from pseudo-science 
or science from metaphysics is at the same time to spot a limit of logical analysis. 
In Popper’s view, a pseudoscientific method may well appeal to observation and 
experimentation. For instance, astrology claims to possess overwhelming empirical evidence 
in its favour based on observation. Astrology claims to be about the empirical world. But 
because there is no potential to use experience to refute astrology, astrology fails to adhere to 
acceptable scientific standards (Popper 1963: 44).  That is what makes astrology a pseudo-
science. 
Popper contended that Marx’s theory of history had already been falsified by events of history6. 
Yet for all of that, Marxists showed no inclination to give the theory up. For them it was an 
unfalsifiable theory, Popper argued. So the Marxists were not after all scientists, nor is Marxism 
a science.  By contrast, Popper claimed that both Freud’s psychoanalysis and Adler’s individual 
psychology could not possibly be refuted. The problem was not in the practitioners so much as 
in the theories themselves. For logical reasons to do with what these theories state, the stream 
of observations or confirmations that were supposed to verify these theories had no bearing on 
whether these theories are scientific.  For, experience had never possessed the potential to 
falsify these theories (Popper 1963: 34). He illustrated this by two different examples of human 
behaviour: “that of a man who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it; 
and that of a man who sacrifices his life in an attempt to save the child” (Popper 1963: 34). 
From Freud’s perspective, the first man would have suffered from psychological repression, 
probably originating from an Oedipus complex whereas the second had attained sublimation. 
                                                 
6 I shall comprehensively discuss Popper on Marx in Chapter 5 of this dissertation on how Popper’s refutation of 
Marxian historicism led to the development of Popper’s political thought. 
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From Adler’s perspective, the first and second man suffered from feelings of inferiority and 
had to prove himself which drove him to commit the crime or, in the second case, rescue the 
child (Popper 1963: 34).  
Popper was not able to find any counter-examples of human behaviour that would not be 
explained in the terms of Adler’s or Freud’s theory. So Popper argued that observation always 
confirms or agrees with the theory, in both Freud and Adler.  This fact, rather than being their 
strength, was actually their weakness, Popper argued. In contrast, Popper made reference to 
Einstein’s gravitational theory which Popper claimed predicted that “light must be attracted by 
heavy bodies (such as the sun); precisely as material bodies were attracted” (Popper 1963: 36) 
Following from this, stars closer to the sun would appear to have moved a small distance away 
from the sun, and away from each other. This prediction was particularly striking to Popper 
because it involved considerable risk. The brightness of the sun prevented this effect from being 
observed under normal circumstances, so photographs had to be taken during an eclipse and 
compared to photographs taken at night. Popper stated, “If observation shows that the predicted 
effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted” (Popper 1963: 36). To Popper, the 
scientific status of a theory depends on its falsifiability, refutability, or testability. 
Summary: the context of Popper as philosopher of science 
Many scholars have wondered why Popper claimed in his Unended Quest: An Intellectual 
Autobiography that “logical positivism is dead... [and] I fear that I must admit responsibility” 
(Popper 1974: 88), when clearly logical empiricism exerted a considerable influence on the 
development of his philosophy of science. It is essential to point out that Popper’s claim to 
have killed logical empiricism was not an indication of rancour and disaffection between him 
and the empiricists; members of the Vienna Circle were also not unreceptive to falsification 
theory. Popper acknowledged the support of members of the Vienna Circle, particularly Carnap 
and Herbert Feigl (1902- 1988), whose several discussions with him helped in the formation 
and clarifications of thought on falsification and demarcation. Although some logical 
empiricists, such as Neurath, shunned the theory of falsification after the publication of The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, many others, such as Carnap, embraced the theory of falsification 
as an extension of the idea of verification rather than a competitor idea. After all, even though 
Popper criticised the verification principle, his subsequent replacement of it with falsification 
theory is clearly in line with an idea that many positivists held, that knowledge can advance 
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only through criticism. “Hypothetico-deductive empiricism” was the common possession of 
Popper and many of the positivists. The continued discussions Popper had with Carnap in their 
published correspondences on important issues in philosophy of science such as corroboration 
versus confirmation and in social philosophy such as on the status as pseudo-science of 
Marxism clearly indicates that there was mutual respect between them (Sheamur and Norris 
2008b: 85-108)7. Yet I have argued above that Popper learned mostly by negative example 
from the logical empiricists. Popper resembled them in taking as his starting point the need to 
update and suitably revise the philosophy of science of Kant. However, Popper did not suppose 
as the positivists did that the chief issue to address was that of meaning. In limiting philosophy 
to logical analysis, the positivists left themselves no room to concede the enduring significance 
of some very large problems of philosophy. An illustration of their mistake is Wittgenstein’s 
exploring not half as deeply as Kant the reasons to prioritise inter-subjectivity to subjectivity. 
I have argued that Popper does recognise deep reasons to prioritise inter-subjectivity to 
subjectivity, or at least to balance the competing poles of individualism and communitarianism. 
This balance in Popper is a reflection of Popper’s enduring respect for Kant. 
Popper: Personal, Social and Political influences 
Beyond all of the above, this section explores several important personal, social and political 
influences on the development of Popper’s philosophy. Hacohen’s independent biography of 
Popper’s formative years from 1902 to 1945 remains the most comprehensive account of this 
development outside of Popper’s own Unended Quest.  I will consider in relation to Popper’s 
own account four significant factors that can be discerned as having tremendous impacts on 
the life of Popper and the development of his philosophy. The four revolve around the social 
and political turmoil in Austria in the early twentieth century. I look to them for further 
understanding of the balance in Popper between individualistic and communitarian tendencies. 
First, in 1919 Popper became attracted to Marxism (Hacohen 2001:23). He declared in his 
Unended Quest that at that youthful time he was a communist and had even joined the 
communist party (Popper 1974: 34). However, the death that occurred of young Marxian 
                                                 
7 There is an array of correspondences that transpired between Popper and Carnap. This reveals the continued 
contact with members of the Vienna Circle. It also reveals a number of discussions ranging from the problem of 
probability theory to the theory of confirmation, to dialectics, to social and political philosophy. Issues of personal 
concerns on health and welfare were not left out. In his later writings Carnap recognized both the problems with 
the classic verification principle and Popper’s falsification principle and proposed a more liberal criterion of 
confirmability. See Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris (eds.) After the Open Society, 2008.   
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protesters that the police opened fire on after a demonstration changed Popper’s disposition to 
Marxism. Popper was negatively impressed by the willingness of some adherents of Marxism 
to put their own or others’ lives at risk for the sake of promoting an ideology. Popper felt some 
personal responsibility for the incident that brought about the death of these innocent young 
protesters, because he had endorsed the idea of revolution, as part of the struggle to overcome 
capitalism and hasten the coming of socialism. He was dismayed by the attitude of the 
communist to “arrogate to oneself a kind of knowledge which made it a duty to risk the lives 
of other people for an uncritically accepted dogma” (Popper 1974: 34). Popper thought the 
underlying reason he joined one of the communist groups seeking political and economic 
change was because of the promise of a better world. Popper soon discovered that these 
underlying reasons were nothing more than propaganda. He became disillusioned by what he 
saw to be the pseudo-scientific historical-materialism of Marx. He became appalled by the 
facile confidence of Marxists’ promise of a better world, which communism hopes to realise, 
and he regarded this promise as a pipe dream that was not realisable. His thinking led him to 
believe that those promises served sharply only to aid individuals seeking political power. In 
Popper’s view, only piecemeal changes to the society make better reform8.  
One of the themes that Popper rejected in Marxism is its revolutionary stands. Popper was an 
anti-revolutionary whose philosophy of piecemeal reform represents a form of conservatism. 
He did not advocate a radical change but a disposition to changing one thing at a time. Although 
Popper was averse to Marxism because of its historicism, his value system accentuates an 
ideology which promotes both the freedom of the individual, as well as about public policy and 
the alleviation of suffering rather than promotion of happiness. This heralds his idea of negative 
utilitarianism: a public policy which aims to alleviate suffering for the greatest number of 
people than promoting happiness. This idea of negative utilitarianism exhibits an element of 
the individual and the social. With negative utilitarianism, Popper’s welfarism is established 
which is to be implemented through state’s limited interventionism. The aim is for the state to 
take care of the wellbeing of the individual and the social public. Popper’s welfarism aims at 
ameliorating extreme inequality, which is what the social engineer should address.  It is upon 
                                                 
8 The discussion on piecemeal social change as alternative to large-scale planning that characterises Marxism will 
become the major crux of Popper’s critique of historicism and holism. A comprehensive discussion of Popper’s 
arguments against Marxism shall come in chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. 
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these ideas that Popper’s concept of social liberalism is built, or what I call Popper’s enduring 
liberal-communitarianism. 
Second, the period after 1928 when Popper got his PhD under the supervision of Karl Buhler, 
marked the beginning of his intellectual career. Although he started as a teacher of mathematics 
in a secondary school in Vienna the ideas on the criteria of demarcation between science and 
pseudoscience preoccupied his mind. He was concerned about how philosophers of science 
had continued to use the inductive method as the criterion of demarcation. In Popper’s view, 
testability or falsifiability was the better criterion of demarcation (Popper 1974:79)9. The ideas 
of falsification which Popper anchored on the theory of hypothetico-deductive methodology 
are expressed to establish the basic form of scientific method. To Popper, “the method of 
science is not inductive” (Popper 1974: 81). Although Popper’s idea of falsification is 
expressed as a single methodology of scientific method, its inherent themes of fallibilism and 
inter-subjective criticism are founded on the dependency of science on the social community. 
Third, the aftermath of the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany and the apparent rise of 
totalitarianism in Europe which led to the dispersing of many intellectuals including Popper 
and members of the Vienna Circle had both various negative and various positive effects on 
the development of Popper’s philosophy. Popper was no doubt supremely well suited to the 
intellectualism and critical scholarly engagement that there had been in Vienna, to the extent 
that its being decimated must have been a great blow to him. Many of the members of the 
Vienna Circle went into exile in the USA while Popper also migrated first to England and later 
to New Zealand where he got a job at Canterbury College of the then University of New 
Zealand, from which he later returned to England. These dislocations could not have been a 
help to Popper, except perhaps by focusing personal rage into the “war effort” work The Open 
Society and Its Enemies on which Popper was then working.  A positive effect for Popper of 
all these changes is that in the British influenced part of the English-speaking philosophical 
world they allowed the dominant scientific-philosophical tradition to shift from verification to 
falsification. In the United States, logical positivism continued as the more dominant 
philosophy of science. However because Popper’s ideas of science flourished ahead of logical 
positivism in countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia after his 
                                                 
9 Discussion on Popper’s argument on falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation will be examined in chapter 2 
of this dissertation. 
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migration from Austria, especially after and the 1959 publication of the English translation of 
the Logic of Scientific Discovery, one could count his forced migration from Austria a 
significant benefit to Popper. Popper’s ideas consequently supplanted those of the logical 
positivists in many places to become the modern philosophy of science. Popper took on 
standing as paragon of the advancement of the logic and methodology of science. Just as there 
is a balance of individualistic and social tendencies in Popper’s understanding of science, 
Popper’s own idea of falsificationism as a theory of science was made possible not only by the 
singular or individual effort of Popper but significantly as outcome of his critical engagements 
with others, especially with the logical positivists.     
Fourth, Popper’s migration to Canterbury University College, Christchurch, New Zealand in 
response to an advertisement for a teaching position in philosophy in 1937 and becoming the 
only philosophy lecturer at the university at the time also remains one of the most remarkable 
periods in his intellectual development. It was remarkable because in the midst of a hostile 
attitude to research, since the focus of the University then was teaching, Popper was still able 
to make time for his personal research and development. So, in New Zealand, Popper refocused 
his philosophical writings onto social and political philosophy. The reality of suffering, 
exploitation, war and totalitarianism that necessitated his move from Austria to New Zealand 
inspired this shift in interest towards the philosophy of the social sciences. His interest was 
motivated by the rise of totalitarianism in Europe. He made inquiries into the methodology of 
the social sciences. These inquiries resulted into his writings of The Open Society and Its 
Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism. 
Of great importance about Popper’s venture into social and political philosophy was his attempt 
to establish an ideology for human freedom, which he realised was not present in the totalitarian 
society of Europe at the time. In establishing an ideology for human freedom Popper was 
motivated by the Kantian ideologies of ethical individualism as well as the three formulations 
of categorical imperative. Popper also acted as a re-creator of the Kant’s essay “What is 
Enlightenment”, stepping forward within the troubled times he lived in much as a figure such 
as Kant would have recommended. This undoubtedly meant that, with Kant, Popper ever 
balanced individualism with communitarianism in his thinking. Also, Popper was inadvertently 
influenced by Wittgenstein’s idea of speech community. These ideas generated in Popper the 
need to establish a liberal ideology that would recognise the primacy of individual freedom, 
while at the same time it does not require a disregard for the value of community. This forms 
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the basis of the individual and social aspects of Popper’s political philosophy. It establishes a 
balanced philosophy of Popper’s liberal-communitarianism.    
It is clear that the underlying balanced philosophy of the individual in relation to the social that 
is both at times explicit and ever implicit in Popper’s philosophy are thoroughly evident both 
in the development of his philosophy of critical rationalism and in the significant impacts of 
his life experiences. For what it is worth, it can be argued that from the experiences of his life 
Popper not only developed a penchant for critical attitude but also an ever deepened 
compassion for others. He was critical of the pre-existing scientific methodology of verification 
and replaced it anew with falsification. He also became critical of Marxism which he averred 
motivated the rise of collective totalitarianism in the political society in Europe at the time. He 
termed Marxism a historicist/holist ideology, and instead introduced an anti-revolutionary cum 
conservative ideology in the form of piecemeal social engineering. He held Marxism to have 
encouraged a collectivist philosophy which had no respect for the sanctity of human freedom. 
Popper therefore made inquiries into the methodology of the social sciences in order to 
accentuate a liberal philosophy that recognises the primacy of individual freedom and that gives 
respect to the nature of human social character. Yet through it all Popper maintained some of 
the socialist attitudes of his youth. This constancy, this way of being conservative of values 
even in acts of intellectual boldness, is essential to Popper’s courageousness in philosophy and 
in the world. 
Apart from establishing a coherent balanced philosophy of the individual and the social in his 
critical rationalism, the life of Popper could also be said to have been an exemplar of his 
philosophy. His migration from Austria to England, later to New Zealand and back to England 
in a succession of scholastic progress and improvement is a living example of his article, All 
Life is Problem Solving (1999). The very basis of the idea in the article is on the apparent 
progress of scientific knowledge, and how we are served to understand how the universe seems 
to improve over time.  Such improvement is the life that Popper lived in a succession 
proceeding by conjecture and refutation as a means of progress.  
As a way of concluding this chapter, it is important for me to mention that what I say was an 
enduring liberal-communitarian directedness in Popper would read as novel to many scholars.  
Most Popper scholars have contended that what is prevalent in Popper’s critical rationalism is 
his idea of individualism. However, for reasons that I have laid down in my arguments on 
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Popper’s liberal-communitarianism it seems clear that Popper’s critical rationalism consist of 
both individual and social aspects.  I will go on to argue in the next chapter that Popper’s 
official anti-inductivism is but one pole, for which another pole in his philosophy provides 
needed balance.  Those further arguments will also seem controversial, but they are true to the 
intellectual in question, who successfully lived a richly complicated life. 
Let me also remark that a great number of misunderstandings revolve around reactions to the 
personality of Popper. Popper lived for his work but many people judged him egoistical and 
arrogant. Much as Socrates’ method of dialectics made Socrates both significant friends and 
significant foes, Popper’s manner of posing philosophical puzzles to his colleagues and 
attempting falsifying their responses was not always well received. His intention was never to 
belittle the philosophical positions of others but to stimulate arguments. He regarded 
philosophy as problem solving. He was frequently noted to always be grappling with one 
philosophical problem or another at any point in time. His fallibilism encompassed both his 
work and personal life as he constantly reviewed his drafts and questioned the rationalisation 
of certain actions. Although he was not very interested in meta-ethical issues, he was concerned 
about public policy issues (Sheamur 2011: n/p). More fundamentally, he was concerned about 
how to enthrone the essential liberal-communitarian aspects of his political philosophy that 
would enhance the openness of society. His thought was that an open society could be achieved 
by the critical method that characterises the method of science.  
What constitutes the philosophy of science in Popper will therefore be examined in the next 
chapters (Chapters 2 and 3). Chapter 2 focuses on the central thesis of Popper’s critical 
rationalism, and addresses the central themes of fallibilism and inter-subjective criticism. Here 
I will advance the surprising claim that Popper was himself in the end an inductivist. Chapter 
3 examines the notion of the unity of method in science.  Here I will advance the surprising 
claim that Popper chiefly accentuates pluralism about scientific method. 
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Chapter Two: Popper’s Critical Rationalism: Fallibilism and 
Inter-Subjective Criticism10 
 Of course, I may be mistaken; but I think that I have solved a major 
philosophical problem: the problem of induction. ... This solution has been 
extremely fruitful, and it has enabled me to solve a good number of other 
philosophical problems. 
                   (Popper 1972: 1) 
Introduction 
I have shown in the previous chapter on the intellectual background to Popper’s philosophy 
that his philosophy of science included a balance between individualist and communitarian 
aspects, and that his philosophy of science was developed to counter logical empiricism. 
Popper rightly recognised that logical empiricism conflated the problem of meaning and the 
problem of demarcation, and that logical empiricists were mistaken to use the verificationist 
principle at all, let alone to use that principle as their attempted solution to both these problems. 
Popper remarked that for consistency the charge of empirical meaninglessness would need to 
be made against logical empiricism itself, yet that irony or paradox for logical empiricism 
simply showed that the logical empiricists were pursuing a misguided line of thought (Popper 
1959: 250-252). Popper refused to recognise their “problem of meaning” either as crucial for 
understanding science or as liable to be answered in any single self-consistent way. 
Popper sought to take philosophy of science in a different direction for two principal reasons: 
(a) The logical empiricists, such as A. J. Ayer and the early Rudolf Carnap, were 
foundationalists: for the support of science or rational justification, they required there to be an 
empirical foundation. Foundationalism is the view which sees every proposition as requiring 
empirical justification to support it. Ayer (1936), for instance, in his Language, Truth and 
Logic, insisted that sentences need to be supported by evidence. Ayer proposed that sentences 
gain their meaning by how they can be verified, but they nevertheless cannot be conclusively 
verified. The logical empiricists themselves waivered concerning their commitment to 
foundationalism. Carnap (1947) under the influence of Neurath, later abandoned that stance, 
even rejecting verificationism, in favour of the concept of the degree of confirmation in severe 
                                                 
10 Material covered in this chapter has previously been published in Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. “Popper’s Critical 
Rationalism: Corroboration versus Confirmation”. Philosophy Study 3.6. June (2013): 506-516.   
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testing of scientific hypothesis. Popper by contrast was consistent in his criticism of 
foundationalism, and would not agree even with Carnap’s eventual view, since it traded in what 
to Popper was the doubtful idea of evidence for a theory. 
(b) The logical empiricists were verificationists, who wielded the mistaken positive idea of 
verification as their way of demarcating science from non-science. That is, they sought to 
explain the difference between science and non-science by reference to the idea that science 
alone is meaningful, that meaningfulness consists in verifiability, and that science is steadfast 
in its orientation to empirical verification. Popper by contrast emphasised the negative idea of 
testing, or thus the idea of the susceptibility to falsification as hallmark of scientific thinking. 
Popper systematically disputed both the very idea of foundations for science and also the very 
reality of empirical justification. In Popper’s view, without empirical justification, 
verificationism falls. In place of foundationalism, Popper fully endorsed the philosophical 
position known as fallibilism according to which all our knowledge of the world is provisional 
and amenable to corrections. Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery had introduced the 
notion of ‘basic statements’ that for the time being are treated as empirically known. 
Metaphorically this is where there is traction logically for experience for shaping potential 
criticisms of a theory. However, all such ‘basic statements’ are themselves fallible, since they 
will not fail to incorporate some theoretical meaning. That is to say, given sufficient change in 
thinking, for example the change that is wrought by a shift of concepts, what had been admitted 
as ‘basic statements’ would seem neither any longer so, nor potentially any longer acceptable 
as true.  Popper (1959:111) writes: 
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about 
it. Science does not rest upon rock bottom. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any 
natural or ‘given’ base: and when we cease our attempts to drive our piles 
into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We 
simply stop when we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being. 
A good example of the kind of change that Popper was here allowing for is that that Einstein 
wrought when Einstein changed some of the concepts of physics. For example, general 
relativity theory absorbs into the concept of ‘mass’ the very concept of ‘weight’11. Consider 
                                                 
11 I learned this from personal discussion with Philip Catton. 
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some Newtonians, who are simply standing on their feet. They feel pressure on their feet. A 
basic statement for them might be that the pressure onto the ground from their weight is 
balanced by an automatic upward pressure from the ground onto their feet. The balance of 
pressures, they say, is why, despite their weight, they are not accelerating downwards. That is 
how they conceive the pressure that they are feeling on their feet. Yet Einsteinians have 
significantly different concepts for understanding even such basic seeming experience. 
Einsteinians deny that the pressure is from gravity pulling downward. Einsteinians say that 
there is just the pressure upward. This unbalanced pressure is accelerating the Newtonians, the 
Einsteinians would say. The Newtonians are being accelerated away from the straightest 
trajectories that they might otherwise be following. This is the Einsteinian conception.  Gravity 
is inertia, requiring that space-time be curved or non-Euclidean. (The geometry of space-time 
is “semi-Riemannian”.) That means that the Einsteinian drives the piles deeper into the swamp. 
Their basic statement concerning what they feel in their feet is different. Their basic statement 
concerns not a balanced pressure, but an unbalanced one. 
Popper (1959: 37) also rejected the programme of demarcating science from non-science with 
the system of meaningfulness pseudo-statements. Popper held that verificationism is not even 
coherent as a doctrine of meaningfulness. In place of meaningfulness as a demarcation 
criterion, he emphasised merely the critical method; in place of verification, he emphasised 
falsification or criticism. 
In this chapter, I examine Popper’s critical rationalist perspective on science and I emphasise 
Popper’s fallibilism and Popper’s own stress on inter-subjective criticism. I examine how 
Popper developed a hypothetico-deductive account of scientific method into a theory of 
corroboration. Popper’s idea of corroboration tracks severity of testing: the severer the test that 
a theory manages to pass, the more highly ‘corroborated’ by its passing that test the theory is. 
I will argue that without a kind of inductivism, Popper could not have his idea of severity of 
testing. (But a flip-side of this is that by stepping back from avowedly inductivist empirical 
methods like that of the Bayesians you can see an analysis of severity of tests.) I will show that 
in Popper’s way of balancing individualism and communitarianism, Popper did make sufficient 
room for the needed inductivism. I will also discuss how some richer methodological 
conceptions (such as the bootstrap methodology of Clark Glymour (1942- ) or such as Bayesian 
methodology for example as that is worked up by Wesley Salmon (1925-2001) into a theory 
of ampliative inference) to which the deductivist Popper has every reason to be open can further 
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ground Popper’s idea of severity of testing. Thus I work hard to save Popper’s idea of 
corroboration of theories from criticisms that trade on the idea that in its anti-justificationism 
or strict anti-inductivism the concept of corroboration collapses in on itself.  Yet by defending 
as I do the concepts of severe testing and of corroborations, I draw into doubt whether Popper 
can after all reasonably discard the notion of confirmation.  He does not quite get away with 
his official anti-justificationism, or with his official anti-inductivism, I will argue. 
‘Corroboration’ is a workable concept that is utterly important for the understanding of science. 
But over against Popper himself, ‘corroboration’ is a fallible kind of confirmation in the view 
of it that I will defend. However, I do not need my partly inductivist or justificationist defence 
of critical rationalism to succeed, if there is a consistent anti-inductivist or anti-justificationist 
defence of critical rationalism that succeeds. David Miller (1942- ) has attempted such a 
defence that I will briefly discuss (much as Alan Musgrave (1940- ) independently has done). 
If such defences of critical rationalism succeed there remains the question which defence is 
better, mine for respecting a kind of balance in Popper’s philosophy, or theirs for respecting 
Popper’s strident anti-justificationism. Yet, that issue is not crucial to this thesis. The main 
point for this thesis is that critical rationalism has proved defensible. 
In my Chapter 3 I will further explore the idea that by stepping back from various 
methodologies you can make them all out as illuminating severity of testing.  Corroboration in 
that case gains generality as a core methodological concept. By being methodologically 
pluralist, you can better acknowledge the strengths of Popper’s critical rationalism. In Chapter 
3 I will argue non-standardly, that Popper, despite his official doctrine of the unity of method 
or rather in support of it, was himself methodologically pluralist. 
In my Chapters 4 to 10, Popper’s general concepts of hypothetico-deductive methodology, 
severe testing and corroboration of hypothesis, are shown to carry over into Popper’s 
distinctive views about social science, particularly as science relates to politics. The critical 
rationalist perspective on science presents an officially non-justificationist theory of scientific 
knowledge. I defend the emphasis on criticism but not quite the non-justificationism of 
Popper’s official perspective. Moreover, I make out how Popper himself created room (whether 
he admits this or not) for the necessary (seriously stripped-down) elements of justificationism. 
Popper extended his project of critical rationalism to all areas of thought. In each field, the 
central task of critical rationalism is to supplant overtly justificatory methods with critical ones. 
This explains Popper’s application of his (largely) non-justificationist perspective to new fields 
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in his The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies. Roughly, Popper 
applied his critical methodology for the physical sciences also to the social sciences. Both The 
Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies defend the open society on the 
grounds that only open societies preserve reason, that is, criticism, and as a consequence, only 
open societies can be civilised and can be saved from the barbaric consequences of fascism or 
communism.  
In examining the fallibilist and anti-foundationalist position of Popper on science, the present 
chapter extracts from the balance between individualism and communitarianism in Popper a 
set of reasons not only to turn as Popper did from the positive idea of verification to the negative 
idea of falsification but also to acknowledge officially, as Popper did not acknowledge 
officially, how the needed account of corroboration is not wholly anti-inductivist after all. 
Popper believed he had turned his back on induction. He believed he had ‘solved’ the ‘problem 
of induction’ by providing a non-inductive account of corroboration. I support Popper most of 
the way but not quite all the way with respect to claims like these. Popper used the term 
‘corroboration’ rather than ‘confirmation’ since he believed that the latter term is too closely 
allied to the notion of the inductive or probabilistic support that a theory can receive from 
evidence. Salmon’s (1967) “concept of confirming evidence” and Glymour’s (1980) “bootstrap 
conception of evidence for theory” both imply on the contrary that corroborated theories have 
(by the very fact of their having been corroborated) been confirmed by evidence or warranted 
by evidence so that the corroboration has lifted their degree of warrant or probability. Whereas 
Miller restates and defends Popper’s critical rationalism over against Salmon and Glymour, I 
aim for an accommodation of Popper to Salmon and Glymour, that I argue still maintains the 
intended core of critical rationalism. Miller’s repudiation both of ampliative inferences and all 
conceptions of confirming evidence perhaps better expresses hard-line critical rationalism. 
However, I do not think that it allows adequate recognition of what I call balance in Popper. 
That is why I attempt to reposition Popper’s hypothetico-deductive corroboration in order to 
acknowledge a certain unavoidable “whiff” of inductivism in that concept12.  
                                                 
12 Newton-Smith had drawn up arguments against Popper to reveal that there is “a full-blown storm” of induction 
in Popper’s conception of science contrary to what Popper himself acknowledged as a “whiff of inductivism here”. 
Newton-Smith’s argument is that since Popper himself concludes that there is an agreement between 
verisimilitude and corroboration of theories, Popper cannot but be himself committed to science being an inductive 
process. For if current theories have greater verisimilitude than previous theories, and if current theories have a 
greater degree of corroboration than previous theories, then corroboration is a sign of verisimilitude. Newton-
Smith insists that this is an inductive argument twice over, since nothing but an inductive argument can establish 
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On Critical Rationalism 
Popper insisted that any element of presumed knowledge should be held tentatively, precisely 
by holding it open to potential criticism. Critical rationalism emphasises that all empirical 
forms of knowledge must be put to the test of criticism, and that only those that are put to the 
test of criticism can properly be termed ‘scientific’. The progress of knowledge, in Popper’s 
view, is concerned with falsifying one’s theories or with thereby eliminating error from one’s 
theories. Theories are but tentative conjectures, so the progress of knowledge is by conjecture 
and refutation. This process promotes to tentative standing as knowledge only those scientific 
theories that have so far withstood testing without yet being falsified by evidence (Popper 
1945b: 260). Any such presumed knowledge must be potentially falsifiable in order to be 
admitted to the body of empirical science. The body of presumed knowledge changes 
frequently by rejection of the specific theories that evidence has refuted and by the consequent 
re-adjustment of concepts. That refutations, too, are fallible, must also be admitted, partly 
because refutations depend on fallible ‘basic statements’ whose meaning would be changed 
and whose truth-assignment could be changed if the concepts involved in them change 
appreciably (like in the Einsteinians-versus-Newtonians example concerning the pressure that 
persons when standing feel in their feet, that I mentioned above). In any case, Popper does not 
expect that change of concepts is ever altogether sweeping. Not only does Popper refuse to 
countenance revolution in the political world. Popper also refuses to countenance revolution in 
science. 
Popper the anti-revolutionary conceived that every bold new conjecture conserves a lot even 
as it alters some things. The point is that the cut and thrust of conjecture-refutation-and-new-
conjecture-seeking-new-refutation is intellectual. No-one needs to die in order for there to be 
progress.  Ideas can die and be replaced, all in people’s stead. But the process is conservative 
of former values or former concepts. Not all former values or former concepts are conserved, 
but most are. As Chapter 1 showed, significant conservation of values is necessary if the bold 
intellectual work of theorists is to be courageous and not vandalistic. Courage not vandalism 
can require that any element of presumed knowledge is open to criticism but cannot require 
                                                 
the conclusion that a current theory has (by and large) more verisimilitude than a previous theory. For more on a 
“whiff” of inductivism in Popper, see Newton-Smith 1981 pp.67-70 
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that all presumed knowledge may be reconsidered as a whole all at once. To reconsider 
everything all at once would be vandalism pure and simple in Popper’s anti-revolutionary view. 
Yet Popper poured scorn on the idea that changes even that are courageous can make 
convictions more “probable” to be true. Falsified former beliefs are not ruled completely 
improbable, since refutation is itself fallible. However, corroborated hypotheses or theories, no 
matter how severe the relevant tests had been, do not amount to probable knowledge. They 
amount only to tentative, possible knowledge. According to Popper, “the old scientific ideal of 
episteme – of absolutely certain, demonstrable knowledge – has proved to be an idol. The 
demand for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must remain 
tentative for ever” (Popper 1959: 280).  It is the least probable theory that still withstands 
attempts to falsify it that is the theory that is to be preferred. These are the criteria that Popper 
used in his attempts to distinguish science from non-science. I do not believe I weaken this 
claim of Popper’s, if I argue that corroboration of theories does ‘probabilify’ them. Theories 
are in their boldness not probably true, but I will argue that the probability that they are true 
nevertheless moves upward the more severe tests they pass. Popper did not espouse this latter 
argument, but I will explain why I think that his general position can well accommodate it. 
Popper rejected the criterion of verifiability on the grounds that it rendered laws of science 
meaningless, and the problem itself as merely verbal and trivial (Irzik 2013). With this, Popper 
appropriately identified the verifiability criterion as the main weakness of logical empiricism 
in science. Boldly, he inverted their fascination with verification by instead emphasising 
falsification, a novel move that proved to be a powerful idea. He was thereby encouraged to 
develop his alternative understanding of science; his critical rationalist approach. Popper’s 
critical rationalist approach is embedded with features that require knowledge to be conjectural, 
hypothetical, tentative or fallible. For knowledge to be fallible Popper held:  
[R]oughly speaking, … what cannot (at present) in principle be 
overthrown by criticism is (at present) unworthy of being seriously 
considered; while what can in principle be so overthrown and yet resists 
all our critical efforts to do so may quite possibly be false, but is at any 
rate not unworthy of being seriously considered and perhaps even of being 
believed – though only tentatively. 
                (Popper 1963: 309) 
More fundamentally, Popper used his falsificationism to develop a new version of the 
Darwinian evolutionary approach and adapted it into an evolutionary approach to knowledge. 
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Popper likened the manner in which not only scientific but also other kinds of knowledge 
progress with the Darwinian struggle for existence in nature. What Popper said was that our 
theories need to survive when tested against their evidential base and many will not survive 
this test. In this respect, they “die off” like species who do not adapt against the test of a 
changing environment. This he used to explain how knowledge progresses. In likening progress 
in science to progress in the living world through Darwinian evolution, Popper proposed to 
understand life as progressing. He was committed to saying: life progresses through its 
Darwinian struggle for existence (Popper 1972:19). 
It is important to note that biologists are mostly ambivalent to or even opposed to the idea of 
progress through evolution. Although most evolutionary biologists understand that large-scale 
macroevolution yields a drift towards there being some more complex life forms they 
increasingly criticise and avoid the use of the term progress. Their reasons include largely 
among others that: (a) the term ‘progress’ carries with it historical, theoretical and social 
implications which are not congruent with modern knowledge of the course of evolution (b) an 
incongruence exists between the notion of progress and Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) theory 
of natural selection (Rosslenbroich 2006:41). Darwin illustrated (b) with his study of barnacles. 
Natural selection favoured changes away from species with motility, powers of perception etc. 
to ones that root themselves on rocks. Some male barnacles are reduced to an almost parasitic 
dependency on the female, except that they are semen factories and necessary for reproduction. 
Natural selection may as often as not reduce complexity among life forms, at least once there 
are life forms complex enough for their complexity to be reduced. 
Popper arguably is at variance with the majority of biologists in his thinking about evolutionary 
progress as he did. Famously, Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) pointed this out (1970: 1-23), 
professing to employ evolutionary ideas himself about the scientific process. To the extent that 
Kuhn did use evolutionary ideas that are more like those of Stephen J. Gould (1941-2002), or 
saltationist, just as Popper’s evolutionary ideas are more like those of Richard Dawkins (1941- 
), or adaptationist. Moreover, similarly to Gould who denounced the idea of evolutionary 
‘progress’ by life, Kuhn used the idea of evolution to reach the conclusion concerning progress 
in science, that in fact the concept ‘progress’ has limited applicability to science. 
I believe that Popper is in a position to view some reductions of complexity of theories as 
progress, just as he would view some increases of complexity of theories as progress. So, in 
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my view Popper can deny that the inconguences (a) and (b) apply to evolutionary theory of 
knowledge. The details of the debate between Popper and Kuhn, let alone the details of the 
debate between Dawkins and Gould, are beyond the scope of this thesis. Popper’s attempt was 
to embrace and apply the Darwinian principle of natural selection to scientific theories and to 
other forms of knowledge. His concern was to analyse how knowledge progresses by analogy 
with the Darwinian form of natural selection through problem-solving and error elimination. 
Progress occurs, in Popper’s view, through the generation of new ideas as a result of error 
elimination, critical discussion and experimental testing, in that order, and the cycle continues 
when a new problem emerges. This is the core of Popper’s evolutionary epistemology and it is 
represented in his four-step general schema of problem-solving: P1 ---> TS ---> EE ---> P2. 
Popper writes: “Using ‘P’ for problem, ‘TS’ for tentative solutions, ‘EE’ for error-elimination, 
we can describe the fundamental evolutionary sequence of events” (1972 :243). I will assume 
that Popper’s evolutionary epistemology with its understanding of progress is defensible, even 
if evolutionary biologists mostly adopt different attitudes concerning the word ‘progress’. 
Induction, Corroboration, and Severe Testing of Hypotheses 
Scholars since David Hume (1711-1776) have faced the challenging task of dealing with the 
logical problem of induction. Induction is standardly regarded as the process of inferring a 
general law or principle from observation of particular instances. A broader construal of 
induction depicts induction as a process where the premises of an inductive argument indicate 
some degree of support (inductive probability) for the conclusion but do not entail it (Vickers 
2013). This broader construal of induction suggests that induction imposes elements of 
probability, which means the certainty of the conclusion is a matter of degree. Certainly not 
implausible and certainly not logically entailed, inductive conclusions stand as warranted or 
made more probably true because of evidence that supports them. The idea remains however 
that induction is dependent on reasoning from detailed facts to general principles.  
Hume rarely used the word ‘induction’ but the underlying principle of his epistemology 
revolves around the problem of induction. His argument concerns how to rationally justify 
inductive reasoning in the contexts of uniformity of nature and causation. Hume’s argument is 
that inductive inferences cannot be rationally justified, and this can be shown in two different 
ways of reasoning: demonstrative (deductive) reasoning and probable (inductive) reasoning. 
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While Hume contended that the former is “consistent and conceivable” (Hume 1902: 111) with 
deductive reasoning, the latter cannot hold any form of rational justification. 
Clearly with Hume, the problem of induction surrounds simply ‘enumerative induction’. Such 
ostensible inferences lead from specific observations to a generalisation, but it is impossible to 
see how they might lead to the kinds of logically richly-structured generalisations that science 
mostly deals with. ‘All swans are white’ is not a very convincing example of a scientific theory. 
Its logical richness pales in comparison with, for example, that of the conclusions of Newton’s 
Principia. If simple enumerative induction truly were of paramount significance, then it 
becomes impossible to understand how science would become logically rich. In particular, as 
I shall discuss below, if the logical richness of generalisations in science were all on a level 
with ‘All swans are white’ then ‘bootstrap’ tests of scientific theories would not be possible. 
In other words, the kind of science that Glymour describes requires logically richly structured 
generalisations that allow deduction of a theoretical conclusion from a phenomenon, in a way 
that employs a background of already theoretical further assumptions (Catton 2009b: 4). On 
this basis one could be led to argue that Hume missed the point.13 Popper used Hume’s 
scepticism concerning induction more creatively, as a basis to dismiss the inference form of 
‘enumerative induction’ as able to exist at all. Popper insisted that you need to be able to 
distinguish between ‘good induction’ and ‘bad induction’ in order to point to any induction at 
all. So if Hume shows that there is no such thing as ‘good induction’, then the conclusion must 
be that ‘induction’ is an empty concept. We need, Popper insisted, a way of thinking about 
science that is deductivist, rather than inductivist. Popper used just hypothetico-deductivist 
thinking to account for science. As I shall soon discuss, Glymour argued that hypothetico-
deductivism is too limiting. Glymour’s ‘bootstrap’ account is deductivist in a logically richer 
way. If I can square ‘bootstrapping’ with critical rationalism, then I can use Glymour to support 
Popper’s elimination of the whole category of induction in the sense of enumerative induction. 
The ways that inductivism of some kind might need to be acknowledged after all simply do not 
concern enumerative induction. They concern something logically much richer about science.14 
                                                 
13 See Catton (2009b) for discussion of ‘induction’ as something synthetic and not just an argument form. 
14 Again, Catton (2009b) argues that the richer understanding of induction that is required makes induction out 
as a synthetic concept. Then induction is not about a single analyzable inference form at all, but rather is about 
how a concert of inferences, all to one conclusion, inferences that each can be analyzed only as deductive in form, 
and inferences that each trade in fallible, theoretical premises, confer synthetically a higher kind of warrant on the 
conclusion. 
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The key question concerns the defensibility of Popper’s critical rationalism. Popper looked for 
an anti-inductivist, critical-rationalist way to characterise when a theory in science is doing 
well by the empirical evidence. To this end Popper developed his theory of corroboration 
(Popper 1959:33). One of the ways to introduce Popper’s notion of corroboration is by means 
of the notion of a severe test. 
Popper introduced the term ‘corroboration’ especially the degree of corroboration to describe 
the degree to which a hypothesis has stood up to severe tests, and thus ‘proved its mettle’ 
(Popper 1959: 248-249). His assertion is that a theory is ‘corroborated’ so long as it is able to 
stand up to these severe tests. Popper’s emphasis is on the idea of a severe test as opposed to 
those tests which involve evidence similar in kind to that already gathered in support of a theory 
(Popper 1957: 269). 
An illustration of a severe test of a theory is when the wave theory of light was found to predict 
that in the centre of the shadow of a circular disc that is illuminated perpendicularly on one 
side by coherent, monochromatic light there should be a bright spot. Background thinking 
suggested that there should be no brightness anywhere in a shadow. So apart from the wave 
theory, no-one expected that there should be brightness at the centre of the circular shadow. In 
fact it was proponents of the rival theory, the particle theory of light, who pointed out that the 
wave theory of light must make this prediction. Proponents of the particle theory thought that 
this consequence refutes the wave theory. Nevertheless, when the experiment was tried, the 
bright spot was detected, right where the wave theory of light predicted that it would be found. 
So this was a very severe test of the wave theory of light, which the wave theory of light passed 
just fine. 
In Popper’s view, the number of corroborating instances determine the degree of corroboration, 
and also the severity of the various tests to which the hypothesis in question has been subjected 
that it has also passed determines the degree of corroboration. A theory that has passed many 
very severe tests may be termed ‘highly corroborated’. 
Popper pointed out that pursuit in science of highly corroborated theories proceeds best if 
science is not only highly critical, that is to say, highly devoted to testing its theories, but also 
if it keeps its theories bold and simple. A simple, unqualified generalisation is more testable 
than a complicated, highly qualified generalisation. Therefore, the degree of testability of the 
simple, unqualified generalisation is greater. Bold, simple theories will predict more things, 
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and will predict more things that background thinking would have led one to expect would be 
false. So, bold, simple theories will be able to be tested in more ways and more severely. That 
is why the pursuit in science of highly corroborated theories determines that the theories in 
science tend to be bold and simple. 
Popper gave this explanation as a way of illustrating that his solution to the problem of 
induction leads to solutions of other problems, including metaphysical problems about science. 
One may wonder why science does seem to prefer simple, unqualified theories to complicated, 
highly qualified ones. This seems to beg a metaphysical question concerning whether the world 
is simple. However, Popper answered in a way that is methodological. Science seems to prefer 
simple, unqualified theories to complicated, highly qualified ones, because science pursues 
highly corroborated theories. One would not achieve highly corroborated theories unless one’s 
theories are bold and simple. The hypothesis which is falsifiable in a higher degree, or the 
simpler hypothesis, is also the one which is corroborable in a higher degree (Popper 1959: 250) 
unless, or course, it is refuted. In Popper’s estimation, the more a theory is corroborated the 
better testable it must be. 
Next I will develop in symbolic form a way for thinking about this. My discussion points 
toward Bayesian ways of considering evidence in science. By stepping back I will make out an 
analysis instead of Popper’s idea of severe testing. 
Let us consider the introduction of a new theory “T” that is to be tested in a way of which the 
following logical analysis is schematic. The introduction of theory “T” takes place against the 
background of older theories which it could well displace if it passes some appropriate severe 
tests. Denote as theory “B” some older or background theory, with respect to which “T” is a 
new rival. Let “E” be some test evidence. Let us suppose that from the point of view of the new 
theory “T”, “P” is an exciting novel prediction; but from the point of view of the older theory 
“B”, “P” is not even envisaged at all, or “P” is highly unlikely. Then since, with respect to the 
old theory “B”, “T” “sticks its neck out” over “P”, then “P” is said to be a severe test for “T”. 
If we then check “P” against evidence “E”, and “P” fits “E” very nicely (that is, “P” is true), 
then “P” is said to corroborate theory “T” rather than the older background theory “B” (Nola 
2012b). 
By adding further technical details to this account of Popper’s theory of corroboration, we can 
bring out its relationship to Bayesianism. Let the expression ‘prob(E, T)’ stand for the 
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probability of the evidence “E” given theory “T”. This is sometimes understood as the 
expectedness, or the likelihood, of evidence “E” given theory “T”. It is quite distinct from 
prob(T, E), which is the probability of theory “T” given evidence “E”. Popper defined the 
severity of a test by comparing the likelihoods of the evidence “E” given both the new and the 
older background theories, vis., “T”, and “B”:  
That “E” is a severe test of “T” with respect to background theory “T”, or thus that S(E, T, B) 
holds, demands by definition that prob(E, T) is much greater than prob(E, B). 
The Bayesian explanation for this would be as follows. Let us take the case where from “T” 
(with any auxiliaries) we can deduce “E”; then prob(E, T) = 1, or is very high. 
Now considering the background theory B and E, there are (as Nola 2012b points out) two 
cases: 
(1) If on the one hand “E” is highly likely given “B”, i.e., either prob(E, B) =1 or at least 
prob(E, B) is very high, then the Bayesian probabilification of T given E is low.  In Popperian 
terms, either S(E, T, B) = 0 or at least S(E, T, B) is very low. In this case, “E” gives roughly 
the same degree of support to “T” as to “B” and is not well able to decide between them. 
(2) If on the other hand “E” is quite unlikely given “B”, i.e. either prob(E, B) =0 or at least 
prob(E, B) is very low, then the Bayesian probabilification of T given E is high.  In Popperian 
terms, either S(E, T, B) = 1 or at least S(E, T, B) is very high. In this case, “E” gives quite 
different degrees of support to “T” and “B” and is well worthy of consideration to help decide 
between them.  
Another way to express Popper’s idea of severity of testing would be in terms of a demand for 
‘novelty’ of predictions. If a new theory implies some novel prediction that background theory 
could not have led one to expect (or even that background theory could have led one not to 
expect), then this prediction provides opportunity to test the theory severely (Nola 2012b). 
Given the above quantitative notion of a severe test defined in terms of likelihoods, Popper is 
now in a position to define the notion of degree of corroboration. In its simplest form, this is 
done by saying: the degree of corroboration of “T” by “E” with respect to “B” is directly 
proportional to the severity of test of “T” by “E” with respect to “B”. However, it is also 
possible to introduce a “normalising factor” so that a measure of degree of corroboration can 
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be set up between -1 and +1. This is done in the following way, following a suggestion of 
Lakatos (1968: 415): The degree of corroboration of “T” by “E” with respect to background 
theory “B”, Corr(E, T, B) = Defn [prob(E, T) - prob(E, B)]/[ prob(E, T) + prob(E, B)]. 
To show how this definition works, let us simplify this so that we consider only three cases of 
degree of corroboration, -1, 0, and +1.  
Case 1: if from the new theory “T”, evidence “E” can be deduced (with the help of auxiliaries), 
then, prob(E, T) = 1. The corroboration formula then simplifies to: Crb(E, T, B) = [1 - 
prob(E, B)]/[1 + prob(E, B)]. 
Of this Case 1, there are then two sub-cases to consider: 
Case 1(a): if the likelihood of “B” on “E” is hi
corroboration of “T” by “E” is zero (or nearly zero). (Consider what happens to the numerator 
of the equation.) In this case, since the likelihood for both “T” and “B” on E is high, then “E” 
gives little corroboration to “T.” 
 0, then the degree of 
corroboration of “T” by “E” is 1 (or nearly 1). (Again consider what happens to the numerator 
of the equation.) In this case, since the likelihood for both “T” and “B” on “E” is quite different, 
then “E” gives high corroboration to “T.” 
Case 2: Suppose that “E” refutes “T” (with its auxiliaries). That is, from the new theory “T”, 
we cannot deduce evidence “E” but rather its negation “not-E.” Then prob(E, T) = 0. If we 
substitute this in the definition of Crb(E, T, B), then the equation reduces to: [0 - prob(E, B)]/[0 
- prob(E, B)]. Then, no matter how small prob(E, B) is, providing it is not zero, if “E” refutes 
“T”, then the corroboration that “E” gives “T” is -1. This aligns with our intuitions about the 
case where “E” refutes “T”. In this way, we have a measure for the degree of corroboration of 
“T” by “E” that ranges from the worst case of -1 to then best case of +1 (Nola 2012b). 
Popper thought that any formal account of corroboration, such as that attempted, partly using 
Bayesian principles, above, could not capture all that he intended by the notion. In particular, 
Popper insisted that corroboration is only a guide to the way in which a theory has passed tests 
up to a given time. He did not think that it provided a guide to the future success of the theory. 
This reflects the consistency of his anti-inductivism where he assumed there to be no secure 
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inductive inference from past observation to future performance. I have stepped away from 
Popper to the extent of employing Bayesian principles. However, I do this precisely in order to 
make out clearly Popper’s idea of a severe test. This idea clearly is key to Popper’s critical 
rationalism. So, in one key way, even if ever so slightly, Popper’s anti-inductivism needs to be 
relaxed. It is by making probable the improbable-seeming that a theory manages to be 
susceptible to a severe test; and it is when the theory passes such tests that it can be looked 
upon with favour. The idea that the theory’s being looked upon with favour has nothing to do 
with what is probable cannot be right; we discover something to do with what is probable in 
what even brings about the favouring. Another way to consider this is as an instability in 
Popper’s own anti-justificationism. Popper sought not any-old kind of favouring of a theory 
but rather a justified kind of favouring of a theory. Favouring a theory because it has passed 
many tests none of which is severe would be a mistaken kind of favouring in Popper’s own 
view. Only favouring a theory because it has passed a good number of severe tests (and has not 
yet failed any tests) is justified, according to Popper. So Popper must to some extent have been 
oriented to justification. The account of Popper that we need is one that minimises the needed 
justificationism. 
By turning from the positive idea of verification to the negative idea of criticism Popper 
believed he had turned his back on induction. He believed he had “solved” the “problem of 
induction” by providing a non-inductive account of corroboration. He believed that a story 
concerning science, an explanation of what keeps the theoretical activity in science honest to 
empirical considerations, can be told entirely in terms of hypothetico-deductive testing. To 
Popper, a hypothesis remains ever tentative no matter what tests it has passed: the next test 
could produce refuting evidence rather than corroborating evidence. I have preserved the spirit 
of this philosophy in the above analysis of severity of testing. But to do this I have relaxed a 
little, Popper’s own official anti-justificationism. 
Popper, rightly, and profoundly, is a fallibilist about science. Popper supported the hypothetico-
deductivist idea, but he did not accept a theory of confirmation that commonly goes with it. 
Instead, he opted for corroboration. Popper was a hypothetico-deductivist with a difference: he 
wrapped into his hypothetico-deductivism the anti-inductivist understanding that “hypothetico-
deductive confirmation” is a contradiction-in-terms. Consequently, he sought to do without any 
notion of “confirmation” of theories.  
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Well known criticisms have been made of Popper’s methodology of scientific research. One 
may wonder if Popper can contend fully coherently that his position is anti-inductivist or anti-
justificationist. Popper can almost have but cannot quite completely have his deductivist anti-
justificationist critical rationalist ‘solution’ to ‘the problem of induction’. However, what stops 
him quite having this solution is the need for evidence for a theory in order that there can be 
content to the very idea of a ‘severe’ test. The concept in Salmon (1967, 1989) of ampliative 
inference as well as the idea in Glymour of ‘bootstrap’ testing both directly challenge Popper’s 
philosophy yet at a higher level they may instead flesh out Popper’s philosophy in ways entirely 
helpful to it. They seem to suggest that Popper’s telling perspective on falsification suffers 
some instability, but at a higher level they serve to underline its enduring strengths. 
Alternatively one can look to defend Popper by turning to Miller, Musgrave and others, have 
not been convinced by the criticisms of Popper themselves to give up critical rationalism. In 
the next two sections I consider in turn Salmon’s and Glymour’s apparently anti-Popperian 
methodological conceptions. But I shall also show the good work they do for Popper. Then I 
shall consider Miller’s alternative more direct defence of critical rationalism. 
Wesley Salmon’s Concept of Ampliative Inference 
With the concept of ampliative inference, Salmon develops his case that induction cannot be 
by-passed in the actual testing of hypotheses. In the first instance, Salmon avers that there is 
no reason to find a deductive justification for induction “precisely because it is the function of 
deduction to prove the truth of conclusions, given true premises. Induction has a different 
function. An inductive inference with true premises establishes its conclusions as probable” 
(Salmon 1967: 38). To justify inductive inferences, according to Salmon, is not to establish 
them as true, but to establish them as probable. Thus Salmon is a fallibilist about science. But 
he insists that there is good content for the notion of evidence for a theory. It is only deductive 
inferences that can be rationally fully justified to have true conclusions; inductive inferences 
cannot be rationally fully justified, it rests more on probability.  
Originally, Hume’s contention is that just because, say, an event occurred sequentially in a 
certain way in the past, one may not justifiably say that it will continue to do so in the future 
(Hume 1902: 165). The problem of induction posed by Hume’s argument ostensibly impugns 
the concept of evidence for just about any belief. Indeed if (as Popper insisted is the case) every 
belief reflects some theory, then Hume’s argument ostensibly impugns the concept of evidence 
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for any belief whatsoever. This position of Hume’s argument rests upon two premises: (1) 
Hume’s inductive skepticism and (2) the justificationist principle that it is reasonable to believe 
only what you can justify. Popper’s answer to Hume was critical rationalism, which accepts 
(1) but rejects (2). For Popper, there are no inductive inferences. Belief can come about only 
some other way, and the reasonableness of a belief must be evaluated in some other way than 
concerns how fully ‘justified’ the belief is.  
Salmon opined that without an element of induction, Popper’s method of seeking highly 
corroborated theories would not broadly be considered as a scientific process. Salmon did not 
aim to defeat Popper; rather to show that the scientific enterprise that Popper himself describes 
must involve inductive inferences not only deductive reasoning alone.  
Salmon’s disagreement with Popper targeted the non-inductivist notion of corroboration that 
Popper held. Salmon argued that human beings use evidence from experience to ground beliefs 
for things not yet observed. A scientific theory must necessarily have a warranted power of 
prediction in order to be able to have warranted implications for future experience. To Salmon, 
science requires predictions both for practical purposes and in order to test theories. Salmon’s 
main argument against Popper is that his view is too intellectualist (Salmon 1967: 18) and 
cannot account for our practical reliance on theoretical judgments, for example to decide action 
in the face of life-or-death practical challenges such as in medicine. In Salmon’s view, the 
Popperian claim that the best corroborated theory is to be preferred must be based on 
probability, otherwise the practical connection cannot obtain. In any case where one hypothesis 
has survived all tests to date, there is a variety of possible hypotheses which likewise have not 
yet been falsified. Then there seems to be no logical method of determining which is to be 
preferred. Practice will be frustrated, because there are too many hypotheses to choose from. 
This suggests that since Popper needs to make a selection from the number of unfalsified 
theories available to him, he faces a dilemma. Popper must first see that among the many 
hypotheses that can pass all the tests to date, one stands as tested more severely by those tests 
than any of the other hypotheses. Second, Popper must say that the most severely tested theory 
has the highest probability of being true. Otherwise, there is no good reason to choose it to base 
practical decisions on. Yet Popper in that case needs to make an essentially inductive claim, 
that since a theory has survived severe criticism in the past, it will be better able than its rivals 
to survive severe criticism in the future. Salmon insists that Popper cannot get away from 
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saying that corroboration is an indicator of future predictive success. Otherwise to use 
corroboration as selection principle for guiding practice makes no sense (Salmon 1967: 26). 
My work in an earlier section to grow an appreciation for Popper’s idea of corroboration from 
out of Bayesian inductivist ideas shows how I am in a position to accept Salmon’s criticism of 
Popper, yet to rise with it to a higher plane of appreciation of Popper’s critical rationalism. To 
accomplish this I accept that Popper’s anti-justificationism is unstable, but I inject the least 
amount possible of justificationism into the needed rescue of critical rationalism. 
Clark Glymour’s Idea of Bootstrap  
Glymour formulated an overtly non-hypothetico-deductive notion of “bootstrap” inference. 
Yet Glymour represents “bootstrap” inference as providing an important severe kind of test.  
Glymour’s bootstrap methodology is a formal characterisation of how a hypothesis is 
confirmed by a piece of evidence with respect to some background theory. So, unlike Popper, 
Glymour opens the door to the concept of evidence for a hypothesis. The bootstrap idea is that 
given background theory only a certain specific family of hypotheses may coherently be 
entertained. Yet a single element of empirical information may tell which member of this 
family alone agrees with the evidence. Then the evidence truly ‘picks’ one particular 
hypothesis from out of the family. Of course you also need the background theory that tells 
you what family of hypotheses it is appropriate to consider. 
Glymour’s point is that the background theory becomes better warranted by evidence the more 
rich and overconnected become the bootstraps that that background theory makes possible. A 
particular hypothesis may be ‘picked’ by evidence in more than one way. That is, we can 
‘bootstrap’ infer the hypothesis in question not in one way only but in many empirically quite 
independent ways. Then it will seem to us (given the background theory) that the hypothesis 
in question has rich evidence for it. Our choosing it is “over-determined” by evidence, when 
by comparison hypothetico-deductive methodology suggests that our choosing a hypothesis 
must always be “under-determined” by evidence. (Another way to state the “problem of 
induction” is in terms of “under-determination of hypotheses by evidence”.) Glymour argues 
that historically science has preferred the kind of background theory that allows rich 
“bootstrap” over-determination of hypotheses by evidence to happen.  
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This suggests a reason to call “bootstrap inference” a kind of “bootstrap testing”. Your 
background theory will be judged relatively to how well the “bootstrap inferences” work out 
and how richly they cohere. In a sense such “bootstrap testing” of the background theory is just 
a kind of severe testing of it. An example can show why this is so. 
Whales are in evolutionary terms more closely related to pigs than to cows, and still more 
closely related to hippopotami than to pigs. Study of evolutionary shifts in fossil morphology 
shows this to be so. That is, you can use the background theory of evolution and specific 
evidence from fossils to deduce the conclusion in question. The neat thing is that the same 
conclusion follows from a completely different bootstrap. The examination of DNA can show 
that whales are more closely related to pigs than to cows, and still more closely related to 
hippopotami than to pigs. That is, you can use the background theory of evolution and specific 
evidence from DNA studies to deduce the conclusion in question. The two different deductions 
use completely different kinds of evidence but they line up with one another. And that helps 
explain why the theory of evolution has evidence going for it.  
Of course, bootstrap-confirmed theories can be false, because bootstrap inferences depend on 
background assumptions that can be in error. Still, there are powerful reasons to think that a 
theory that is well bootstrap-confirmed is significantly onto the truth. At any rate, bootstrapping 
displays an ability to harmonise the evidence.  Bootstrapping displays the quality of 
“consilience of inductions” as discussed by William Whewell (1840), and in Edward Wilson’s 
Consilience (1998). We could link to truth, if we can link truth with harmony or consilience. 
With Popper we could instead step back in a different way from Glymour’s bootstrap 
methodology. We could remark that the expectation of consilience represents a very severe test 
of a theory. Should the fossil evidence really point to one and the same conclusion as the DNA 
evidence? Without the theory of evolution, there would be no good reason to say so. But, the 
theory of evolution helps to tell us that we should expect this. So, to expect bootstrap 
confirmation of a theory represents very severe testing of the theory. 
David Miller’s Restatement and Defence of Critical Rationalism 
Miller’s book, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (1994) expounded, defended 
and extended an approach to scientific knowledge identified with Popper. Miller’s central task 
was to combat misrepresentations of some of the logical and methodological problems of 
50 
 
Popper’s critical rationalism, and to show that critical rationalism when properly understood is 
wholly defensible. 
Miller does not allow any room for inductivism or for justificationism. In Miller’s assertion, 
“for the problem of induction, widely regarded as the fundamental problem of the philosophy 
of science, brilliant solutions already exist” (Miller 1994: 14). He declared that “the problem 
of induction is solved much as Popper solved it” (Miller 2014: 3). 
Miller took on the opponents of deductivism in science, particularly Salmon who felt that the 
principal line of criticism was to identify in scientific activity places where guesses have to be 
made, and to declare that these guesses were to be the conclusions of ‘inductive inferences’ 
(Miller 1994: 27). Miller disputed whether such ampliative (inductive) inferences play any role 
in science by simply re-rehearsing Hume’s scepticism about induction. A valid argument is 
deductive in nature; the content of the claim is already contained within the premises of the 
argument. Therefore the claim is already presupposed by the premises, and is no more 
“supported” than are the assumptions upon which the claim rests (Miller 1994: 81). If an 
argument is otherwise, if it is ampliative, then it is invalid. There then is no logic for holding 
that its conclusion should be trusted to be true. 
Miller’s argument here is deductivist. His position rests primarily on the argument that since 
ampliative (that is, inductive) inferences are invalid, their conclusions are no better supported 
than unsupported guesses. He attacked the use of “good reasons” in general (including evidence 
supposed to support the excess content of a hypothesis). He argued that good reasons are neither 
attainable, nor even desirable. This is what Miller calls “tediously familiar”. This is that all 
arguments purporting to give valid support for a claim are either circular or question-begging 
(Miller 1994: 107). This point is related to McGinn who held that “we have to be able to infer 
that if a falsifying result has been found in a given experiment it will be found in future 
experiments” (2002: 48). This is clearly an inductive inference. It is an old criticism, and others 
like it, were fully answered long ago by Popper 1972, Chapter 1 (Miller 2014: 4).  
Miller further restated and addressed some other issues raised by opponents of deductivism, 
blind to the possibility of rationality without induction, who remark that ‘it is a feature of 
Popper’s philosophy ...[that] when the going gets tough, induction is quietly called upon to 
help out’ (Bird 1998: 180). Miller insisted that just when Popper is getting the better of 
inductivists, they will insist upon some recourse to induction (or some similar procedure of 
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justification) by Popper, by which turning of the table they mean to dramatically expose Popper 
as a fraud (Miller 1994: 93). Emblematic of such inductivist accusation is what Salmon (1981) 
labelled the task of ‘rational prediction’. Salmon’s allegation was that despite the great success 
that deductivism can chalk up in the domain of speculative explanatory hypotheses, it is unable 
to make sense of the practical application of scientific results (Miller 1994: 106).  All of these 
criticisms, Miller asserted, are mistaken. They are positions turned up-side-down that thereby 
conceal the real truth (Miller 2014: 3).  
In a staunch defence of deductivism in science, Miller sought to set matters straight in a way 
that conforms entirely to the spirit of critical rationalism. Miller sharply reacted to the claim 
that empirical falsification is rarely encountered, or even impossible, particularly because 
falsifications of otherwise successful hypotheses are often little attended to, and on occasion 
more or less ignored, as evident in historical observations (Miller 2014: 5). A typical example 
is the inconsistency of Newtonian celestial gravitational mechanics with undisputed empirical 
reports of the perihelion of Mercury (Miller 2014: 5). Whether this constituted a refutation of 
Newton’s theory historians in some ways dispute. Miller’s reaction was that such a claim, 
popularised within the philosophy of science by Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1974), remained a 
question to ponder for a critical rationalist. He affirmed the fallibilism of critical rationalism in 
the spirit of Popper’s philosophy. However, Miller argued that the critical rationalists’ lack of 
a solution to this difficulty pales in significance with the lack by Salmon and others of any 
defensible understanding of what induction can possibly be. He also attacks as directionless 
ways to excuse this lack, those efforts to weaken what would be required in order for 
justificationism to hold, by investment in instrumentalism or even outright irrationalism (Miller 
1994: 126).   
Miller asserted that what Popper had in mind, no doubt, by falsification, was something 
comparative that admit of degrees.  The thought was that a hypothesis that has failed some 
tests, but not failed them too badly, a hypothesis with some failed predictions definitely beyond 
the limits of experimental error, but not gravely wrong, will appear to be closer to the truth 
than a radically unsuccessful rival, even though both are falsified (Miller 2014: 8). Although 
the issue to be raised may be that these ‘appearances’ of closeness to the truth can only be 
conjectures, since we know at present so little about verisimilitude and closeness to truth, it 
still is not possible that such truth shall be under the total control of empirical evidence (Miller 
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2014: 9). It is not disputable that when considering the truth of the test statements involved, we 
may realise that a hypothesis has been falsified. We can therefore conclude that a hypothesis 
that has endured some regime of tests to which it has been submitted, and that has survived 
them, needs to be accorded a measure of corroboration (Miller 2014: 9).  
Miller’s tenacious conviction is that falsification defines the scope and practice of science. To 
him, Popper’s well-articulated hypothetico-deductive methodology underlies the basis of every 
scientific hypothesis. I have myself parted company with Miller by embracing the idea that for 
Popper’s critical rationalism to work there needs to be a “whiff” of inductivism in this position, 
or some purchase acknowledged for the justificationist idea of evidence for a theory. I believe 
that I sufficiently defend Popper by minimising the justificationism, or thus by keeping the 
inductivism as merely a “whiff”.  Maybe I am wrong and Miller is right. Either way there 
would be enduring significance for Popper’s critical rationalism. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, from the positivist’s perspective on verification and their inductivist orientation, 
Popper developed some critical arguments which then led to him to assert that what truly 
matters is falsification. Both Salmon and Glymour reveal that there is some instability in 
Popper’s position. However, Miller sharply restated and defended Popper’s critical rationalism.  
In spite of the grand-standings of either the opposition to or the defender of Popper’s critical 
rationalism, the key ideas of this critical rationalism, the emphasis that Popper laid upon 
fallibilism and inter-subjective criticism, stand secure as analysis of how good science should 
proceed. In this chapter I have redressed in my own way the instability in Popper’s philosophy 
that Salmon and Glymour claim that there is. I have nevertheless used their thinking to return 
attention onto strengths in Popper’s philosophy. If Miller’s defence of Popper is better than 
mine, so be it. Either way, there is reason to embrace critical rationalism. 
By my repositioning the philosophy of critical rationalism in Popper so as to accept that well 
corroborated theories are also thereby confirmed, I also make clear that the testing of 
hypotheses and the legitimate processes of scientific inquiry can be conducted through a 
plurality of methods. This accounts for why Popper’s critical rationalism has been known to 
embrace a plurality of ideas. As I shall argue in Chapter 3, Popper’s critical rationalism can be 
said to embrace arguments for methodological and epistemic pluralism in science. Although 
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Popper considered rightly in my view that any scientific theory must be falsifiable, I argue that 
significant enrichment is possible of Popper’s thinking concerning how severe tests are 
achieved. This plurality of process is nonetheless Popperian pluralism, for at an appropriately 
high level the processes all reflect the aim for severe testing. To emphasise the pluralism as 
Popperian is to reflect Popper’s own stress on openness. The plurality of ways in Popper’s 
critical rationalism does help science to promote openness to new ways and methods. Plurality 
of methods is the way not to stultify further research by narrow insistence that always and 
everywhere the process of science must be the same. 
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Chapter Three: Unity of Method combined with Methodological 
Pluralism 
...I am going to propose a doctrine of the unity of method; that is to say, 
the view that all theoretical and general sciences use the same kind of 
method, whether they are natural or social sciences. 
                             (Popper 1957: 130) 
Introduction 
The question whether there is a unified or universal method of science that cuts across every 
discipline of science is central to this chapter. Popper proposed that there is one method 
common to all theoretical sciences, natural and social.  That is to say, he prescribed conjecture 
and refutation, or thus speculative effort to solve problems, followed by severe empirical 
testing, as the one way that science works in all its disciplinary manifestations. “[W]e are 
always concerned with explanations, predictions, and tests, and … the method of testing 
hypotheses is always the same” (Popper 1957: 132). I argue that Popper is right, but that even 
so, Popper’s doctrine of unity of method does not truly closed the door on methodological 
pluralism. As I had begun to do already in Chapter 2, I will argue that critical rationalism gets 
support, and requires support, from a variety of methods that officially differ from Popper’s 
method, but that at a suitably high level of generality in fact collapse right back into critical 
rationalism. 
That means that I will argue in this chapter that there is a balance in Popper not only (as I have 
argued previously) between individualism and communitarianism and between anti-
justificationism and anti-revolutionism but also between the doctrine of the unity of method 
and openness to methodological variety, provided the various methods come together in the 
end as each its own kind of encouragement to there being severe testing of theories. Popper’s 
openness in this balanced sense of methodological variety is important to my argument on 
Popper’s communitarianism. The way that, say, Glymour’s ‘bootstrap test’ idea comes together 
with Popper’s philosophy is a model for repositioning Popper that I have discussed in the 
previous chapter.  A very different philosophy from Popper’s can link to Popper’s philosophy, 
enhance Popper’s philosophy and be enhanced by Popper’s philosophy. 
Of course Popper’s doctrine of unity of method is important for me in another way. Popper 
remarked that, we must proceed to test theories as severely and frequently as possible in order 
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to find fault with them if we can; in fact, we must try to falsify them. “Only if we can no longer 
falsify them in spite of our best efforts can we say that theories are corroborated, that is, they 
have stood up to severe tests. This is the method of falsification” (Popper 1957: 134). Similarly, 
Popper believed that falsification as “the” scientific method is also applicable to the social 
sciences. With falsification, conjecture and refutation, criticism becomes the special feature of 
an open society. Falsification is the best way for the open society to work. So for Popper, in 
the natural and social sciences as well as in politics, falsification is the basic unified 
methodology. In other words, Popper believed not only that the social sciences must work by 
conjecture and refutation, but also that social engineering must be done by a piecemeal, 
conjecture-and-refutation approach. Any other approach would be utopian and reckless. By 
advancing his doctrine of unity of method, Popper established one important bridge between 
his philosophy of science and his political philosophy.  Similarly, in this chapter I bridge from 
Popper’s philosophy of science to his political philosophy. The political philosophy of Popper 
will be my chief concern in later chapters. 
At a less concrete level, it may appear that Popper’s doctrine of the unity of method is 
committed to the idea of criticisability, testability, or falsifiability as the mark of a single 
rational inquiry. This might appear to be unitary. However, a more concrete analysis of Popper 
reveals that he allows that a great many different modes of inquiry might be appropriate to 
different domains of inquiry and each might allow for criticism or tests or falsification. 
Falsification, for Popper, can welcome plural modes of inquiry that makes possible rational 
criticism.  
Popper’s notion of a unified method is a normative claim. In further support of Popper, I 
develop a descriptive analysis of arguments for pluralism about scientific method that draws 
support from more recent works in the philosophy of science. The pluralism that I defend rebuts 
such philosophers as the early logical empiricists, who contended or actually often simply 
assumed that there are universal procedures, laws or methods that are defining of science, and 
that consequently are applicable to all fields of scientific enquiry. What the positivists 
contended or assumed does not allow for the possibility that I explore here, that ‘science’ (or 
‘scientific’) is a family-resemblance term in Wittgenstein’s sense, variously applicable to kinds 
of inquiry that share no one set of characteristics in common. Then I seek to show that, in their 
great variety, all scientific kinds of inquiry do support forcible criticism. They all support 
severe testing of theories, even if in them Popper’s hypothetico-deductive model of inquiry is 
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far from explicit. So I seek a balance between a pluralistic conception and use of Popper’s own 
demarcation criterion. Helen Longino (1944- ) has defended the thesis of pluralism about 
Western science. In a way I agree with Longino (2000), even though I also use Popper’s 
demarcation criterion to reveal a kind of higher unity. Stephen Kellert (2006) has argued a 
related thesis about epistemological pluralism. Kellert argues that epistemologies (in the plural) 
are “local” not only within cognitive geography at a time but also historically. Popper would 
not have endorsed the drift of this towards a kind of epistemological relativism. But Popper did 
himself emphasise that there is a socio-cultural character to the development of science. Popper 
would not have been surprised by the evidence of variety that leads Kellert to discuss “local” 
epistemologies. Again I think that a balance is to be struck, here. To some extent the methods 
of inquiry in science, and the views that its practitioners will adopt concerning their subject 
matter, in the questions that are asked and in the choices concerning what work will be carried 
out, are significantly a function of socio-cultural understanding that will be unique to a time 
and a place. Yet there is a need for these methods to support in some way forcible criticism or 
severe testing, or otherwise they are not scientific. I shall thus, in a balanced manner, argue 
against universalism in scientific method, or in other words marry Popper’s doctrine of the 
unity of method with methodological pluralism. 
The pluralism that I defend here is three-fold.  
1. Methodological Pluralism: This is the descriptive position that multiple methodological 
approaches in scientific inquiry are legitimate and fundamental for science.  I shall 
argue that by virtue of its specialisation into various sub-disciplines, each with a 
distinctive culture of its own, Western science, neither in its theoretical thinking, nor 
by extension in its methods, is at all a monolithic enterprise. I do acknowledge that in 
its interdisciplinarity science can often benefit from the act of “borrowing of knowledge 
from one field in order to assist the endeavours of another discipline” (Kellert 2006: 
219). However, in spite of the tying-together that this creates, each field of science 
remains distinctive from others. This is the basis of the scientific pluralism that Kellert15 
and a number of more recent philosophers of science defend.  
                                                 
15 See Stephen H. Kellert (2006), Helen E. Longino (2002) and Kenneth Waters (eds) (2006). 
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2. Epistemic Pluralism: This is the position that different ‘local’ epistemological outlooks 
are legitimate and necessary for a full knowledge of the world. In a balanced way, I 
shall defend this pluralism up to a point, but also argue that polylogue becomes 
important, for example as a way to foster criticism. Adherents to different ways of 
knowing or thinking should seek to learn from one another, and should be able to be 
self-critical in the process. In particular, if we consider inquiry outside the ‘West’, there 
is a lot of difference that ‘Western’ inquirers should take interest in, with openness to 
self-criticism, just as there is a lot that those outside the ‘West’ learn from contact with 
‘Western’ knowledge. The quotation marks around ‘West’ and ‘Western’ are needed 
because there is no such monolithic way of thinking: there is also pluralism within the 
‘West’.  
3. I shall conclude by arguing that there is no conflict between Popper’s critical 
rationalism and the argument which supports plural modes of inquiry. The thesis here 
supports two overlapping dimensions in Popper’s critical rationalism: (a) it encourages 
the existence of a plurality of ideas through mutual criticism with others; (b) it allows 
for plural modes of inquiries that welcomes possible rational criticism. In short, I defend 
a still further kind of balance in Popper’s philosophy. 
Methodological Pluralism in Science 
The thesis that science is to become one unified entity theoretically, or alternatively, that there 
is a unity of method in science, is central to the argument for the unity of science or a unified 
method in science that some philosophers of science, such as the logical empiricists, defend. 
This is a normative argument for methodological unity and theoretical unity in science. One 
basis of this argument is that physics shows how science is done, and that ultimately the 
theories of all natural sciences are reducible to the theories of physics. This is reductionism in 
science, and the idea is that, because everything in the world is made of the same basic stuff in 
complex combinations, the laws of biology ought to be derivable from those of chemistry, and 
the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics (Ladyman 2002: 95). 
The Logical Empiricists and subsequent philosophers of science during the twentieth century, 
would readily attest to the claim of unity of method or unity of science, or both. They assume 
that all the sciences share a common method. These scholars share the assumption that science 
as such follows one and the same universal method across all its sub-disciplines and through 
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the entire history of its development. The empiricists long assumed that there would be unity 
to science at least concerning its methods, if not also concerning its theories. They have held 
methods in scientific inquiry to be single and monolithic and that all scientific theories have 
been derived through these methods.  
Popper’s doctrine of the unity of method differs essentially from that of the empiricists. Popper 
held that even though falsification is a single specifiable system of method which holds of all 
the sciences it does not preclude modes of inquiry specific to a subject matter or a phase of 
development of a field provided that the mode of inquiry fosters the rational method, the 
method of criticism. The falsification criterion then applies, according to Popper, across a 
variety of modes of inquiry: it is ultimately the critical testing of theories or hypotheses that 
ensures that an inquiry is science (Popper 1974: 79). When Popper described science in terms 
of a critical rational structure which demarcates it from pseudo-science, his prescription was 
not narrowing, but rather was an open one. True, in order for any kinds of inquiry to escape the 
realm of pseudo-science, they must be open to rational criticism. Yet this very doctrine of 
method reiterates the connections between science and an ‘open society’, or between 
hypothetico-deductive processes and ‘piecemeal social engineering’ in Popper’s critical 
rationalist philosophy. With Popper, therefore, “falsification is only a part of a much more 
general critical project” (Habermas 1976:214). We should expect that for Popper a variety of 
modes of inquiry are all able to stand as science, in all the various ways that those many modes 
of inquiry ultimately support critical testing of theories. 
Popper also took a balanced view of the expectation of theoretical unity of science. A unifying 
theory would certainly be bold. That then recommends that scientists should try to unify 
science, since the bolder that a theory is, the easier it will be to test severely. However, criticism 
is needed of any step to unify science. So the struggle to unify science might not go smoothly 
or well. Science could find that they can more profitably be bold in more limited domains. 
Conjecture and refutation could for long periods make science, as a whole, ever less unified. 
In short the emphasis on unity by logical empiricists seemed to Popper to be dogmatic. In 
support of Popper, I likewise use Popper’s doctrine of the unity of method to rebuff the logical 
empiricists’ position. I doubt whether at the level of abstraction away from specifics of theory 
and subject matter that we must operate at in order to do general philosophy of science, there 
really is much to remark about unity of theory that is common to all inquiries, and in all stages 
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of the development of those inquiries. Likewise I doubt whether there is any more to remark 
about unity of method, than that Popper settled upon within his doctrine of the unity of method 
that is open to variety of modes, with each mode consonant with Popper’s leading demand for 
criticism or severe testing of theories. Like Popper, I do not need to take a stand on whether 
reductionism can succeed or must fail in science. The unity of theory can figure as an aim that 
it is appropriate to seek to progress towards only as much as general progress allows. Nancy 
Cartwright (1944- ) and John Dupré (1952- ) doubt the possibility of a unity of theory in 
science. Dupré claims that “science could never be a single, unified project” (Dupré 1993: 1).  
They may be right; the issue whether they are right, however, has no bearing on critical 
rationalism. 
Feyerabend (1988) developed a kind of methodological anarchism about science. Even if this 
is in its bald form objectionable, Feyerabend’s critique of methodological reductionism is 
perhaps ultimately compatible with Popper’s view.  That there exists no single scientific 
method we could agree to and still be critical rationalists, if we consider the pluralism to be 
about mode of inquiry, and critical rationalism to require merely that in some ultimate way the 
modes foster criticism or severe testing of theories. For Feyerabend, “the events, procedures 
and results that constitute the sciences have no common structure” (Feyerabend 1988: 1). This 
could be acknowledged as true up to a point, from the balanced perspective that I am defending. 
Popper both spelled out a relatively simple, straightforward demarcation criterion for science 
and urged in a parallel way the requirement of openness. If there actually is any single self-
consistent over-arching mode of inquiring scientifically, then you would expect not to have 
very complicated things to say about it. You would expect moreover that it would be open, to 
being embellished one way or another, by nuance that is different if the subject matter is 
different, or if the historical epoch is different, or if the cultural milieu is different, or if different 
personalities are at work. What I am calling Popper’s “balanced” view of methodological unity 
is the only sensible view of methodological unity. You could not expect to be left with any 
great richness to describe if you have sought to say what holds of absolutely all of science, 
despite the patent variety in science. 
However, Popper’s normative claim about unified methodology in science provides strong 
heuristic guidance about what embellishments can work. What one might  do in inquiry, as a 
means in the end to hold up one’s theories to criticism depends on what  would be specific to 
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this or that subject-matter. For example, one can not use litmus paper to test theories in 
sociology but one can use litmus paper to test some theories in chemistry. Of course the modes 
of inquiry of sociology and chemistry will differ in many ways. Yet it could be the one aim of 
being appropriately critical that could explain the differences in question. The claim that all 
science is critical also provides the standard of what can be termed scientific. When Popper in 
this way demarcated what is scientific from pseudo-science he did not negate openness but on 
the contrary helped define what he meant by that. There should then be variety in what counts 
as science, and ingenuity in the pursuit of criticism and growth of knowledge will generate this 
variety.  Popper’s only assumption is that falsification will always help to define what counts 
as scientific.  
The general nature of such other claims about unified methodology in science, different from 
Popper, may be termed to be relevant when we highlight the simple traditional recipe in 
performing a scientific research. However, such other claims fail to address the peculiarities of 
the different fields of the sciences. This is because, in reality, scientists from the different fields 
of the sciences engage in many different activities with many different methods peculiar to 
their specialities.  
The issue is whether progress towards the goal of science is regulated by a single self-consistent 
method, any more than achievement in science is bound up in a single self-consistent master 
or reducing theory. I doubt whether science can be made a unity theoretically, for instance, by 
reduction of every special science to one deep science. I furthermore doubt whether (except 
under the most general kind of description) there can be one method by which all of science 
can best work. In other words, there cannot be a unity of laws in science that explain the whole 
diversity of natural phenomena. Nor can there be one method that remains the same across all 
the various sub-disciplines of science across the whole history of their developments.  
My position here is that it is erroneous to have a universalistic view of science when we 
consider the complexities inherent in the world. The explanations that these complexities 
require cannot suffice by a reductionist approach which explains all phenomena in terms of, 
for instance, the laws of physics16. Cartwright considers this reductionist view to be that physics 
                                                 
16Lee Smolin is baffled by the attention focused on string theory in physics which is claimed to be a unified 
theory in science. His conclusion is that the trend which supports one direction of research while other promising 
approaches are abandoned has tragic consequences as new discoveries in physics have allowed since the early 
1980s (Smolin 2006). 
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needs “to be the governor of all matter”. Cartwright dismisses this view as quite wrong. She 
argues that theories achieve unification only when they are backed away from nitty-gritty truth 
(Cartwright 1999: 2-4). In other words, the laws of physics alone cannot give us the totality of 
the truth about the world and in fact are themselves false because they pretend that there is 
more unity than there is. The various sub-disciplines of science have a role to play in 
developing theories and methods of investigating the reality of the phenomena with which they 
are specifically concerned. Although the inter-disciplinary areas of science have shown that 
nature is relatively interwoven, this does not justify the call for a unity of science. The tendency 
to reduce science to a single approach, in most cases, physics, is to say rather more than that, 
for instance, the laws of thermodynamics are applicable to all the sciences. It is to say that all 
scientific explanation can be reduced to explanation in terms of physics. Such a claim is 
premature at best and at worst it is folly. Certainly Cartwright argues that it is folly. The other 
sciences concern phenomena far and away richer in their complexity than the science of physics 
can ever make clear.  To say, for instance, that thermo-dynamical principles might constrain 
what it would be reasonable to think in another science, does not suggest that what it is 
reasonable to say in the other sciences would all reduce to or be explained by the laws of 
thermodynamics.  
With the doctrine of the unity of method falsification also extends to non-Western modes of 
inquiry. The recognition that there exist varieties of inquiry beyond what has developed in the 
‘West’ but still scientific is not contrary to Popper but on the contrary is what Popper should 
lead us to expect.  Some unique way of carrying out research might nevertheless amount to a 
critical method. Then it would be science, even if it has until now been isolated from the ‘West’. 
Any such example underscores methodological pluralism as a feature of falsification.  
Epistemic pluralism: The rationality question  
The implication that science constitutes the very standard of rationality accompanies most 
doctrines of the unity of method, particularly, the one held by Universalists such as the logical 
empiricists. Popper by contrast argued that non-scientific modes of reflection or thinking could 
be useful, partly by feeding ideas into the critical work of objective science. There is nothing 
wrong with some idea coming into science out of metaphysical, non-scientific thinking, 
provided that its use within the science sustains advancement that is rational through use of 
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criticism or testing. The logical empiricists claim that there is one single self-consistent variety 
of rationality the same everywhere and for all time, and that what it is for people to be rational 
in inquiry is simply to do science. Popper relaxed both these expectations in the direction of 
openness. 
In Popper’s paper ‘Principle of Rationality’ (or ‘rationality principle’), a paper that he delivered 
as his Harvard Lecture of 1963, later published in his book Myth of Framework (1994), Popper 
held that rationality is not restricted to the realm of empirical or scientific theories, but that 
empirical criticism of the kind you get in science is merely a special case of the general method 
of criticism, the method of finding and eliminating contradictions in knowledge without ad hoc 
measures. According to this view, rational discussion about metaphysical ideas, about moral 
values and even about purposes is possible.  
Popper’s view on the rationality question about science epitomises openness. Epistemic 
pluralism epitomises openness. So it is natural to ask how attracted Popper was to epistemic 
pluralism. Popper implied that forms of concerted inquiry that are different from occidental 
science are not on that account alone necessarily irrational. He implied that polylogue could be 
useful to science. Through polylogue ideas could enter science that would usefully become part 
of its regime of severe testing and corroboration. The basis of Popper’s assertion is that other 
forms of inquiry different from occidental science do not necessarily have to conform to some 
standard contemporary account of epistemic or scientific rationality. In Popper’s view, to count 
something as rationally known is not to bless it as certain or justified, but is only to remark that 
by criticism some errors have been already eliminated from it, and that as the critical process 
continues it is so far doing okay. In Popper’s words, “there are no such things as good positive 
reasons; nor do we need such things ... But [philosophers] obviously cannot quite bring 
[themselves] to believe that this is my opinion, let alone that it is right” (Popper 1994: 180). 
Inferring from Popper’s assertion therefore, we must consider both the normative and 
descriptive importance of a pluralistic way of knowing that takes into account both empirical 
and non-empirical approaches. Such consideration would rebuff the view which holds that 
there is a monolithic standard of rationality that can be read out of Western science only, or 
which sees rationality as a Western signature. Against such a view, I question here whether 
even within canonical science (occidental “science of the ‘West’”) there is anything like unity 
of method.  
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Looking more broadly at human inquiry, and choosing as examples some significant features 
of some other systematic indigenous knowledge, such as in Africa or in oriental cultures, I will 
argue here that inquiry that looks different again from this or that exemplary pocket of 
“Western science” can however be optimal in its social environment and for purposes that are 
rooted in the particular social environment. Whether the distinctive kind of inquiry, in Africa 
for instance, is science, is perhaps a less important question to ask than what polylogue would 
look like between its practitioners and the practitioners of “occidental science”. I will maintain 
that polylogue is needed, and that it would allow learning in all directions. What I advocate is 
the value of a possible polylogue involving learning by the West from African or oriental 
cultures, not only learning by African or oriental cultures from the West. 
I perceive as obscuring the true nature of science the view that science depends upon a kind of 
rational method that an individual could deploy, and that all of science is unified around this 
fact. I am also concerned that the universality of what it is to do good science or the attempts 
at unifying the method of science may obscure the need to recognise that there exists other 
systematic indigenous approaches to knowledge that while they may not be burgeoning as to 
the same extent as that in the West, yet maintains significant indigenous methods of inquiry of 
their own.   While these views were on the rationality of science orthodoxy in former decades, 
I am by no means alone now in my determination to jettison these standard views. 
In this connection, whether there is a single self-consistent mode of Western rationality that 
could be globalised, that occidental science epitomises, and that occidental science vindicates 
because occidental science is especially rationally impressive, I deny, not by denying the 
impressiveness of science in the West, but by questioning both its ostensible unity, and its 
ostensible monopoly on rationality. However, I do not deny the tremendous importance of the 
category of rationality in science, and particularly in philosophical discourses. A denial of this 
would defeat the very purpose of this engagement in a philosophical activity.  
However, in part, I subscribe to the position held by Wittgenstein and Peter Winch (1926-
1997), both of whom have defended the relativity to cultures of rationality itself. This point of 
view is apt for searching into science and for appreciating its variety, as well as for looking 
beyond occidental science to cultures of inquiry in other places and times. In the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein’s two major ideas (namely, language game and form of life) have 
relativistic implications. On the idea of language game, Wittgenstein posits that there are rules 
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that govern every language game and these rules also govern how language is used within it. 
Consequently, there are no general sets of rules or general language games. To Wittgenstein, 
the error we make is to think that we can establish a general sets of rules which would show us 
a true picture of the world. This kind of general perspective to the world, according to 
Wittgenstein, would distort our view of particulars (Wittgenstein 1953: 7). Similarly, 
Wittgenstein linked the measure of his idea of language game with the idea of forms of life. To 
him, language makes meaning within the context of its form of life. According to Wittgenstein, 
language games have ‘countless multiplicity’. Since language games have forms of life, and at 
the same time have ‘countless multiplicity’ then there must also be multiple different forms of 
life (Wittgenstein 1953: 217). This simply explains that the different forms of life have varied 
standards and as such the rationality of beliefs in each form of life is an issue of interest within 
each form of life, possibly in every culture17.  
On his part, Winch says that Western scientific culture represents a standard of rationality that 
is just one among many, and in some cases members of different cultures with different 
standards of rationality could not possibly comprehend each other’s rationality criteria or their 
application. Winch’s claim is that Western scientific culture cannot be the ultimate paradigm 
upon which the yardstick of rationality is measured. While I agree, partly, with the positions 
of both Wittgenstein and Winch that Western scientific culture represents a standard of 
rationality among many standards, I think the absolute relativism that both contain is too strong. 
Instead I defend a position of pluralism which advocates a level of dialogue as a unity in the 
limit. I am particularly concerned about Winch’s extreme position as it relates to logic within 
the Azande’s cultural milieu. I agree that no culture has a monopoly of rationality but I do posit 
that logic as philosophers standardly understand that itself requires a level of literal mindedness 
that is not systematically met with in an oral, art-of-memory based culture like that of the 
Azande. Winch’s anthropological account fails to distinguish the question of “which logic” 
from the question whether the form of life is one in which “logic” is worthy in the first place 
as a concept for organising how one thinks about thought. I do not deny that variations of 
reasoning patterns occur within different cultures. My argument is that logic as an intellectual 
                                                 
17 I am not unaware of the controversy that rages among scholars who differ on the relativistic nature of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. On my part, I subscribe to the position which sees Wittgenstein has being committed 
to strong relativistic views in much of his later works. 
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study is essentially the business of the literal minded philosopher or scholar and it should be 
recognized as such.  
On the above showing, the strong relativism that both Wittgenstein and Winch express 
undermines the idea of unity-in-the-limit of what scientific knowledge comes to be known that 
constitutes the pluralism that both Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) in Peirce (1868) and 
Feyerabend (1987) defended. With Peirce, scientific knowledge is socio-culturally and 
historically specific, but there is a quasi-stable arrangement for all knowledge to come together 
which signifies the idea of unity-in-the-limit; a view which allows one to expect that method 
will be different at different times and in different connections with different inquiries or 
different socio-cultural arrangements. This is a view which resonates with Feyerabend who 
averred that “any form of knowledge makes sense only within its own cultural context” 
(Feyerabend 1987: 102). This view queries the general assumption that only Western science 
holds the criteria for rational inquiry. 
My defence of epistemic pluralism also exemplifies the social character of scientific knowledge 
that Longino emphasises in her attack upon the dichotomisation of the rational and the social. 
Longino asserts the thesis that scientific knowledge is both social and rational. She is however 
concerned about the dichotomy of the modalities of knowledge, each of which is differently 
understood by empirical researchers and the normative researchers. This dichotomy is based 
on the illusion that there are just two positions regarding scientific knowledge (rational and not 
social; social and not rational). To her, a realignment of these understandings would bring about 
a new set of interpretations involving interdependence of cognitive agency, plurality of content, 
and contextuality of productive practices (Longino 2002: 203-204)18. This aligns with my 
position on the worth of cross-cultural epistemic pluralism. It relates to how I will argue that 
knowledge that deals with fundamental reality in every socio-environment and how people of 
every socio-environment perceive this reality can be mutually harnessed through a polylogue 
process of interaction. 
I acknowledge that the phenomenon of occidental science is unique in a certain way.  It 
burgeons like inquiry nowhere else and at no other time.  Somehow it is veritably explosively 
self-compounding and self-ramifying. That is a unique fact. Nevertheless, the development of 
knowledge across culture is, without doubt, indicative of the power of rationality that human 
                                                 
18For further reading on this see Helen E. Longino, The Fate of knowledge, chapters 1, 8, and 9. 
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societies are significantly built upon. The accomplishments that different cultures all over the 
world have attained in the thousands of years that people have lived in various societies only 
confirm that systematic indigenous knowledge is wrapped around rational inquiries about the 
natural world. The criteria for what passes as the standard of rational inquiry in occidental 
science cannot be used as a parameter of what can pass muster as knowledge in other cultures, 
as experiences, values, history and politics differ from one culture to the other. The values and 
potentials of systematic indigenous knowledge and its methodologies take into account local 
knowledge and practices of a particular environment and its people. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that occidental science is built upon a formal, both empirical 
and conceptual, structure of knowledge that is instrumental to the study of the world within the 
confines of the Western perspective. Just as what Western scientists do is to understand how 
the world works, undoubtedly also, every well-functioning indigenous society must have its 
knowledge-production specialists, and must have created ways in which for the knowledge 
produced and held by these specialists to be made relevant to social decision-making. However, 
conditions may not obtain for the knowledge-making in indigenous societies to be theoretical. 
Indigenous knowledge is wrapped together with memory-art, oral culture. This means it is 
bound to possess greater spiritual dimensions not only empirical and conceptual elements. As 
memory art, such intellection may be oriented to the production and retention of “useful 
descriptive knowledge”19, and not fully oriented towards literal-minded explanation.  It may 
take a mytho-poetic form, for that is a condition of its being memorable, by strictly oral means.  
This would make it become impressive in its extent and usefulness, but may nonetheless be 
limited in its extent by the limits of memory capacity (Catton 2010:39).  
The form of mytho-poetic inquiry reflects its building and depending upon oral arts of memory. 
This form of inquiry may sidestep the explanatory function that is preeminent in Western 
science. Systematic explanation interferes with memory art functions that are key in an oral 
culture, and oral culture is misunderstood if it is understood to aim at systematic explanation 
(Catton 2009a: 36). Methodologically, mytho-poetic consciousness is both spiritual and 
mystical as a matter of course. However much more spiritual and less literal-minded it is, 
                                                 
19 I am not implying that Western science is not concerned with this.  There has been a very strong pragmatic 
theme on this. Francis Bacon and others were long ago looking for science to provide a sufficient understanding 
of nature to allow much greater human power and benefit etc. It was not just for knowing sake, as much as many 
scientists may claim this as their personal motivation.  
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mytho-poetic inquiry is not the complete antithesis of Western thinking. For example, in most 
non-Western traditions thinking resonates with the abstract idea of nous (which sees knowledge 
as the perception of the mental rather than the physical) that is associated with the mystic 
philosophy of Plotinus. In fact, it can be pointed out that mysticism or religiosity does not 
necessarily hinder the progress of knowledge, as Western societies were still largely religious 
while science progressed there20.  
So, the embrace of the mytho-poetic mode of inquiry that is associated with some systematic 
indigenous knowledge of non-Western orientation is quite compatible with the claim that the 
spiritual is incidental to the physical. To the extent that they believe that the spiritual affects 
physical phenomena, other non-Western systematic indigenous inquirers may consider their 
ways of thinking at odds with the West’s. But there are ways to understand the relationship that 
would argue instead for polylogue. The Logical Empiricists’ verificationist theory and 
Popper’s demarcation principle may not canonically apply to systematic indigenous knowledge 
of non-Western orientation. Some systematic indigenous modes of inquiry do consider as 
important phenomena that are not empirically verifiable. A good many metaphysical or 
psychological issues that Popper regards as pseudoscience do have relevance in the indigenous 
mode of inquiry, for instance, in African epistemology21. Yet none of this is reason to shun 
polylogue or to expect outright that polylogue can do no good. 
In view of the above, what is favourably considered as a mode of inquiry in the African sense 
is not separated from the empirical, material, mechanical, psychological, art, supernatural, 
religious or the spiritual. This is why if we consider, for instance, the understandings that 
African intellections give concerning causal events then we would discover a difference in 
                                                 
20 Religious belief was integral to the motivation of much of Western science.  Scientists at some point were 
trying to understand the mechanisms by which God had constructed the world. The way that the religious 
motivation played out was tied to the earlier influence of the Greeks, with their literal minded pursuit of rational 
understanding. However, this claim does not preclude the fact that science was also at some point in conflict with 
religious views. The Copernican heliocentrism and with the Galileo affair against the geocentric model of the 
church is a case in point.  Moreover, the relationship between science and religion since classical antiquity has 
been controversially characterized as either one of conflict or harmony. Nevertheless, a more qualified claim 
would affirm that despite these differences most scientific innovations before the Copernican revolution as a 
paradigm shift in the history of science were achieved by societies organized by religious traditions.  
21 A major source of reference regarding African epistemology is Leopold Senghor’s conception of African mode 
of knowing. When faced with an object, Senghor says, the African becomes one with the object of knowledge. 
He feels with the object and establishes a relationship with it.  The African mode of knowing is premised on ‘we 
are, therefore I am’. See Senghor, Leopold. (1985). “On Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro,” Albert 
Mosley (ed) in African Philosophy: Selected Readings. Englewood Cliff s, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
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approach from that of the West. The Western scientist is interested in explaining the empirical 
causation involved in event ‘A’ causing event ‘B’. The specialist African knowledge inquirer 
is involved with what can be called ‘agentive causation’. Typically, oral memory arts have as 
backbone a fabric of myths.  Myths are narratives, involving agents.  Agentive causation is 
what makes for narrative.  The knowledge for which mnemonics arts are provided via or within 
the myths picks up, as part, the myths’ own attribution of causal agency to its protagonists.  
The rainbow is defined as God’s covenant for example, or as offspring to wonder and mother 
of love.  This is agentive causality: the kind that can figure in stories, with agents, most of them 
human or humanlike, e.g. ancestors or gods.  
In general, the point about unity of method is that it is quite possible to defend the rationality 
of science without being committed to reductionism about one single self-consistent way of 
doing science, or the invalidity of other forms of inquiry outside of occidental science. The 
point about different ways of knowing or what other methods of knowledge exist apart from 
scientific knowledge is to re-emphasise the need to recognise that not all knowledge is derived 
through empirical procedures. Even though the methods of science accounts for solvable 
problems that have empirical solutions based on observable events other forms of inquiry, such 
as mytho-poetic or the agentive causation mode of inquiry may be said to attain a proper 
knowledge status by ‘tenacity’22. By tenacity, the process of accreditation for other forms of 
inquiry can be that they have continued over the years to serve a societal function, even 
surviving all urges to modify practical bearings or intellectual starting points. They may to that 
extent have survived a kind of critical testing over the years. Accordingly, presumed knowledge 
will be held firmly on as the truth because for so long it has been remarked as known to be true. 
Frequent repetition of such presumed knowledge within an oral tradition not only seems to 
enhance its validity but also orchestrates for it a kind of ‘test of time’.   
Popper’s Pluralistic Methodology 
The philosophy of critical rationalism that informs both Popper’s philosophy of science and 
political philosophy emphasises the need to engage in critical discussion, to be prepared to 
listen to criticism, to be able to accept criticism, to practice self-criticism, and to engage in 
                                                 
22 Please see Charles Sanders Peirce, The Fixation of Belief (1877) in his discussions of rival forms of inquiry. 
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mutual criticism with others. The attitude of engaging in criticism with others encourages 
openness and acceptance of a plurality of ideas for the progress of knowledge. Such a fruitful 
attitude of pluralism aligns consistently with the notion of falsification in Popper that underlies 
his doctrine of unified methodological procedure which ostensibly embraces different forms of 
inquiry that can inculcate rational criticism. 
The existence of plural ideas through mutual criticism with others is an essential ingredient of 
Popper’s critical rationalism. It is what ensures that the objective of criticism in Popper retains 
the values of pluralism that critical rationalism entails. This theme is suggested in the remarks 
credited to Feyerabend that “Popper’s falsificationism cannot exist without pluralism; and 
pluralism, as the guarantee of criticism and falsifiability, has consequences wholly in 
agreement with Popper” (Farrell 2000: 260). 
The goal that pluralism is intended to achieve in scientific theory and methodology is to rebuff 
the assumption of the Universalists who hold the view that scientific practice and scope can be 
monolithic and reductionistic. Popper’s falsificationist methodology is anti-universalism 
because universalism cannot be reconciled with the pluralistic methodology that underlies 
Popper’s critical rationalism. Popper urges us to be critical. In order to be critical, we must 
question the prevailing scientific or political approaches to problem solving. Open and critical 
discussion is essential to the way knowledge progresses in science and political society. In 
engaging in critical discussions, different approaches to problem solving may be entertained. 
A plurality of ideas emerges in the process of problem solving. Potential solutions to problems 
in science are debated within the scientific community. Critical rationalism therefore has a vital 
social element. 
The pluralism which entails Popper’s critical rationalism in science also has implications for 
discussions of liberal politics in Popper’s political philosophy. The engagement in mutual 
criticism with others and the effects of such a critical attitude on the organising of political 
society is suggestive of the significant aspects of the individual and the social in Popper’s 
critical rationalism in politics. I will discuss the element of Popper’s philosophy in greater 
depth in later chapters. However, the implications of mutual engagement and mutual criticisms 
that critical rationalism entails encourages the recognition of pluralism and the possibility of a 
polylogue for mutual benefits and variations of learning. 
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Value of cross-cultural polylogue: The argument  
The focus here is to establish that there is a broad spectrum of epistemological approaches to 
the study of nature that are not limited only to that of occidental science. One main feature of 
occidental science is the ways it focuses commitment to reason and ardent literal-mindedness. 
Of course, this is its greatest strength rather than a weakness. However, this focus is 
unaffordable to a people that uses oral means or unaided mental ability to retain their 
knowledge. These people are not liable to produce burgeoning explanatory knowledge at the 
explosive pace of scientific knowledge development in the West.  However, in a relative 
degree, each has attained some level of success and failure with respect to a desideratum that 
the other holds dear and needs to hold dear. This is why I defend the thesis of the value of 
cross-cultural polylogue. Polylogue is needed among specialists, scientists and even 
philosophers of different systematic indigenous knowledge types in order not only to learn 
about the variety of thought amongst different cultures but also to learn better about the world. 
My argument is that each tradition will become aware of the need to revise some of its former 
thinking, by virtue of what is learnt through polylogue, and in particular, by virtue of new 
criticism realised through polylogue. There may be certain preconditions and limitations to be 
considered, as well as expectable results of such a polylogue. What is impressive is that the 
distinctiveness in each tradition would enhance polylogue among them. The knowledge that 
can be gained in occidental science, for instance, stands to inform those other systematic kinds 
of inquiry in new ways, just as the desired polylogue could inform occidental science in new 
ways. 
Conclusion 
To ask whether a cross-cultural polylogue in science as well as in knowledge in general is 
possible is to beg the question. The evidence of divergent cultural traditions and what is 
distinctive in each can be used to establish the thesis of pluralism in terms of different kinds of 
inquiry. A kind of inquiry which aims to provide answers that are intended to be universally 
true may ostensibly undermine the linguistic and conceptual tools that are also valuable in other 
traditions and cultures. This same concern is also relevant to the different fields of inquiry 
within canonical science such that the methods of inquiry in all the fields of specialisation 
cannot be single and monolithic. Rather, methodological pluralism can allow for the 
sustainability and uniqueness of each field that contributes to the progression of knowledge.  
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The value of cross-cultural polylogue among all traditions, and the possibility and necessity of 
epistemic pluralism as an essential ingredient to the growth of knowledge resonate with the 
spirit of open and critical discussion that Popper’s critical rationalism prescribes. The attitude 
of mutual criticism inherent to critical rationalism is consistent with both ideas of 
methodological pluralism and epistemic pluralism. Both types of pluralism are aimed at 
ensuring that issues and questions concerning reality, man and the universe are not understood 
by a singular and universal  method of inquiry or only under the purview of a particular 
systematic indigenous knowledge, say, Euro-centrism, for instance. This presupposes that 
many other methods can be used to gain understanding of how knowledge can be applied to 
different fields of inquiry or how different systematic indigenous forms of inquiry can have 
their diverse understandings of the subject matter. In this case, cross- cultural polylogue ensures 
that a mutual bilateral understanding can achieve the possibility of learning on all sides. 
In many ways for Popper, his philosophy of critical rationalism in science entails a pluralistic 
element that interacts consistently with the doctrine of the unity of method that he also 
espoused. This is in spite of the fact that the falsification that Popper defended as a 
methodology in science has deficiencies now well recognised by philosophers of science. 
These strengths and weaknesses of falsification as a concept and other aspects of Popper’s 
philosophy of science have been addressed in chapter two.   
In spite of the concerns that I have raised about the structure, content and direction of Popper’s 
philosophy of critical rationalism in science, particularly in Chapter 2, such concerns do not 
affect my enthusiasm about the philosophical importance and practical relevance of his 
philosophy of critical rationalism in politics. Although Popper used the idea of criticism as a 
basis for understanding the method of falsification in his philosophy of science, he also used 
criticism as the basis for the development of his liberal idea of politics. Despite the 
acknowledged weaknesses of some contents in his science, the attitude of openness, individual 
freedom, piecemeal reforms, mutual dignity and respect to others which form the social 
character of his politics, all have implications for how problems of contemporary politics are 
addressed. The critique of historicism and holism that Popper made, his ideas of individual 
freedom and piecemeal social engineering to social reconstruction of society emphasise the 
relevant features of his political thought. The value of his piecemeal reform is to mitigate the 
evils of large-scale or wholesale change of society. The philosophical relevance of these 
features in Popper’s political philosophy that I shall address in subsequent chapters motivate 
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my continued drawing from Popper in spite of the weaknesses that I have emphasised in some 
aspects of his philosophy of science. Despite the critical method that mutually links his science 
and politics together the acknowledged problems in Popper’s philosophy of science do not 
cancel out the philosophical importance of his political philosophy. 
In this respect, the proceeding chapters shall examine the development of Popper’s political 
philosophy, particularly as it emerged from his criticism of Marx’s scientific interpretation of 
history. This criticism began Popper’s engagement with the social sciences, and particularly 
into political philosophy. Using the falsification methodology central to his critical rationalism 
in science Popper aimed to establish falsification as the methodology in the social sciences for 
his idea of a science of society. 
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Chapter Four: Popper on Science of Society— A Refutation of 
Historicism  
In memory of the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or 
races who fell victim to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable 
Laws of Historical Destiny. 
      (Popper 1957: “Dedication note” prefacing the book) 
We may become the makers of our fate when we have ceased to pose as its 
prophets. 
                     (Popper: 1945a: 3) 
Introduction 
In chapters 2 and 3, I discussed how Popper made falsificationism and rational criticism the 
underlying basis of his philosophy. This same philosophy of science ideal of falsificationism 
and criticism Popper imported wholesale not only to the social sciences but also to his own 
general way of modelling how society can best work. Popper used his method of 
falsificationism, conjecture and refutation as a basis for the doctrine of the unity of method in 
natural as well as social sciences. With falsificationism, Popper believed he illuminated “the 
method of science”. Equally, he believed that falsificationism illuminated the best theoretical 
model for a society to work.  
In chapters one to three I have shown that Popper’s philosophy of science becomes fully 
intelligible only if it is understood to incorporate balance of several distinct but interdependent 
kinds. I have discussed the balancing that Popper did between individualism and 
communitarianism, between anti-justificationism (fallibilism) and anti-revolutionary views, 
and between unity of method and openness among other things to variety of modes of inquiry. 
Underlying the philosophy of Popper’s critical rationalism, both in its bearing upon philosophy 
of science, and in its bearing upon political philosophy, are the themes of falsificationism, 
fallibilism and inter-subjective criticism, that Popper used to exquisitely achieve a balance 
between the individual and social aspects of his philosophy. In this chapter I shall particularly 
re-emphasise the balance in Popper between individual and social aspects. 
I proceed in the conviction that Popper roundly established falsificationism as a legitimate 
methodology of science. My purpose in this chapter is not again to demonstrate this point of 
view, for then this thesis would principally be a contribution to philosophy of science.  
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However, I have already made a case for the positive evaluation of Popper’s philosophy of 
science. I have shown how some outstanding seeming alternatives to Popper’s hypothetico-
deductivist, falsificationist philosophy of science collapse back into falsificationism when 
viewed from a sufficiently high vantage point. Falsificationism unifies all methods of science, 
Popper argued, and I have agreed with him about this. Popper at times allows it to appear that 
this single unifying methodology could potentially be wielded by an individual researcher. 
However, Popper himself laid great emphasis upon inter-subjective criticism. Popper allows 
us to see that there is a plurality of modes of inquiry that count as scientific because they all 
meet in their own way the rational standard of falsification. This pluralism heightens the social 
character of Popper’s falsificationism. The inter-subjective element in his critical rationalism 
establishes the dependency of science upon community as it focuses on individual critical 
rational criticism, and on the engagement of the individual with others all in mutual (inter-
subjective) criticism.  
So, as regards the social sciences, with his method of falsification Popper advocated a theory 
of rationality that embodies openness of society. His “social ethic consists of the commendation 
of openness, which is the social equivalent of falsifiability ̶ the holding of social principles 
without rigidity, in a spirit which is willing to learn, innovate, experiment and change” (Gellner 
1974: 172). This open society, however, consists of what Anthony O’Hear calls the idea of the 
unity of mankind. It is the idea that “in the open society anyone may criticise and contribute, 
regardless of origin, race, religion, class or gender” (O’Hear 2009:206). Popper’s contention 
was that the critical method which was typical in science can be generalised into the ‘critical 
and rational attitude’ as a basic feature of the open society (Popper 1974: 132). 
The general themes of fallibility, openness and inter-subjective criticism which Popper exposed 
in his view of natural science matter specifically to his view of the social sciences, particularly 
his account of politics. In politics, a Popperian liberal-communitarian philosophy is constituted 
by both individual and social aspects. The liberal tendency in Popper is balanced by his regard 
for the necessity for social interaction and interrelationship, and thus by a communitarian 
tendency.  
Granting that Popper applied the same method in both science and society one needs to focus 
an analysis on the question of whether Popper’s critical method with its orientation to 
intellectual openness in science truly is apposite to his defence of political liberal-
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communitarianism, and if it is, then on how good are these political philosophical 
understandings to which it directs us. What this analysis exhumes are the moral and political 
values that Popper’s political agenda embraces - political values of intellectual openness, 
political freedom, welfarism, critical debate, feedback from citizens, and social interaction and 
interrelationship. In Popper’s thinking, these values are all analogous to valuing the growth of 
knowledge, and thus to valuing problem-solving by conjecture and refutation in science. That 
is to say, Popper recognised and lauded both the growth of knowledge and problem-solving by 
conjecture and refutation in wider society not only in science. So, for Popper, in politics as well 
as in science, the schema of problem-solving ultimately “consists in trying out tentative 
solutions to those problems from which our investigations start” (Popper 1992: 66).  
When Popper applied his understanding of science to politics, his agenda for the social sciences 
was to establish a science of society using the methodology entrenched in his critical 
rationalism. Yet a science of society would not in all ways resemble a science of physical 
nature, for society would evolve partly by its knowledge evolving, and there cannot be laws 
that would fate how knowledge will evolve. With critical rationalism about physical science, 
Popper emphasised bold conjecture of general laws, followed by attempts at empirical 
falsification. Yet even about physics Popper argued that determinism breaks down: he 
considered that the future is open (Popper 1982: 185). Synoptic understanding of how change 
will happen in the world is not fully possible even in physics. In politics, Popper emphasised 
openness of society. Synoptic understanding of how change will happen in society is definitely 
not possible, because society evolves partly by its knowledge evolving, and there cannot be 
laws that would fate how knowledge will evolve. These two related applications of Popper’s 
philosophy are combined within his criticisms of Marx’s23 ostensibly scientific, materialist 
interpretation of history.  
Popper’s background as a philosopher of science focuses his criticisms of pseudo-scientific 
theories of society. As a philosopher of science Popper perceived as suspect the claims by 
various scholars in the social sciences such as Marx who wrongfully assumed that they could 
predict and interpret social phenomena scientifically. Marxism, in particular, claimed to be a 
                                                 
23 A comprehensive examination of Popper’s criticisms of Karl Marx will occupy discussions in the next chapter. 
It is important to emphasize that Popper’s idea of liberal politics developed from his criticisms of Marx’s theory 
of historical materialism. A discussion of Popper’s critique of Marx’s scientific historical method can be found in 
the Open Society and Its Enemies, and The Poverty of Historicism. 
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scientific theory of historical and social development. It also claimed for historicist social 
science the same objectivity as that in natural science. Popper regarded this pretension as the 
claims of pseudoscience. He criticised Marxism for incorporating a historicist method of 
prediction, a method that was believed by Marxists to function with predictive power over the 
future course of human history. Popper maintained that the historicist method in Marxist or 
other guises has exerted a profound and problematic influence on society, helping to explain 
the rise of totalitarian regimes. This is ironic in the case of Marxism given the claim that 
Marxism is to be emancipatory. Historicism is a poor method, Popper remarked, and is also 
dangerous to society. In establishing a science of society, Popper’s preoccupation was to reveal 
the essential danger in historicist ideology and to show the inadequacy in the historicist’s 
method in the social sciences.   
Popper’s science of society presents itself as a criticism of historicism. His criticism of 
historicism leads to his development of piecemeal social engineering as solution to the 
historicists’ holistic ideologies and tendency to help precipitate totalitarianism. Popper’s The 
Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism elaborate on the exquisite 
benefits of piecemeal social engineering. Piecemeal social engineering requires that proffered 
solutions to problems within the human society will be dealt with in bits-and-pieces, always 
with a sense of fallibility and a willingness to reconsider, in order to negate the heady holists’ 
tendency to precipitate sweeping negative consequences that are unintended even by them. 
Fundamentally, these two books by Popper serve as Popper’s “defence of freedom against 
totalitarian and authoritarian ideas, and as a warning against the dangers of historicist 
superstitions” (Popper 1974: 131). Popper identifies those who are enemies of individual 
freedom and the open society as all champions of historicism, who reduce the task of social 
sciences to prophesying the events of social development. Popper argued against the dangers 
of historicism and offered an argument for the ‘rational unity of mankind’ where criticism and 
intellectual openness are valuable for human freedom in the open society. In Popper’s view, 
the only kind of political arrangement that can ensure freedom is the open society, just as the 
only way to secure security itself is first to secure freedom. 
In consideration of the above, it is pertinent to present, in this chapter, a critical exposition of 
some of Popper’s themes in the philosophy of politics without distorting or understating his 
salient points. I begin my exposition and critical analysis of Popper’s philosophy of politics 
from the standpoint of his anti-historicism since all salient themes from his political philosophy 
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stem from his anti-historicism. I outline many of the themes and terms in Popper’s philosophy 
of politics that will be used in subsequent chapters. 
Essential Themes of Popper’s Philosophy of Politics  
The Open Society: This is:  
A concept articulated and championed by the philosopher Karl Popper 
and intended to denote a society characterised both by open, rational 
debate and also on that account by it’s evolving along an unpredictable 
trajectory.  Popper argued the following.  The growth of knowledge is 
inherently unpredictable.  Yet the character of a society will depend on the 
knowledge that the society has acquired.  Thus for a society to have a 
predictable pattern of evolution or be static it must be intellectually 
stagnated.  “Tribal” societies approximate this condition.  Within societies 
marked by rational debate, intellectual progress, and therewith 
unpredictable social change, some may hanker after a return to stasis.  
Such are (perhaps unwitting) enemies of the open society.  Their tendency 
of mind represents “tribalism”.  One signature of tribalism is collectivism, 
the doctrine that each individual’s essence or good is defined by the social 
collective as a whole.  Like the (related) conception that society is an 
organism, collectivism is apt only of “tribal” societies, and not apt of an 
open society.  Notably, collectivist thinkers such as Plato and Marx hold 
that an ideal society would not be subject to change.  Their ambitions for 
social reform are “utopian”.  To embrace by contrast the ideal that society 
should be open is incompatible with utopianism.  In an open society the 
appropriate way forward is by “piecemeal engineering”.  The goal, over 
against J. S. Mill with his doctrine of utilitarianism, is not to maximise 
happiness, so much as it is to ameliorate, by trial-and-error limited 
reforms, the conditions all rational people agree are harmful.  This is 
“negative utilitarianism”, and represents a middle path between moral 
dogmatism and moral scepticism or nihilism.  It avoids any pretence that 
there are truly general laws of society or of history, for there are none 
(Catton 2006: 408). 
From the above succinct description of Popper’s conception of open society, it is clear that the 
open society encapsulates his philosophy of politics. However, the underlying basis for 
endorsing an open society stemmed from his criticism of historicism. Among critics of 
historicism Popper’s criticism is remarkable. The way that he criticised historical determinism 
in Plato’s republicanism, in G.W.F Hegel’s (1770-1831) philosophy of history, and in Marx’s 
historical materialism is important to the overall development of liberal thought. Those 
criticisms contributed to the development of his essential themes on piecemeal social 
engineering, individual freedom, government interventionism and negative utilitarianism. The 
themes are recognised as central ideas of Popper’s liberalism.   
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At its basis, The Poverty of Historicism is a theoretical application of scientific method in 
politics, but at the same time, it is also an elaborate criticism of all beliefs in inexorable laws 
of history, laws of social development, or laws of human destiny. His other book on political 
philosophy, The Open Society and Its Enemies, is focused simply as an attack in the strongest 
terms on the ideologies of Plato, Hegel and Marx; those figures he termed “enemies of the open 
society”. Popper’s most stringent criticism falls on Marxism which he regarded as “the purest, 
the most developed, and the most dangerous form of historicism” (Popper 1945b: 2). 
The term ‘historicism’ connotes what Popper regarded as belief in inexorable laws of historical 
destiny, that is, ostensible laws of historical or social change. Historicism is in Popper’s view 
the intellectual origin of fascism and communism. Popper, like many political philosophers, 
was concerned with how a society ought to be organised, as well as with identifying a suitable 
method for social reform. The principal task in social reform, according to Popper, is to design 
social institutions, and to proceed, always with an understanding of their possible imperfection, 
with those already in existence (Popper 1957: 65). In redesigning and reconstructing social 
institutions, Popper proposed a functional method of small adjustments and re-adjustments 
always on the look-out for reverse or unintended effects. In order to achieve optimal social 
reform one cannot be utopian in Popper’s view. Utopia is a will-o’-the-wisp; and to target 
utopia is pathological. With arguments that significantly overlap those of the eighteenth-
century Irish political writer Edmund Burke (1729-1797), who became an anti-revolutionary 
and is studied for his anti-revolutionary views, Popper condemned the method of redesigning 
society as a whole. That is, Popper rejected large-scale social reform, which often arises out of 
the claim that knowledge of the future course of history is possible.  
Popper was appalled by the confidence often displayed by social scientists thinking it was 
within their capacity to predict the future course of human history. Such confidence arises out 
of the presupposition that because of the successes that natural science has recorded in the 
predictions of observable phenomena in the world, the social scientist too can reasonably 
deduce knowledge of the laws of history or sociology (assuming that such laws exist) that will 
lead to the successful prediction of sweeping future events or predictions about particular social 
and political developments. Marx is one of those scholars who Popper said had sought to use 
a scientific method of prediction as a definite programme for discerning and implementing 
laws of historical and social change. Given the liberal ideas that Popper defended, in terms of 
individual rights and individual self-determination, Popper was averse to notions of historical 
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prediction aimed at directing conscious efforts at socio-economic and political change. Such 
notions that societal change was determined by inexorable laws of history defeated the purpose 
of individual rational self-determination since social events were said to be predetermined. So 
what Popper attacked in historicism was the claim of its adherents that there were laws of 
history or laws of social development, valid for all historical periods, which determined future 
social events.      
More often than not when scholars try to address issues of intellectual concern, they ultimately 
apply a mode of thinking that is specific to a particular context. Such is the concept of 
historicism that Popper used to denigrate the socio-political theories of Plato, Hegel and Marx. 
Fundamentally, the term ‘historicism’ has no singular definition. There are divergent 
interpretations of it. However, it can be broadly seen as a theory that emphasises that events 
are influenced by conditions of history. Popper’s usage of the term is similar to the broad 
perspective of it. His interpretation of the term aligns with many other views which see 
historicism as the belief that natural laws govern historical events which in turn determine 
social and cultural phenomena24. In spite of his conception aligning with many other 
interpretations, there are some concerns to be raised with regards to Popper’s usage of the 
concept ‘historicism’ in The Poverty of Historicism.  
A first problem relates to how Popper made the term ‘historicism’ cover an unwieldy scope. 
Popper distinguished between anti-naturalistic doctrines of historicism and pro-naturalistic 
doctrines of historicism: the former is the view that methods of natural science (physics25 in 
particular) cannot be used in the social sciences, while the latter is the view that methods of 
physics can be used in the social sciences. In spite of this distinction, it is sometimes unclear 
what position Popper held within the conceptual clarification. He attributed historicism to both 
doctrines of (A) anti-naturalism and (B) pro-naturalism. One is hardly able to correctly follow 
his critical objections to historicists’ notions of either position A or position B. This is because 
Popper did not distinguish the description of these positions (A) from (B), their criticisms, and 
                                                 
24 For views similar to Popper on historicism see Dagobert Runes (ed.). Dictionary of Philosophy.Totowa, NJ:  
Littlefield, Adams and Company. 1962., and Leo Strauss. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 1953.          
  
25 It is worthy of note that Popper differs essentially from the explanations that require a reductionist approach 
which explains all phenomena in terms of, for instance, the laws of physics. Popper repudiated physicalism- the 
doctrine that the mind was just a physical entity. As such, mental phenomena would not be explained by the laws 
of physics.   See chapter three of this thesis for further discussion on reductionism in science.  
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the description of his own position (Keuth 2005: 197). In this way, a certain level of confusion 
arises as he sometimes wrote as if he had overthrown position (A) when in fact his argument 
was only directed against position (B), which although occasionally associated with position 
A by no means entails it (Passmore 1975:31). Even in the face of this broad scope, Popper also 
seems unable to account for why some anti-naturalists might also hold the view that the 
knowledge of prediction in natural science can be used at least to some degree to improve 
knowledge of social and political developments.  
The four sections with which The Poverty of Historicism is structured appear at first glance to 
have a harmonious relation to one another. Let us consider how the sections are outlined: 
(section I) the anti-naturalistic doctrines of historicism, (section II) the pro-naturalistic 
doctrines of historicism, (section III) criticism of the anti-naturalistic doctrines, and (section 
IV) criticism of the pro-naturalistic doctrines. However, a detailed look at the chapters 
contained in each section reveals an unmatched organisational structure26. Section III is meant 
to critique section I, and section IV is supposed to critique section II. What happens in reality 
is that there are a number of unmatched chapters in section III in relation to section I, and in 
section IV in relation to section II; which makes the book relatively non-symmetrical. In 
addition, some chapters in section III have no relation to section I, and some chapters in section 
IV have no relations to section II. As a result, this accounts for the impediment to clearly 
identifying Popper’s view of the difference between the methods of the natural and the social 
sciences. Ian Jarvie (1937- ) in Jarvie (1982) in his paper, “Popper on the difference between 
the Natural and the Social Sciences” similarly argues that this impediment is partially due to 
the organisational structure of The Poverty of Historicism (Jarvie 1982: 84).     
Despite these considerations, it is important to keep in mind that it is the same truculent anti-
authoritarianism which Popper brought with him into the field of philosophy of science which 
he then replicated in his political philosophy. This accounts for why the development of his 
political philosophy branched out primarily from his refutation of historicism. In attacking 
historicism, Popper attacked totalitarianism. He saw historicism as a justification for the 
implementation of a large-scale social reform since it is deemed possible to foretell the future 
“course of economic and power- political development and especially of revolutions” (Popper 
                                                 
26 The book is rather messily put together as Popper latter admitted when he said it was his first attempt at a 
composition in English and was not successful. See Popper’s Unended Quest, p.130 
 
81 
 
1945b:79). Social reform, Popper remarked, must be piecemeal in order to ameliorate human 
suffering. He preferred that urgent evils of society be dealt with in a bits-and-pieces approach 
with a view to best learning from one’s mistakes. This explanation culminates in the four 
essential concepts that I shall undertake to examine in the following sections below. These 
concepts include: historicism, holism, social engineering (piecemeal vs. Utopian), and negative 
utilitarianism. They all play major parts in the central thesis on the development of Popper’s 
liberalism that I shall discuss in the next chapter. 
Popper’s Refutation of Historicism 
“Historicism” Popper defined as “an approach to the social sciences which assumes that 
historical prediction is their principal aim and which assumes this aim is attainable by 
discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution 
of history” (Popper 1957:4). This is a compact definition, as there are a number of related issues 
clustered together. John Passmore (1914-2004) identified four of these issues, namely: (1) an 
approach to the social sciences, (2) assumes that their aim is historical prediction, (3) assumes 
that such predictions are based on the discovery of “rhythms” or “patterns,” of “laws” or 
“trends,” (4) assumes that these laws or rhythms underlie something describable as “the 
evolution of history” (Passmore 1975:33). The analysis of this definition succinctly captures 
the refutation of historicism that Popper summarised in the Preface to The Poverty of 
Historicism as he was unwavering in his attack on historicist ideologies.  
The outstanding issue in Passmore’s analysis of Popper’s definition of historicism can be found 
in statement (2). Popper himself regarded this as the most decisive; as it fundamentally 
addresses the central concern of the refutation of historicism. It is clear that what Popper was 
concerned with is the issue of historical prediction as a principal aim of the social sciences. He 
granted that, for instance, economic theories are capable of a certain level of prediction. Thus, 
all things being equal and under certain circumstances, then particular conditions of 
development may be achieved. At least, some level of social prediction would be possible in 
economic theories if Popper is to use his falsificationist method of testing. Yet this is not a 
consolation that historical prediction by way of using ‘rhythms’ or ‘patterns’, ‘laws’ or ‘trends’ 
of history can be arrived at by a physics-type scientific prediction. Scientific predictions do not 
necessarily have to be physics-type even though such prediction is typical of good theory in 
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physics. Nevertheless, a historical prediction does not have the necessary impetus of a 
falsificationist method of testing that can be found in natural science.  
The refutation here is that the social sciences cannot lay bare the law of evolution of society in 
order to foretell its future. Consequently, there can be no prediction of the course of human 
history by scientific or any other rational method. Popper’s contention was that human 
knowledge is fallible, and as such “if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then 
we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow” (Popper 1957: VI). 
Accordingly, the evolution of human society is a unique historical process. Human action can 
neither be predicted with precision, nor the history of the future events or societal development 
with certainty. 
On the one hand, I maintain that Popper was correct to say that the historicists were mistaken 
in their stance on the equation between “laws” and “trends”. The pro-naturalist historicist is 
committed to the methods of the natural science being applicable to the social sciences.  Popper 
by contrast insisted that there are no laws of the succession of historical events by which the 
social scientist might predict future social developments. At best it is possible to identify trends, 
not laws. Laws as understood in science are mostly applicable to situations under the same 
conditions, often implying a causal relationship between the occurrences. In situations where 
there are causal relations that are subject to a scientific law, such as, for instance, ‘water will 
boil below 100 degrees Celsius if air pressure is adequately reduced’; ‘in the planetary motion 
of the solar system Jupiter (relatively to Kepler’s predictions) will speed up somewhat as it 
begins to overtake Saturn just as Saturn (relatively to Kepler’s predictions) will slow down 
somewhat as Jupiter begins to overtake it’; or that ‘if I turn the car key the vehicle will start’, 
it is clear that prediction is possible because of ascription of a law. Laws support prediction of 
events, just as they inform us how the events are caused. However, within the social 
environment, Popper maintains, there are not any such laws. 
On the other hand, Popper recognised that causal laws are an extreme or limiting case of a more 
general type of conditions. Weather forecasting, for example, will operate using knowledge of 
trends, but the predictions cannot be hard and fast as they would be if they tracked a strict 
causal kind of law. The predictions will instead be probabilistic. A forecaster’s statement that 
it will rain at 8:00 am tomorrow may perhaps have been drawn from a prediction that there is 
a 60%-70% chance of rain tomorrow morning. A situation where such a prediction fails, and 
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instead of rain in the morning the sun appears glowingly, cannot by itself decisively impugn 
the forecaster’s way of theorising the weather. For, the thinking was bound to be probabilistic. 
One could still find a way to test empirically a theory that is probabilistic, however. One could 
consider the frequency to see if that matched the theory’s estimation of chances. Wide disparity 
would begin to count against the theory, though Popper maintains that chances mean something 
different from frequencies, so disparity is possible without contradiction. Still it would take a 
dogmatic person to hold on to a theory that implied 60%-70% chance of morning rain on a 
large number of mornings where, say, rain actually occurred with merely 10% frequency. 
For that reason the notion of ‘trends’ as distinct from laws is inadmissible within testable 
science. Popper averred that the events of social development can only be associated with 
trends, not laws. Moreover trends in the social environment are themselves susceptible to 
change. This is quite unlike laws in science which are usually both universal and conditional. 
Trends allow conditional prediction but do not allow long-term forecast. Trends are not suitable 
for long-term forecast because of their inherent uncertainty.  
If we look at the trend of social and political change in, for instance, the politics of the United 
States of America, it might be agreed that ever since the 1776 declaration of independence, 
democratic government has been in place. That then would be a trend for maintenance in the 
U.S. of democratic government. However, even such a trend can break down. If some condition 
that is significant for the maintenance in the U.S. of democratic government were undermined, 
then there might be a change, perhaps a quite sudden change, say to military rule.  The 
expectation of continued democratic rule in the United States of America might, say, have been 
dashed by a group of military generals, who did not recognise how the protection of something 
dear to them would really be a quashing of the former political order. They might change the 
face of politics and hugely alter the course of events. If every societal trend is like this however, 
defeasible by defeating conditions that might come along, then trends are no good basis for the 
kind of ‘unconditioned’ predictions seen, for example, in Marx’s historical prediction of the 
coming of a classless society. Prediction of events of social development according to some 
prophesied sequence is impossible.  
Nevertheless, Popper himself identified prophesy as a trend that can be self-fulfilling. Popper 
referred to this as the “Oedipus effect” (Popper 1957: 13). Popper used the legend of Oedipus, 
a mythical king in Greece, of whom it was prophesied that he would kill his father and marry 
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his mother. The particular prophesy in question itself played a causal role in Oedipus actually 
fulfilling it. Popper’s discussion focuses on the important role played by an oracle in the series 
of events which led to the prophecy being fulfilled. To Popper, what can bring about the 
fulfilment of a prediction or prophecy in the social sciences is such an Oedipus effect (Popper 
1957: 13). This is however but a contingent trend. It is not a law that prophesy will be self-
fulfilled. 
The above discussion shows that the refutation of the historicist doctrine of the social sciences 
by Popper is powerfully well thought-out. I maintain that Popper cogently captured the flaws 
in the idea of historical prediction of social development with his distinction between 
immutable scientific laws and contingent social development trends. The failure of the 
historicist to distinguish what in fact is a critical difference between the two domains weakens 
the historicist argument 
Consider this simplified hypothetical argument in syllogistic form: if I maintain that the United 
States of America (USA) attacked Iraq with military force because the USA believed that Iraq 
had developed a nuclear weapon; and if I consider that the USA has now threatened to attack 
North Korea with military force if the USA can establish that North Korea has developed a 
nuclear weapon; then what must I expect to be the USA’s action if Iran develops a nuclear 
weapon? The answer is of course that I cannot know with any completeness or certainty what 
the USA will do. This follows from the same arguments that tell against historicism. Actions 
of the USA are not subject to immutable, causal laws. 
In this connection, Popper’s refutation of historicist doctrine regarding prediction of future 
social development rests on the explanatory power of the four-element schema of problem-
solving he symbolises as “P1 ---> TS ---> EE ---> P2”. Although the schema has to do with 
stages in the criticism of successive theories it is also applicable to the criticisms of historicism 
that Popper made. Popper established the four-element method of problem-solving whose first 
point in this schema is to identify the problem (P1), which will lead to finding tentative 
solutions (TS). These are subjected to error elimination (EE) through critical rationalism, and 
from there emerges a new problem (P2), and the process continues (Popper 1972: 243). 
This is the process that Nicholas Tilley regards as an emergent theory in Popper’s philosophy 
because of the way new problems emerge in Popper’s schema of problem solving. Tilley’s 
assumption is that Popper’s schema of problem-solving is a historicist law (1982: 64). Tilley’s 
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contention is that Popper’s schema authorises unconditional prophecies because of the way it 
demonstrates that if (TS) is insufficient for the purpose it is intended then a new emergent (P2) 
would arise, with the process continuing indefinitely. Tilley sees this as a historicist predictive 
inclination and as such Popper adopts the same position he rejects in The Poverty of 
Historicism.  However, Struan Jacobs’ response to Tilley coincides with the position being 
defended in this thesis that Popper’s schema is in no way indicative of historicism because the 
schema is explanatory not predictive and undoubtedly not prophetic (Jacobs 1983: 204). 
Popper’s schema of problem solving is incompatible with an unconditional prediction in the 
social sciences because it relates to how human beings are constantly testing the conjectural 
knowledge they have of the world as they attempt to solve the problems they face with respect 
to their experiences. In fact, Popper affirmed in the preface to The Poverty of Historicism that 
knowledge cannot be predicted either by rational or scientific methods, and that knowledge 
strongly influences the course of human history.  
So when Popper argued that historicism was theoretically misleading and fundamentally 
dangerous, what he was saying is that historical predictions of social development have 
negative effects on proper social reform because they are similar to unfounded prophecies and 
revelations. In Popper’s view, the Jewish idea of the chosen people; Plato’s idea of the 
philosopher-king; Hegel’s idea of absolute spirit; and Marx’s eschatological idea of the end of 
history which presupposed the coming of a classless society, are all manifestations of the 
“oldest dreams of mankind- the dream of prophecy; the prophecy of social, political and 
institutional development” (Popper 1957: 44). Typically, they are examples of moral 
historicism; because they infer moral values from historical situations. They represent the idea 
that what was good in the past (conservatism), good in the present (positivism) would also be 
achieved as good in the future (futurism)27.  
Certainly, Popper’s views on the effects of historicism on intellectual and social life are clear. 
His arguments are convincing. Yet it seems that there is an element of exaggeration in his 
account of why historical determinism is implausible. Popper advocated that the ‘logic of the 
situation’ helps explain our actions in terms of the situation in which they occur, but there are 
some events within socio-economic and political developments that are not necessarily 
                                                 
27 See Popper’s discussion on ‘moral historicism’ in The Open society and Its Enemies, (pp.199-211) where he 
discusses the ethical implications of Marxian historicism. 
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compatible with the regularity theory of historical explanation. While Popper can be said to be 
correct in his rebuttal of historical determinism it might also seem plausible, as Jeremy 
Shearmur (1948- ) in Shearmur (1996: 46) notes, that a certain kind of human action may 
generate consequences of which we can derive a historical explanation. It might moreover seem 
plausible that Popper held this to be the case. This is also true of the case of the USA and Iran 
above where there may be some usual conditions which pertained in each case which causes 
the USA to attack, and if these conditions were to be met then the USA would attack again, as 
reflects the ‘logic of the situation’. 
Popper’s Critique of Holism 
A further related issue to this discussion is what Popper referred to as ‘holism’. Similar to the 
way that Popper was appalled by the historicists’ claim to have the capacity to predict events 
of future developments, he was also dissatisfied by holists who seem to exude confidence that 
they can study, control and reconstruct society ‘as a whole’; similar to the manner in which 
controlled experimental demonstrations in science are carried out. Holism is often contrasted 
with methodological individualism: “the doctrine that all social phenomena, and especially the 
functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the 
decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of human individuals, and that we should never be satisfied 
by an explanation in terms of so-called “collectives” (Popper 1945b: 91). A more detailed 
discussion of methodological individualism will be provided in chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
Popper made the point that what the holist considers as studying ‘wholes’ may be viewed from 
two perspectives. The holist may see ‘whole’ as “(a) the totality of all the properties or aspects 
of a thing, and especially of all the relations holding between its constituent parts...” or may 
understand whole as “(b) certain special properties or aspects of the thing in question, namely 
those which make it appear an organised structure rather than a ‘mere heap’ “ (Popper 1957: 
76). The apparent equivocation between the two senses in which the word ‘whole’ is used stems 
from the idea that since ‘wholes’ can be scientifically studied in sense (b), wholes in sense (a) 
can also be studied. Popper rejected the study of wholes in sense (a) since “it is not possible 
for us to observe or to describe a whole piece of the world, or a whole piece of nature..., since 
all description is necessarily selective” (1957: 77). It is in this sense that the study of wholes in 
sense (a) is sharply distinguished from sense (b) because a scientific description of a whole 
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concrete social situation is impossible. Consequently, the holist confusion about the scientific 
study of wholes in sense (a) cannot also be applied to concrete historical and political situations.  
In Popper’s view, “it is a mistake to believe that there can be a history in the holistic sense, a 
history of ‘States of Society’ which represent ‘the whole of the social organism’ or ‘all the 
social and historical events of an epoch” (Popper 1957:81). To him, history, like any other kind 
of inquiry, can only deal with selected aspects of the objects in which it is interested. Popper 
noted that a description of the whole history of human society is impossible because the list of 
characteristics making up such a description would be indefinite. Popper said it is a mistake to 
think that social processes can be observed in wholes, which may consequently result in the 
possibility of a historical prediction in social and political life. It is a mistake to attempt to 
regulate the whole of social life informed by the historical method because this would be to 
engage in large-scale social planning. He averred that human history is a series of unplanned 
events, and that large-scale social planning exercises a negative practical effect on proper social 
reform. It is a utopian dream to be involved in large-scale social planning and such attempts at 
total control of social situations often lead to totalitarianism. 
Broadly speaking, the holist idea of regulating the society as a whole that Popper criticised 
serves as the basis for his claim that social reform must take a more piecemeal form: a method 
for making a few changes or performing minor reforms. Piecemeal social engineering is a 
method of problem-solving by trial and error recognising the fallibility in human existence. 
Popper prefers piecemeal social engineering to holistic/utopian social engineering. In Popper’s 
view, holistic/utopian social transformations only aim at regulating the ‘whole of society’ in 
relation to a definite plan or blueprint. The piecemeal approach attempts to locate and eradicate 
the greatest and most urgent evils of society. In Popper’s estimation, holistic/utopian social 
engineering has a negative effect on piecemeal change; it does so in a manner that negates the 
benefits of such change, since the approach of remodelling the whole of society restricts an 
adequate estimation of the effects of piecemeal reform. In Popper’s view, owing to factors such 
as the range of possible outcomes and reactions in the human social environment, the problem 
of holistic/utopian social engineering lies in that it can never fully predict its effects on social 
behaviour. 
The sense in which Popper’s argument against holism in sense (a) is an illumination of how 
the study of the ‘whole’ is inappropriate in concrete social and political situations. So the idea 
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that social institutions in the society- for example, politics, culture, religion and sexuality, can 
be studied as a whole without recourse to a plurality of social institutions across time and space 
is incorrect. By implication, Popper’s refutation of wholes is suggestive of a pluralism that is 
inherent in his critical rationalism, only implicit in his philosophy of science but more explicit 
in his political philosophy within the study of societies, social institutions and politics, and how 
they function separately.  
Popper on Piecemeal Social Engineering 
As already noted Popper preferred social and political reform to be piecemeal. He 
recommended piecemeal social engineering as a model of how society is to be reformed over 
against a holistic/Utopian social engineering. Holistic/Utopian social engineering involves 
large-scale planning and the result often leads to totalitarianism. 
The piecemeal social engineering that Popper favoured for social and political reform seems 
attractive when we consider the risk and the unintended consequences that may arise from 
large-scale social reform. Piecemeal social engineering, as Popper contended, would mitigate 
the dangers of attempting the reform of society in wholes instead of applying the bits-and-
pieces approach. 
In spite of the reasonableness that accompanies the trial and error approach of piecemeal social 
engineering many critics have faulted Popper’s usage of the term ‘engineering’ in association 
with social and political reform28. Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) was one of the first major 
critics of Popper’s piecemeal social reform. Hayek’s concerns were of two kinds: First, he was 
concerned that piecemeal social engineering as Popper described it may be accompanied by a 
growth in bureaucracy, given the technicality and procedural approach implied by the term 
‘engineering’. An engineering approach in this sense may hinder rather than foster social 
reform. Second, he was concerned about the nature of engineering which is typically 
centralised in terms of how knowledge and the control of engineering projects rests in the hands 
of a small number of engineers. Consequently, Hayek contended that knowledge suitable to 
proffer solutions to the problems of society must not be centralised in the manner typical of 
engineering. As such, Popper’s social engineering may inadvertently be involved in centralised 
planning like the large-scale planning it is intended to criticise (Hayek 1979: 157, footnote 25). 
                                                 
28 A comprehensive examination and analysis is done in chapter 6. 
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Over against the effects of an overbearing blueprint for social policy that accompanies 
holistic/utopia social engineering Popper responded that the benefits of the piecemeal approach 
are much greater than the former. Popper’s response to Hayek is that the knowledge the social 
engineer possesses will help him decipher his limitations, particularly through the formulation 
of a legal framework; as such the benefits of social engineering will be greater than the cost of 
undertaking a utopian social engineering... However, what Popper did not address, is whether 
the knowledge of such limitations will actually prevent the engineer from implementing 
grandiose plans that suit his fancy. It is on the basis of this that Douglas Williams (1989) 
criticised Popper for putting all hopes on the social engineers or technocrats to reinvigorate 
liberal democracies. His argument is that the more authority or control put in the hands of the 
engineers the more they may be detached from the “informed oversight, control and possible 
understanding of the general public” (Williams 1989:184). The crux of Williams’ argument is 
that social engineers may form a bureaucratic network which may threaten the very form of 
liberal democracy they are meant to uphold. The unintended consequences of the bureaucratic 
social engineer may result in the “needs of the system replacing the need of the people, 
administration replacing politics, management replacing leadership, and so on” (Williams 
1989:184). 
One major term that needs further clarification in the light of Popper’s piecemeal approach to 
social reform is “planning”. Popper’s insistence that social engineering must proceed 
piecemeal clearly forbids large-scale social planning. Ordinarily, the term planning appears 
sensible in terms of, for example, the planned itinerary that every individual undertakes on a 
regular basis; what governments or social institutions take upon themselves to do when 
planning in terms of preparedness for natural disaster; what mothers do in preparing for 
childbirth; and what parents do to plan for their children’s university education. The above 
descriptions are fundamentally different from what Popper associated planning with in 
holistic/wholesale/large-scale planning. The latter is in the sense of forecasting what the future 
will look like, over against what the future should look like. 
The latter type of planning is that of which Popper, Ludwig Von Mises (1881-1973) and Hayek 
were critical. This difference between the two types of planning seems analogous to the is-
ought meta-ethical problem that Hume highlighted in distinguishing between descriptive 
statements (about what is) from prescriptive statements (about what ought to be). Planning can 
be used in both descriptive and prescriptive senses. In the descriptive sense, it is an essential 
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thought process needed for regular human activities to respond to immediate or remote issues 
that human beings are confronted. Popper intended the descriptive, and it is different from the 
prescriptive nature of large-scale social planning which he critically regarded as utopian 
dreams of future prediction.           
Popper on Freedom and Negative Utilitarianism 
Two other essential themes in Popper’s philosophy of politics are his liberal idea of freedom 
and the concept of negative utilitarianism.  Both are clearly ethical themes that for Popper 
interrelate with one another within the realm of politics. Regarding freedom, Popper was 
concerned about the well-being and freedom of the individual. There are underlying ethical 
and epistemological principles associated with this idea in the sense that brings out an implicit 
social element as it interrelates with the explicit strand of individualism in Popper’s critical 
rationalism. These principles can be used to further explain that Popper’s idea of freedom is 
different from the general idea of freedom that most liberals defend. With Popper, there is a 
social dimension to individual freedom in such a way that the individual performs action 
without external constraints yet such freedom is exercised with respect to the freedom of others 
within the social environment.29   
The other aspect of Popper’s ethical and political theory which is an essential aspect of 
piecemeal social engineering is what he described as negative utilitarianism: the view that the 
aim of public policy is the alleviation of suffering rather than promotion of happiness. Popper’s 
negative utilitarianism is an agenda for politics which is to be implemented by means of 
piecemeal social engineering. Although most utilitarian theories, such as those of Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1932) and John Stuart Mill (1806- 1873), deal with producing the greatest 
amount of good for the greatest number of people, Popper’s negative utilitarianism requires us 
to promote the least amount of evil or harm, or to prevent the greatest amount of suffering for 
the greatest number. Popper’s idea is that governments should respond piecemeal to recognised 
social ills – to whatever is widely acknowledged to be harmful to the people. This can take the 
form of economic intervention, state protectionism and the creation of legal frameworks. 
Popper was however quick to mention that “state intervention should be limited to what is 
                                                 
29 I will not discuss the inherent individual and social dimensions to Popper’s idea of freedom in detail here; it is 
the major topic of discussion in chapter 7.         
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really necessary for the protection of freedom” (Popper 1945b: 130) in order to avoid the 
danger of increasing the power of the state. So the piecemeal approach of governments will 
involve trial-and-error attempts to mitigate these acknowledged harms; and when those urgent 
evils of society are dealt with piecemeal, it is with a view to best learning from one’s mistakes. 
No matter how slowly this piecemeal approach proceeds the outcomes are better than the 
consequences of the totalitarian holistic or utopian/large-scale social planning approach to 
social and political reforms. 
“New” Historicism 
Admittedly, the period during which Popper wrote both The Open Society and Its Enemies and 
The Poverty of Historicism was quite different from the era that we are living in now. In recent 
times, a number of issues concerning the difference between natural and social sciences about 
historicism have emerged, issues that The Poverty of Historicism either did not cover at all or 
did not express in a manner apt for our own political situation (Jarvie 1982: 90). A new 
historicism that developed in the 1980s based on the structuralist and post-structuralist theories 
of Michael Foucault (1926-1984) became widespread through the work of Stephen Greenblatt 
(1943- ) (Mikics 2007: 205). New historicism seeks to understand cultural and intellectual 
history through literature. It approaches historical events based on Foucault’s concept of 
episteme which seeks to examine different literatures in order to understand the cultural 
knowledge of a particular time (Veeser 1989: 34). In spite of the current discussions on new 
historicism the ideas that Popper expressed in The Poverty of Historicism are not invalidated. 
Times have only changed. Art will attempt to violate any rule imposed upon it but Greenblatt’s 
work far from giving the lie to Popper’s helps illustrate it. It represents a brief flowering of an 
intellectual turn that could not have been predicted and that has briefly breathed life back into 
ambitions for prophesy and into holistic irrationalism. 
Conclusion 
The issues and events that informed the writings of The Poverty of Historicism as well as The 
Open Society and Its Enemies, vis-à-vis the rise of fascism and communism in Europe may 
seem to be no longer the case. However, one may consider on the contrary that there are still 
some current factors conducive to the rise of fascism. Moreover, the fact is that there are still 
many known Marxists and communist societies that would see the world being organised on 
the socio-economic and political doctrines of Marxism. There consequently is the continued 
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relevance for Popper’s political philosophy in its stringent criticism of Marxian historicism. 
Popper as political philosopher remains well worthy of examination. 
The next chapter deals exclusively with Marxian historicism and the development of Popper’s 
political philosophy. The development of Popper’s political philosophy emerged as a reaction 
to explain the phenomenon of totalitarianism and its “false prophets” (Popper 1945b:229) or 
those that could be described as intellectual enemies of the open society- such as Plato, Hegel 
and Marx.  However, in the light of the fact that Popper’s compelling criticism on historicism 
and the attack on totalitarianism falls most heavily on Marxism discussion on the development 
of Popper’s political philosophy is focused only on Marxism.  
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Chapter Five: Popper on Marx and the Development of Popper’s   
Liberalism 
It is this moral radicalism of Marx which explains his influence; and that 
is a hopeful fact in itself. This moral radicalism is still alive. It is our task 
to keep it alive, to prevent it from going the way which his political 
radicalism will have to go. ‘Scientific’ Marxism is dead. Its feeling of 
social responsibility and its love for freedom must survive. 
                               (Popper 1945b:199) 
Introduction 
Further to my discussion in the previous chapter of Popper’s general attack upon historicism, 
in the present chapter I shall elaborate upon Marxism as a historicist doctrine and upon the 
critique that Popper made of Marxian historicism. To Popper, Marxism combines both allure 
and pathology. Popper was both attracted to and repelled by Marxism. Negotiating this 
intellectual dilemma led Popper to develop his brand of liberal-communitarian political 
philosophy. To Popper, the historicism by which Marxism is characterised directly leads 
Marxists to support holistic/utopian social engineering, that is to say, large-scale, revolutionary 
social planning and change. Popper rejected and denounced this radicalism. Popper’s critique 
of Marxism is central to the development of his political philosophy, and it especially strongly 
informs the philosophical basis upon which the balance between individual and social aspects 
of Popper’s critical rationalism rests. So, as previously discussed, Popper used his theory of 
falsification, which incorporates a balance between individualism and community of values in 
philosophy of science, as his criterion for demarcation of science, in order to reveal the pseudo-
scientific nature as he regards it of Marxism. Also bearing upon political philosophy, Popper’s 
falsificationism also neatly underwrites his rejection of the historicist/holist philosophical 
disposition of Marxism. Against Marxian historicism, Popper developed the political 
philosophical theories of piecemeal social engineering and of greater stress upon the freedom 
of the individual.  These culminate in an overarching principle of liberal-communitarianism. 
Consequently, the two related arguments in Popper’s critique of scientific Marxism are: the 
critique of Marxian historicism, and the critique of Marxian holism. In the first on historicism, 
Popper criticised Marxism for Marx’s thinking that his theory was scientific, scientifically 
accurate, and historically inexorable. Marx thought he was able to scientifically predict an 
inevitable transition of capitalism to socialism through the use of “an inexorable law of 
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history”. However, according to Popper, Marx in fact quite failed to be scientific in the way he 
prognosticated in his inquiry into the workings of society. This is because, according to Popper, 
Marx failed to truly expose his theories to potential tests, or to criticism. 
Regarding holism, Popper criticised Marxism for its attempts to reconstruct or reform society 
in ‘wholes’. According to Popper, who had, by the time he was writing, the benefit of 
significant historical hindsight, such attempt would lead to utopian social engineering/large-
scale social planning which in turn leads to totalitarianism. There seem few reasons to deny 
that these criticisms of Popper’s hit the mark.   
Two further rounds of arguments are examined in Popper’s critique of Marxism. First, I note 
that Popper employed the term ‘falsifiable’ centrally to his philosophy of science, then used 
the term ‘unfalsifiable’ to lambast Marxism for (according to Popper) its failure to be scientific. 
I believe that this criticism of Popper’s against Marxism also entirely hits the mark. Following 
Popper, I maintain that Marxism is not a scientific theory. In agreement with Popper, I argue 
that Marxism is a pseudoscience. My position gains support from arguments developed by 
Ernest Van Den Haag that Marxism was never based on the scientific truth-content of its theory 
(Van Den Haag 1987: 26). Marx seemed to have assumed that there is an “essential affinity 
between the study of human society and the study of nature” (Mendel 1966), and to have on 
that basis concluded on formulating scientific laws of history. Since Marxism is based on 
uncritical and untested theory of scientific laws of history, its scientific approach to socialism 
is not only false but also unscientific.  
Second, from his criticisms of holism and of large-scale planning or utopian social engineering 
Popper developed his philosophy of politics. In place of totalitarianism, which often comes 
from an increase in state power because of large-scale planning, Popper emphasised individual 
freedom. In place of utopian social engineering Popper emphasised piecemeal social 
engineering. Consequently, the concepts of individual freedom and piecemeal social 
engineering became the rallying themes, among others, of Popper’ philosophy of politics. 
There is however ample communitarian focus in Popper’s own conception of what makes for 
“negative utility”, and that becomes on that basis a well-motivated reason for piecemeal social 
engineering. Both the liberal concepts of Popper’s philosophy of politics that concern 
individual freedom, and the strong residual communitarianism in Popper’s outlook, I shall 
discuss separately in succeeding chapters.  
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Marx on Scientific Socialism 
The Marxian theory of class struggle is an essential part of Marx’s “scientific socialism”. 
Marx’s theories about society, economics and politics all maintain that a class struggle exists 
within the history of human societies and together these theories make out the effects of this 
struggle as a progression from one stage to another.  Marx developed a theory of historical 
materialism that explains the progression that he alleges that there is in terms of the material 
conditions of human existence. Marx believed that society’s inevitable progress and its 
historical transition is scientifically determined by economic “laws of motion”. The “laws of 
motion” or what is sometimes called “development trend” is based on Marx’s prediction of 
how human society (capitalist mode of production in particular) would function, develop and 
transform (Marx 1977: 218). In the Communist Manifesto of the People’s Party, Marx wrote 
that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” (Marx and 
Engels 1967: 93). Marx held the view that there exist historically necessary stages of society 
with inherent economic, social and political conflicts among two groups always in constant 
class struggles with each other (Marx 1972: 171). 
Marx viewed capitalist society as comprising two social classes: the Proletariats (workers) and 
Bourgeoisie (capitalists). Marx’s held that in the capitalist society the workers are alienated 
from the commodities they produce. Marx explained that the focus of the capitalist is to produce 
commodities for the exchange market and that in order to maintain a high level of profit the 
capitalist must extract as much labour from the workers as possible at the lowest possible cost. 
This heralds the labour theory of value as advocated by the British economist David Ricardo 
(1772-1823) and accepted by Marx. So since it is the case that the workers’ demands are exactly 
the opposite of the actions of the capitalists ̶ that is, since the workers seek to receive the highest 
possible wages for their work, just as the capitalist owners seek to pay as little as possible ̶ the 
struggle between the two classes is inevitable. 
Marx stressed that capitalism was unstable, and prone to increasingly severe crisis. Marx 
termed “contradictions” to capitalism patterns whose conditions of existence are also key 
ingredients for their own demise. Marx believed that the role that internal social contradictions 
play in the historical process of capitalist society would result in internal implosion. The 
increasingly severe crises would puncture even the cyclic growth of which capitalism is for a 
while capable and lead to collapse.  Marx held that capitalism will implode not only because 
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of its competitive private character, but also because of the anarchical tendencies of the internal 
social contradictions (Roubini 2011: 2). Marx concluded that those structural contradictions 
within capitalism will necessarily lead to its end, giving way to socialism, and an eventual 
transformation to a communist society.  
Marx’s transformation agenda is aimed at a progressive kind of nationalism that benefits only 
the proletariat. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx re-asserted the conditions under which the 
proletariat must first acquire political supremacy. Through the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
the proletariat would rise to be the leading class of the nation, the intention is to be nationalistic, 
but not in the bourgeoisie sense of nationalism (Marx and Engels 1848: 127). In a sense, Marx 
rejected the kind of nationalism that tended to distract the proletariats from their progressive 
objective of overthrowing the bourgeoisie. However, Marx supported the kind of progressive 
nationalism that promoted international class struggle. 
Marx followed Hegel who supported nationalism essentially through the defence of ‘positive 
freedom’ as central normative concept and the nation-state as bringing to highest form of what 
‘positive freedom’ can come to.  A person is ‘negatively free’ who merely has liberty in the 
liberal’s sense.  Negative freedom requires absence of constraint upon a person against their 
following their own appetites and desires.  Positive freedom in Hegel’s sense is utterly 
different, and depends not on the nation’s power over individuals being limited, but on the 
contrary, upon individuals being bound up in national aspirations so far as their own 
functioning or purposefulness and so far as their own freedom is concerned. Hegel conceived 
of human societies as entities that were greater than the individuals. This nationalist conception 
influenced Marx who by contrast ‘stood Hegel on his feet’ and so charted a course that would 
eventually lead the proletariats to a kind of progressive nationalism that benefits them only. 
Marx also got from Hegel’s account a holist perspective which promotes the prioritisation in 
Hegel’s account of the nation-state above that of the individual.  This accounts for reasons that 
Marx’s holism is said to promote central planned/large-scale planned economic system in 
which communist nations are known to do little to value the individual. Marx’s holism is also 
too strongly supposed that freedom must be positive, in much of the state controlled economy 
which undermines individual rights, in much of Hegelian, nationalistic sort of way. 
‘Tribalism’ is Popper’s disparaging term in effect for nationalism; and Popper used the term to 
place Hegel and in particular Marx, as enemies of the Open society. With Popper, the 
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categorisation of some societies as “tribal” is with a classification of whether a 
society is marked or not by a critical attitude. As much as Popper wished that every facet of 
human endeavour including science to be intellectually ”open” he emphasised this “openness” 
more within the realm of politics. His experiences with many of his intellectual colleagues of 
the political turmoil in Europe led him to assert that Europe at the time was a tribal and closed 
society because of the prevalent totalitarianism. Europe, during the time that Popper wrote, 
became intellectually stagnated through political manoeuvring and selfish nationalist ethnicity. 
In recent times, a good many expressions of nationalistic ugliness have again expressed 
themselves, for example, the xenophobic nationalism of far-right-wing political parties in 
various nations. This is a far cry from what Europe was in the 18th century and early 19th century 
where European civilisation was almost already at its peak. Then in the 20th century as Popper 
viewed things, Europe became tribalistic standing civilisation on its head. Popper traced the 
origin of this tribal totalitarianism in Europe to the theories of holism and historicism in which 
history is said to unfold according to inexorably ‘universal’ laws that can be found in the 
philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx. 
Certainly, with Marx’s belief in the inexorable laws of history, Marx thought that he could 
predict social, economic, and material phenomena by examining their historical trends in order 
to derive probable outcomes and probable future developments. With this understanding, Marx 
felt that he could truly scientifically predict events of future societal developments. This theory 
is what Marx thought was scientific, just on the basis of its historical analysis and not on its 
empirical basis. This presupposition is historicist, and is a chief target of criticism by Popper. 
Popper on Scientific Marxism 
Certainly in the mid-nineteenth century Marxism had seemed to warrant being called a 
scientific theory. This was exactly when Darwin’s theory of evolution became influential, and 
people at the time who had regarded Darwin’s contribution as scientific would have been hard 
pressed to find any reasons to deny the same status to Marx’s theory. Common to both doctrines 
is the struggle to survive through natural processes. While Darwin’s theory draws inspiration 
from natural processes of life, Marxism draws inspiration from social transformation and a 
kind of naturalistic historical interpretation. This is why Frederick Engels (1820-1883) 
emphasised that “just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx 
discovered the law of development of human history” (Engels 1978, 162). So Marxism, at the 
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time, was accepted as a scientific theory owing to the nature of its identification of the social 
evolutionary process which was analogous to the biological evolutionary process that Darwin 
discovered. This forms the nucleus of Marx’s scientific socialism. It is with the presumed 
authority of a scientist that Marx announces the historical inevitability of the coming of 
socialism and communism, and the eventual total collapse of capitalism. 
Yet, precisely the perception that Marxism is science Popper attacked, and attacked vigorously. 
As previously discussed, Popper used his falsificationist demarcation criterion to distinguish 
between theories that are scientific from pseudoscientific theories. Popper viewed as pseudo-
science Marx’s “scientific materialist” interpretation of history. This was on a different ground 
from that upon which Popper dismissed Freud’s psychoanalytic theory as pseudo-science. 
Psychoanalysis seemed to Popper logically unfalsifiable. Freud’s theory seemed to Popper not 
to be saying anything that could possibly conflict with empirical evidence. Marx’s theory was 
different because a critical person could engage with it in a way that used it to make predictions 
that experience could then show to be false. The problem with Marx’s theory, Popper argued, 
is that neither Marx, nor the other Marxians, were critical in their way of engaging with the 
theory. They rendered their theory unfalsifiable by the uncritical way that they simply adhered 
to it. Popper contended that, ironically, Marx’s theory is both ‘falsified’ and ‘unfalsifiable’. It 
is shown to be false by actual history, provided you engage with the theory with a will to be 
critical of it. But Marxists themselves render it ‘methodologically unfalsifiable’ because come 
what may they are not disposed to be critical of their theory. 
What makes good science in Popper’s view is the ability of a theory to be made out as false if 
it is, by empirical testing of it. Popper thus confronted Marx with the single word 
‘unfalsifiable’. Logically Marx’s theory is falsifiable, because it was in fact “refuted by events 
that occurred during the Russian Revolution” (Popper 1992: 43). However, Marxism was made 
methodologically unfalsifiable because of the way that its proponents always defended it.  
Popper developed a distinction between scientific prediction and unconditional historical 
prediction or historical prophecy, as I have illustrated in chapter 4. The former is conditional 
because scientists understand that any determinate prediction depends on conditions, such as 
the prediction that water will boil at 100 degrees (false if the ambient air pressure is far different 
from usual). The latter is unconditional in the Marxians’ own telling of their prophecy. In any 
case it involves people and society at large, about whom we are not much able to specify 
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experimental conditions or controls. Actions such as, under what condition would a people 
revolt against a government policy, cannot be known as the boiling point of water is known. 
Human actions and society do not change unconditionally, and the conditions that there are are 
complicated and highly variable.  
What the above argument presupposes is that one can control the conditions of a scientific 
experiment; hence the outcomes are conditional upon those controls.  However, one cannot so 
readily control the conditions of social experiments or planning.  This ultimately makes human 
actions and social change subject to intractable vicissitudes. The workings of society are less 
amenable than the workings of heated water to the control of conditions determining change.   
I concur with Popper’s criticism of Marx’s idea of historical prediction. Marxism trades wholly 
in unconditional historical prophecy. This is not really prediction at all if the theory’s adherents 
all treat the theory uncritically. The basis of Popper’s criticism of Marx is that Marxism 
misinterprets scientific prediction as historicism. Marxism parades its unconditional historical 
prophecy as scientific prediction on the slim basis that the theory of historical materialism is a 
materialist conception of history, not idealist. Yet whether historical prediction is genuine 
prediction altogether rests on whether one can be critical of the theory if the predictions that it 
makes do not match empirical evidence. Since Marxism disallows this, its pretence of making 
predictions is false pretence. The metaphysical adoption of materialism in place of idealism is 
neither here nor there.   
Consequently, I endorse Popper’s criticism of Marx. Marxian historical prophecy is in fact 
inoculated against possible criticism and so is not really prediction nor is it therefore robust or 
truly interesting as prophecy. Even the emergence of some communist states in history did not 
pass through quite the stages that Marx prophesied or into quite the final form that he 
envisaged. Other states that he had predicted surely would progress to communism did not. 
The “dictatorship of the proletariat” that Marx predicted in fact turned out in Russia to be rather 
oppressive and merely totalitarian. Marx’s historical prophecy furthermore confers upon the 
oppressed an emotional hope of a better future life, or indeed, the hope of a “heaven on earth”. 
This is moral grandstanding and its prediction of future economic and political development is 
significantly inaccurate in fact.  
Popper contended that while Marx’s theory is potentially logically falsifiable based on events 
of history, it is also rendered methodologically unfalsifiable. This makes Marx’s theory 
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insusceptible to true corroboration because of the way ‘vulgar Marxists’ have kept 
reinterpreting the evidence in order to maintain agreement with it (Popper 1945b: 93). The 
potential logical falsifiability of Marxism, Popper asserted, is as a result of its claim that it is 
in fully developed capitalist countries that socialist revolutions would occur; and that the 
socialist revolution would be carried out by the proletariat. On the contrary, both claims have 
been falsified by events of experience because first, the socialist revolutions did not occur in 
fully developed capitalist countries such as Belgium and England but what did happen was the 
Bolsheviks socialist revolution in backward and agrarian Tsarist Russia. Second, the socialist 
revolutions that later occurred in other places such as China, Cuba and Vietnam were also 
carried out, not by the working class, but through the peasantry. Marxist scientific prediction 
of the historical inevitability of future social developments and especially of revolutions is 
demonstrated to have failed, and thus has been falsified. The fact that Marxists simply dismiss 
such criticism, shows that Marxists’ prediction is nothing but that kind of prophecy that 
adherents cannot imagine would fail. 
Should Marxism be defended against Popper’s Critique? 
For intellectuals who are ideologically socialist, Marxism remains the moral and intellectual 
foundation. However, the allure of a world, where distribution of income will be done 
according to one’s needs, has faded, much as has the confidence that it will come about, after 
the eventual collapse of capitalism and an inevitable transition to socialism. Reformed hopes 
of Marxist glasnost and perestroika have also not been fulfilled (Sheehan 1993: xv). Instead of 
having Marx’s prophecy fulfilled, ever more once socialist societies are embracing a free 
market economy. Rather than a Marxist future the turn of actual events has been going in quite 
the opposite direction.  
Admittedly, Marxism is an influential doctrine. We cannot lose sight today of the basic facts 
of classical liberalism that Marxism set out to criticise over 150 years ago. Marxism is one of 
the most influential doctrines that exposes the exploitative dimensions of capitalism. Marx’s 
identification of class struggle particularly within capitalist societies appears sensible given 
that the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat only appears in complex and 
developed classical liberal capitalist societies. Marx’s claim that the class stratification that the 
capitalist society creates between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie alienates labour, 
impoverishes workers, and establishes surplus value for the capitalists, remains true in our 
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world today. Popper too did admire Marx’s temerity in Marx’s criticism of both capitalism and 
its attendant economic and social evils. This is evident when Popper acknowledged as fair and 
right “Marxists’ insistence that the social problems of our time are urgent...and that as 
philosophers we should not be content to interpret the world but we should help to change it”30. 
Moreover, it is the same concern with the evils of unrestrained capitalism that prompted Popper 
to develop a theory of negative utilitarianism. Clearly, the aim of both Marx and Popper was 
to reduce the burden of economic exploitation and reduce human suffering. Where Popper 
diverged from Marx was over Marxists’ scientific claim of the materialist interpretation of 
history (Popper 1963: 34). 
The continued relevance of Marxist socio-economic philosophy in contemporary times cannot 
be denied. The model of society as structured by the economic basis, legal and political 
superstructures and a definite form of social consciousness that Marx presented both in The 
Capital as well as in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy remains important to 
socio-economic theory. Marx presented theories which explain such kind of evil in capitalism. 
Today, capitalism has produced the multinational corporations that can assemble far more 
effective intelligence behind their often nefarious designs than any nation’s government can 
assemble to try to hold multinationals at bay.  The machinations of international capital are 
huge, and affect conditions in every country with a uniformity and to an extent that makes one 
begin to think that in the present day ‘nation state’ is politically almost a non-entity.  The 
separation of capital from means of production is pretty eerie and strange in the present day. 
As things go now with the capitalist system, there is an indication that there is some foresight 
in some of Marx’s prognostication. The world seems to continue to acquiesce in the vast control 
of economic and political resources by the wealthiest 1%.  However, even if Marx’s 
prognostications were vindicated in some ways they would be refuted in other ways — for 
there is not the least anticipation in Das Kapital or elsewhere in Marx’s writing that the world 
could be heading in the direction of globalised economies and prodigious clout by multi-
nationals, some specialising in what has little to do with any actual production of anything. 
                                                 
30 This can be found in the paper “Prophesy and Prediction in the Social Sciences” that Popper delivered to the 
Plenary Session of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam (1948). A more comprehensive 
discussion of this can also be found in The Poverty of Historicism. 
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A Marxist scholars who defended Marxism against the charge of historicism was Gerald Allan 
Cohen (1941-2009). Indeed, Cohen’s analytical Marxism, a defence of Marxist’s historical 
materialism, is an affirmation of the logical coherence and clarity in methodology of this 
theory. Cohen deployed his analysis and defence of Marxism on the nature of human rationality 
and intelligence. His in-depth philosophical analysis was anchored on the premise that the 
rational character of the human person makes possible the fact that economic relations of 
production are functionally explained by the productive forces. At one and the same time, 
Cohen insists, the superstructures are functionally linked to and explained away by the relations 
of production (Cohen 1978: 112). Cohen argued that Marxist theory of history can stand 
without the dream of prophecy. However, Cohen ostensibly left out the part of Marxism which 
emphasises the “inexorable laws of historical destiny”. Rather, he accounted for events in 
human history in Marxism, not by a prophecy, but by rationality that determines the mode of 
productive forces.  
Many criticisms, such as that from Richard W. Miller, have been motivated by Cohen’s 
‘defence of Marxists’ historical materialist’ position. Miller berated Cohen for presenting a 
non-dialectically oriented version of Marxism. Miller was of the opinion that the intellectual 
study of Marxism cannot occur in isolation from the struggles and the revolutionary praxis of 
intervention in world affairs. In this respect, Miller re-emphasised the role of class struggle in 
the transition from one mode of production to another that is consistent with Marxism (Miller 
1984: 121). This criticism reiterates the constitutive elements of Marxists historical 
determinism. It demonstrates that the transition from one mode of production to another 
constitutes the prediction of historical destiny that Marx made.  
Like Popper, Eduard Bernstein’s (1850-1932) revisionist interpretation of Marxism 
emphasised the point that Marxism is not a science, and that Marx’s prediction about the 
development and eventual collapse of capitalism has failed. This position puts Bernstein in an 
opposite camp to Karl Kautsky (1854-1938). Kautsky, after the demise of Engels, continued to 
vehemently defend the economic theory of Marxism. Kautsky followed Marx in the historicist 
idea that social labour would be distributed among all individuals according to their needs and 
desires under primitive communism (Kautsky 1903: Chap. VII). 
The point I am developing here is significant in two ways. Firstly, I acknowledge the significant 
contribution that Marxism makes to the diagnosis of the recurrent evils in unregulated 
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capitalism. Although the appeal to Marxism as an alternative to contemporary neoliberal 
capitalist hegemony made by Slavoj Zizek and Costas Douzinas (eds.) in the introduction of 
their book, The Idea of Communism (2011) has attraction, it is not convincing. The argument 
that the economic crisis of the early new century was caused by liberal capitalist economy, and 
as such has brought about struggle and agitations for a new economic and political order, cannot 
be substantiated. Granted that liberal capitalism, like every social economic model, has its 
weaknesses. However, its features of the open market based on property rights and human 
freedom are more desirable than fascist, socialist or communist regimes where state-run 
economies often make systemic corruption a semi-legal affair. So, inspite of their defence of 
Marxism, Marxism does not seem a suitable replacement of liberal capitalism. 
Secondly, I re-emphasise the point that Popper’s critique of Marxian historicism is correct. In 
spite of the defences of Marxism offered by authors such as Cohen, Kautsky, Zizek and 
Douzinas Popper’s argument against utopian/large-scale planning or central economic 
planning reveals a direct consequence of the totalitarianism of Leninist-Marxist ideology.  
In all of this, I argue that Marxism failed as a theory of social change because of its emphasis 
on predictions. The prediction was the promise of an ideal world which characterises the 
coming of a communist classless society that Marxism objectifies. It is on the basis of such 
utopianism that Popper labelled Marx a holist historicist, a person “making heaven on earth 
with a stroke of a dictator’s pen” (Shearmur and Turner eds. 2008b: 60). If Marx had reduced 
the analysis of the capitalist economy to showing only its woes, and if he had not predicted an 
ideal, communist future for the world that would manifest itself due to the “inexorable law of 
history”, Marxism may not have become a self-serving ideology.  
Development of Popper’s liberalism   
A form of liberalism in Popper, and by extension his whole political philosophy, evolved from 
his criticisms of the ‘false prophets’, the enemies of the open society. Popper charged Plato, 
Hegel and in particular Marx with historicism and named them the enemies of the open society. 
While the charges directed at Plato and Hegel are equally of significance in the development 
of his liberalism, Popper’s critique of Marxian historicism is the focus of this section of the 
dissertation. The two basic features of Popper’s liberalism that developed from this criticism, 
as earlier stated, are his ideas of individual freedom and the concept of piecemeal social 
engineering. 
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Popper labelled Marxian historicism as utopian/large-scale social planning which attempts 
holist/historicist prediction of future social development. Popper argued that knowledge is 
inherently unpredictable, and that how a society is structured depends on the knowledge it 
acquires. A society that attempts to structure itself on a predictable evolutionary pattern 
engages in a utopian/large-scale social planning or central economic planning debacle. Such a 
society is not marked by rational intellectualism and democratic transformations. It is also a 
society that does not promote freedom, human rights, justice, free-market economy and 
accountability. Evidently, such a kind of society is closed to freedom of thought, and its 
institutional systems are often totalitarian. Such kinds of society promote a system which 
encourages the need to have a strong centralised rule by a few and a centrally planned economy. 
It is a ‘tribal’ and ‘closed’ society. Popper, in a lecture called “Open society and the democratic 
state”, expressed the following view: 
I believe that a free market-economy is more efficient than a centrally 
planned economy. Yet I hold that it is wrong to base the rejection of 
tyranny on economic arguments. Even if it were true that a centrally 
planned state economy is superior to that of the free market, I should 
oppose the centrally planned economy. I should oppose it because of the 
likelihood that it would increase the power of the state to the point of 
tyranny. It is not the inefficiency of communism against which we should 
fight, but its inhumanity and its inherent hostility to liberty. We should not 
sell our freedom for a mess of pottage, or for the promise that we shall 
obtain the highest possible productivity and efficiency ― not even if we 
could be sure that we can purchase efficiency at the price of liberty. 
                  (Popper, Archives Box 6) 
In arguing that utopian/large-scale planning or central economic planning increases the power 
of the state and also leads to totalitarianism, Popper also saw the need to develop the liberal 
idea of individual freedom. The consequence of utopian/large-scale social planning is that 
individuals risk the erosion of their liberty, not merely to profit from, but most likely never 
even to produce their own ingenious thinking. Where large-scale or central planners assume 
the position of autocratic rule and control government structures, people are indirectly forced 
against their will to respect this monopoly. Such practices are common among totalitarian 
governments with centralised planning. What we find from this, is suppression of the views of, 
participation of, and potential critical feedback from the populace. There is an absence of 
personal freedom and of possibilities for citizens to express and determine their wishes and 
aspirations. The concept of freedom which forms the basis of an open society cannot be found 
in this kind of political arrangement. The argument here is about freedom for creative 
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engagement in politics and in the economy. It also concerns the issue of the paucity of 
information available to the large-scale planners. The capacity to make free, rational choices 
(for the individual or in the interests of one’s social environment) depends to a very large 
extent, not on mere proclamations, but on the practical ability to do so. 
For Popper’s liberalism, an open society, in which individuals rightfully make choices and 
thereby contribute information to the socio- economic and political process, would operate 
instead of a system of large-scale planning. For, that very openness, transparency and freedom 
would require all forms of political totalitarianism to have ended. It would seem that the goal 
would need to be to eradicate totalitarianism and establish openness and freedom. 
Hayek’s criticism of central economic planning, derived from the work of Von Mises, lends 
support to Popper’s critique of utopian/large-scale planning. Hayek used his concept of 
“economic calculation” which places importance on the information provided through market 
pricing to argue that government interference in price allocation of goods lacks the method to 
allocate resources rationally (Hayek 1935: 117). Hayek used this concept as a yardstick to 
determine how resources can be rationally distributed in a society. Hayek criticised central 
economic planning as a shortcoming of socialist economies where the government owns and 
controls the means of production and distribution (Hayek 1944: 72). With his enthusiasm for a 
free market economy, Hayek advocated a pricing information system where individuals 
determine rationally how goods and services are distributed through their willingness to pay 
for these goods and services.  
Although Popper had many of the same targets as Hayek, his critical engagement came from a 
different perspective. Hayek and Popper differed significantly on the grounds and the degree 
to which government can intervene in markets and society. Hayek advocated a limited state 
intervention because he believed that there were dangers and other unintended consequences, 
particularly against freedom, with state intervention. Popper, on the other hand, advocated 
government intervention. Popper addressed this intervention through concern to reduce the 
unintended consequences that may emerge in unrestrained capitalism. Popper was insistent 
upon the need to be cautious of unrestrained capitalism, or, what George Soros calls market 
fundamentalism, which, if unchecked, may lead to exploitation and a degeneration of society 
away from social and economic equality. Popper advocated the establishment of legal 
frameworks without which the unintended consequences that may arise from free-market 
106 
 
ideology may, themselves, endanger the individual freedom they seek to protect. According to 
Popper, “a free market can only exist if it is protected by a legal system, by a rule of law” 
(Shearmur and Turner eds. 2008b: 386).  
With his criticism of utopian/large-scale planning or central economic planning, Popper 
advocated that social reform should be piecemeal. By addressing the large-scale economic and 
political planning with which totalitarian politics are beset, Popper deployed his concept of 
piecemeal social engineering as suitable for social reform.  
More importantly, Popper’s liberal concept of piecemeal social engineering provides a 
significant impetus to understanding the evils found in the trend of large-scale planning that 
often characterises political landscape in totalitarian politics. Large-scale planning is done by 
way of government intrusion in the means of production and distribution of goods and services. 
Sadly, because of the centrally planned economic structure in those kinds of society, there is 
little impetus behind developing a free-market economy. Governments overwhelmingly 
influence pricing systems and their level of control creates a degree of apathy in the 
marketplace, from the private investor to the individual consumer. Despite government 
influence on pricing control mechanisms, these influences are ineffective owing to the corrupt 
nature of government institutions; either government institutions are often corrupt, or the 
powers of government institutions are often corruptive. Government pricing control breeds 
economic inefficiency and allows room for endemic and pervasive corruption. Lack of 
accountability because of economic corruption is tantamount to a failure of intellectual 
openness. The reason for this is that openness and transparency commonly evade large-scale 
planning that is done by one person or a small group of people in power. Von Mises is right to 
say that rational economic activity is impossible in an economy plagued with overwhelming 
government influences and control (Von Mises 1920: 22). The result of this kind of 
arrangement is economic inefficiency, gross misconduct and lack of accountability resulting 
into corrupt practices. 
The results that such political corruption breeds are radically different from what Popper’s 
liberal ideas of piecemeal social engineering are intended to achieve. Popper likened utopian/ 
large-scale social planning to holistic social engineering and asserted that we should think that 
only social engineering which is piecemeal is legitimate. The goal of Popper’s piecemeal social 
engineering is to apply the doctrine of negative utilitarianism in order to reduce or ameliorate 
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suffering through a trial-and-error method of eliminating and isolating issues and proffering 
solutions in bits-and-pieces. Due to the impossibility of acquiring knowledge of future social 
developments, social planning cannot be based on a blueprint idea of public policy. Social 
reforms have to be piecemeal rather than attempt to reform the whole society with definite 
large-scale planning. This is to mitigate any unintended consequences or acknowledged social 
ills that may arise in the course of social reform.   
Conclusion 
I agree with Popper that utopian thinking in the manner of Marxian historicism muddles 
meaningful socio-economic and political reform rather than assisting it. Liberal socio-
economic and political reform is ultimately non-utopian. Liberalism opposes large-scale social 
planning and, quite without reference to any utopia, supplies terms in which to be aptly critical 
of the totalitarianism with which Marxian historicism is predisposed. So, to identify with 
confidence some ways in which social and political reforms could be improved, does not 
depend at all upon a vision of a utopia. It depends on a kind of reform which carefully 
articulates the needed changes or restructuring to undertake with a view to best learning from 
one’s mistakes. This is the piecemeal social reform that Popper advocated. It also depends on 
a commitment to respecting individual freedom and independent thinking and the degree of 
merit that individual ideas can benefit their originators. 
I endorse the criticisms of Marxian historicism that Popper made. I agree that open democratic 
societies are far superior to closed totalitarian regimes which Marxism portends. Popper’s 
insistence that social reform should be piecemeal (although I shall make modifications to this 
concept in the next chapter 6) constitutes a suitable model of liberal reconstruction of society. 
It gives room for Popper’s idea that government must respond piecemeal to societal problems 
in order to mitigate the societal evils that may accompany large-scale social planning or central 
economic planning as Hayek called it.  
Although Hayek’s criticism of central economic planning counts significantly in the realm of 
liberal reform projects, the neo-liberal reform that Hayek’s economic philosophy advocates is 
not in total consonance with Popper’s insistence that social engineering should only ever be 
piecemeal.  For Hayek, the neo-liberal case is that its prescriptions (market solutions wherever 
feasible) lead to good outcomes. Partly for the reason that Popper advocated state limited 
intervention, I do question whether the neo-liberal reform that Hayek advocates can have the 
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same kind of results that Popper is explicitly concerned that social reform should have. 
Although neo-liberalism promotes efficiency in private enterprise, it abolishes government 
roles in economic matters that Popper does not want. This is also contrary to Popper’s idea of 
negative utilitarianism concerning the role of government in ensuring it reduces suffering 
among the people rather than promoting happiness. To counter this concern, Popper’s 
condemnation of unrestrained capitalism and his advocacy for the formulation of a legal 
framework and government intervention are all the other endearing features of his philosophy 
of politics. 
In the spirit of elaborating on Popper’s political philosophy, I will further examine the 
philosophical implications of his liberal ideas of piecemeal social engineering and individual 
freedom in the succeeding chapters. Regarding piecemeal social engineering, it is with a view 
to assessing the theoretical basis of the bits-and-pieces approach to social reform that Popper 
recommends. Certain practical applications of the concept will be evaluated so as to consider 
the magnitude of reforms to which the trial and error, gradualist approach to social and political 
reform can undertake in real life situations. The conclusions reached in the next chapter and 
the modifications that I make therein have implications for a new way of looking at the 
piecemeal social engineering approach that Popper endorses for social reform.  
Regarding individual freedom, further critical examination is made in order to highlight the 
theoretical basis upon which Popper grounds his philosophy of freedom in the realm of politics. 
An extension on Popper’s liberal idea of individual freedom is considered as it concerns the 
notion of individualism that pervades his philosophy of freedom and politics in general. I shall 
argue that there is greater room for the social in Popper’s liberal politics beyond the pervasive 
individualism he is best known for. In establishing the social dimension of Popper’s idea of 
freedom, I shall defend a position on social freedom which emphasises both the explicit 
individualism and implicit social nature of Popper’s politics.  
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Chapter Six: Popper’s Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-
Pieces-at-once’?   
The characteristic approach of the piecemeal engineer is this. Even though 
he may perhaps cherish some ideals which concern society ‘as a whole’… 
he does not believe in the method of redesigning it as a whole.  Whatever 
his ends, he tries to achieve them by small adjustments and readjustments 
which can be continually improved upon … The piecemeal engineer 
knows, like Socrates, how little he knows. He knows that we can learn from 
our mistakes. Accordingly, he will make his way, step by step, carefully 
comparing the results achieved, and always on the lookout for the 
unavoidable unwanted consequences of any reform; and he will avoid 
undertaking reforms of a complexity and scope which make it impossible 
for him to disentangle causes and effects, and to know what he is really 
doing. 
                                    (Popper 1957:  66-67)  
Introduction 
One of the most important themes of Popper’s political thought is his mistrust of large-scale 
planning. Popper introduces an antithetical idea: the idea of piecemeal social engineering. 
Popper terms ‘piecemeal engineering’ the redressing of agreed social problems by a trial-and-
error, bits-and-pieces approach. The specific end must be to ameliorate a condition that all 
reasonable people agree is a problem. The means to that end must be tentative: the social 
engineer must be fallibilist concerning any aspect of the approach that is taken. Popper expects 
that from epistemic modesty of this kind will also flow a disposition to respect individual rights 
and to protect against any injustice. Many Popper scholars such as Magee and John Gray (1948- 
) consider piecemeal engineering (as the centrepiece of social and political philosophy) to be 
isomorphic with falsificationism (as the centrepiece of a philosophy of natural science). For 
Magee (1973: 78) in particular, “Popper’s political philosophy is seamlessly interwoven with 
his philosophy of science”. Magee’s claim was that with falsification, or with conjecture and 
refutation, Popper believed anyone may criticise and contribute, and equivalently, piecemeal 
engineering shuns authority or vaunted expertise and depends merely upon making it the case 
that one can learn from one’s mistakes. Magee claims furthermore that, through this approach, 
we can better eliminate errors and make better social reforms than can be done by 
utopian/large-scale social planning. That is to say, piecemeal engineering may be modest, but 
modest is better. Based on this understanding, piecemeal engineering is claimed to provide a 
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practical underpinning for a scientific–experimental intervention in society involving a process 
of social learning. 
However, not all Popper commentators agree with this. For example,  Freeman’s (1975), denied 
that Popper’s philosophy of science entails an incrementalist approach to scientific change, and 
so denied that the incremental reform that Popper favoured in social change is isomorphic with 
Popper’s own conception of the process of natural science. I think that my own early chapters 
have provided good reason to dismiss this view of Freeman’s. Freeman’s claim is that what 
Popper recommended in science is an act of revolutionary valour by way of falsification or 
error elimination and bold new conjecture, and this is contrary to the piecemeal change he 
favoured in social transformation.  
I have argued by contrast that Popper’s anti-revolutionary dispositions acutely inform his 
philosophy of science, in ways that make what is ‘bold’ appropriate and helpful precisely from 
its being courageous and only when it is courageous.  Courage, I have argued, would not be 
possible in outright revolutionary change, since courage requires significant conservation of 
values. True revolutionaries overturn so much that their boldness can only be rash, not truly 
courageous. This is the implicit burden of a strong anti-revolutionary disposition in Popper. 
Popper consequently downplays the extent to which any bold new conjecture in natural 
sciences outright ‘revolutionises’ its field. (Popper sharply contrasts with Thomas S. Kuhn.)  
It is important to note that Popper himself asserted that “there are a number of common ideas” 
(Popper 1973: 79-80) between his science and politics. Michael Freeman (1975) disputed 
whether there is this connection between Popper’s philosophy of science and his political 
philosophy, but Freeman was mistaken to do so.  
Popper gave thematic significance in both his philosophy of science and his philosophy of 
politics to the critical method of falsification or error elimination (conjecture and refutation), 
together with rationality, fallibilism and openness. At the same time, Popper personified as ‘an’ 
engineer the reformer who would work in trial-and-error spirit by a piecemeal approach.  This 
emblematises Popper’s consistent balancing of individual and social aspects in his philosophy. 
My aim in this chapter is not to delve any further into the controversy of whether or not 
Popper’s philosophy of science and political philosophy are mutually supporting. I aim to 
evaluate Popper’s piecemeal engineering as a model for achieving social and political change 
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when major social and political change is necessary. The parallel evaluative question 
concerning natural science would be whether conjecture and refutation can drive, in real time, 
ultimately very major needed intellectual change. However, because I wish to consider the 
scale and speed of social change that is needed in less developed nations, nations that are often 
riven by corruption, my evaluative question concerns whether piecemeal engineering is 
competent to such tasks. I shall briefly contextualise this study to Africa, where the scale of 
socio-economic and political change that is both needed and needed quickly is vast, and where 
corruption is rife ̶social and pol in countries where foreign interests have come to extract oil. 
By discussing first in philosophy of science why I believe Popper’s method can quickly 
accomplish intellectual change, I shall also defend the value of piecemeal engineering for social 
reform even of deeply troubled nations such as those in Africa.  However, I will defend the 
need for many-pieces-at-once reform when the needs are urgent enough, despite the fact that 
this would blur somewhat the empirical learning that would be accomplished. 
I agree with Popper that piecemeal engineering is a requirement for epistemically most-
responsible peer review and social learning, and so also for the most careful variety of social 
transformation. Partly in terms of “many-pieces-at-once” social engineering that varies 
Popper’s prescription somewhat, I shall argue for the following four points:  
1. that one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal social engineering is liable to be too slow when 
radical institutional changes are needed; 
2. that, since a significant change (cause) is required in order to achieve a noticeable 
consequence (effect) in social relations, small one-at-a-time piecemeal changes would 
often not change society noticeably;  
3. that the magnitude of the situation often requires that social reform be undertaken 
many-pieces-at-once;  
4. that while Popper’s one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal social engineering seems sensible 
where societies are already deeply developed, societies that are less developed require 
faster, much more sweeping political change, that consequently will be “many-pieces-
at-once”.  
Understanding Piecemeal Engineering 
Officially according to Popper, the piecemeal engineering approach is the introduction of 
modest changes to address specific problems, and modest implementation of progressively 
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modified steps or policies in response to the observed consequences of those interventions. 
Piecemeal engineering involves small scale intervention to deal with social issues, and to see 
whether they are producing their intended effects, and to find ways of mitigating any 
unintended consequences. It is therefore a trial-and-error approach to learning that seeks to 
refine interventions based on that learning.   
For Popper, the way to disentangle causes and effects is to avoid undertaking reforms of too 
great a complexity. Popper insists that it should always be possible to know the effect of the 
changes we have introduced in social reform.  In Popper’s estimation, by pursuing a sweeping 
social change, one would make it very difficult to determine exactly which aspect of the 
intervention is having the most influence. Yet Popper insisted that our concern needs to be with 
understanding causes and effects, for that is how we can be duly tentative, and fallibilist, 
concerning our steps. We would otherwise have no way to learn from our mistakes. So, without 
disentangling causes and effects, one would be in confusion concerning whether any 
intervention attempted was contributing to or thwarting a desired social transformation.  
Therefore, the epistemically responsible way to achieve a desired end is to approach social 
problems piecemeal. Sweeping grand scale change is epistemically irresponsible and as likely 
as not will, relative to what one aims to accomplish, be destructive rather than helpful. 
Two commentators who understand that Popper’s idea of piecemeal engineering expresses his 
approach to obtaining knowledge in natural science are P.D Shaw and Gurol Irzik (1955- ). 
Irzik interprets Popper as insisting upon the maxims (a) change as few variables as possible, 
and (b) make quantitatively small changes. Mindful of the scale and pace of change that is 
needed in a developing country such as his own native Turkey, Irzik criticises and rejects both 
maxim (a) and maxim (b). 
Both Irzik and Shaw characterise Popper’s piecemeal engineering as directly expressing the 
falsificationist idea that experimental science progresses through trial and error. How we learn 
from our mistakes, recognise our errors and utilise them critically (Popper 1957: 87), is crucial 
to Popper’s proposed method of social transformation. The claim here is that in a typical liberal 
society it is straightforward to detect social problems. Then by trial and error it is possible to 
assess policies aimed at solving the problems. Relieving society of a condition that every 
rational person agrees is a problem is by a process of experimentation analogous to that 
employed in natural science.  
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It is on the basis of the above claim that I shall examine the possibility of looking at Popper’s 
piecemeal engineering as a scientific method. However, it is important to first evaluate the 
plausibility or otherwise of engineering science itself being piecemeal. In providing this 
analysis, I shall neither here indulge in differentiating the methods that are used in various 
engineering fields of study nor would I differentiate between on the one hand, an applied 
scientist (a.k.a. ‘the engineer’) and on the other hand an ‘experimental scientist’. I am aware 
that engineering projects are not experiments but aim to draw on the considerable body of 
existing theory and established practice. However, the project itself must be approached in a 
manner that allows for some degree of experimental adjustment to the contingencies of 
particular environments and conditions. 
Is Engineering Science Piecemeal? 
It is difficult to determine if most philosophers, especially Popper, possess an account of 
applied theoretical knowledge that engineering science is known to be. To most philosophers, 
engineering is just an application of theoretical tentative presumed knowledge. Of course, since 
Popper professed that we have no evidence for our theories, he seemed to have found it difficult 
to explain why we should apply theoretical tentative presumed knowledge in the way that we 
do. Popper is theory-obsessed, just as most philosophers are theory-obsessed. It is not clear if 
Popper had a good understanding of experimental science. This is because Popper focused too 
much on theory and the testing of hypotheses, thereby failing to acknowledge ways in which 
the practical, experimental side of science has an intellectual life of its own. 
Actual engineering science practice is in many domains based on a code.31  The code bears 
some relation to the sciences, such as physics.  But it is also strongly conditioned by 
practitioners’ convenience.  You could even adopt a John Rawls (1921-2002) like 
characterisation of how it is that a code may be made out as fair (if it is fair) or unfair (if it is 
unfair). Actual engineering culture is careful by being conformist. Engineers demand their own 
and one another’s conformity to codes. For example, there is a code for how you would 
calculate the strength of a way (say by using bolts) for connecting one element of steel to 
another. This would involve simplified approximate assessments of six or seven different ways 
that failure is possible, checking that the strength against each of these possible modes of failure 
                                                 
31 This knowledge of how actual engineering science practice works I got from my discussions with Philip Catton 
who transitioned from the field of philosophy to the study of civil engineering. 
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is more than load demand, even taking into account a generous factor of safety.  An engineer 
who has designed according to code is right, the engineering community will think, since 
engineering as a field is careful by demanding code-conformity.  And yet, the code itself may 
eventually be acknowledged to stand in need of revision or extension or other 
improvement.  Science is not much present in the code which is all about approximation for 
ease and quickness of calculation, but science becomes in some ways relevant at those 
occasions when the code is under review, and engineers are deciding how best to change 
it.  This puts theory at the very least at arm’s length from practice, and Popper I think did not 
know much about this.  Most philosophers seem ignorant of the working of practical fields, 
such as engineering.   
Clearly, Popper did not seem to have a good understanding of how engineering culture works 
in practice. However, it is instructive to say that Popper’s anti-revolutionary stance on social 
reforms is indicative of how he was able to adopt the conformist nature of engineering science. 
Popper seemed to have used the feature of engineering science about cross-checking possible 
modes of failure along the same way to endorsing his idea of piecemeal engineering as a way 
to evaluate the steps in order mitigate mistakes along the way.  It is the same fallibilism that 
Popper emphasised in his piecemeal engineering approach. This may account for Popper’s use 
of the term “engineering” to describe how the practical application of social reforms can be 
piecemeal. Although the method of engineering science may not be piecemeal, which was why 
Popper noted that there are “objectionable associations attached to the term engineering” 
(Popper 1957: 21), its heuristic nature involves making small changes in order to evaluate the 
steps taken. This is the approach that Popper also proposed in addressing social problems.   
If engineering science is the creative application of scientific knowledge and skills to scientific, 
social and economic environments in order to design and also create structures, machines, 
devices, systems, materials and processes, it is this underlying processes in engineering science 
that Popper wishes to adopt. So, when Popper used the word “engineering” to describe his 
piecemeal changes, he was interested in such engineering attitudes as that of completing a 
design by successive approximations, of making small changes at a time, and of retracting steps 
as well as exploring alternatives when failure occurs. 
It is with this perspective that we can say that Popper used the term “engineering” to ascribe to 
the piecemeal engineer, technologist or scientist the responsibility of one who identifies the 
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problems at hand and begins to take a series of incremental steps to finding solutions to it. The 
engineer looks at an engineering design process, for instance, identifies a problem, say how to 
build something (e.g. skyscraper, amusement park ride, bicycle, or music player). He/she 
gathers information and conducts research to understand the needs of the challenges to be 
addressed. Together with his/her team of engineers, they brainstorm many imaginative but 
potentially practical solutions. They select the most promising idea and embark upon a design 
that includes drawings, and analytical decisions on the materials and construction, 
manufacturing and fabrication technologies to use. They create and test many prototypes, 
making improvements, analysing possible errors, learning from their mistakes until the product 
design is good enough to meet their professional needs.  
In all of these steps, what the piecemeal engineer demonstrates is that the scientific process is 
a consciously designed one where engineers formulate the results of their designs in the form 
of hypotheses. They are able to identify the effects of the changes introduced because of the 
small adjustments and readjustments processes taken. The result of these small changes gives 
the engineer more information regarding which variable next to change and how much to 
change it. This is the view that underwrites Popper’s endorsement of piecemeal engineering, 
and which possesses such a neat fit with the account of science as conjectures and refutations. 
However, Popper’s idea of piecemeal engineering is only a method for solving social problems, 
and it is different from the test of hypotheses in science. 
Piecemeal Engineering as a Scientific Approach 
Irzik (1985) critically discusses Popper’s idea that the scientific approach of conjectures and 
refutations dovetails with his endorsement of piecemeal engineering. Popper contended, Irzik 
believes, that the method of changing the smallest possible number of variables in a piecewise 
manner can aid in recognising the consequences of these changes. That, then, according to 
Popper, represents an epistemic reason to be a “one-piece-at-a-time” piecemeal engineer.  
Irzik’s claim however is that while “one-piece-at-a-time” piecemeal engineering can facilitate 
error elimination, and can help us know the effects of the changes that we have made, it cannot 
get very much done within any reasonable amount of time. If, on the other hand, out of a need 
to accomplish considerable change in real time, we manipulate several variables at once, then, 
since the consequences will be a joint outcome of those multiple changes, it will often be 
116 
 
extremely difficult to tell the role of each factor in producing these consequences. Moreover, 
some of these consequences will probably be undesired (Irzik 1985: 3).  
I grant to Irzik that Popper is in a bind, here. Popper hoped that his epistemology would supply 
him with good reasons to be anti-revolutionary, but he took this to an unacceptable extreme.  
If you consider a country such as Irzik’s native Turkey, where there are a great many social 
problems, upon which one would surely want work done many-pieces-at-once, then you don’t 
have to be pro-revolutionary simply to want a good pace of improvement in real time. If 
Popper’s epistemological point argues against this, then, so much the worse for a merely 
epistemological point: there are other values to be satisfied than those that surround knowing 
with greatest clarity and inquiring with greatest methodological control.  One may depart just 
a little from Popper and suggest that the researcher, by using the piecemeal, trial and error 
approach, may after all manipulate more than one variable at a time, and still may exert some 
attempt to control other variables or measure change in other variables. Some conditions for 
ideal controlled experimentation would not obtain, but the rationale would be that the pace of 
needed change cannot allow researchers what would be ideal conditions for them, conditions 
in which they manipulate one variable only, and control the rest of the variables within a 
controlled environment.  
Whether the ideal experiment would involve a control group, where the subjects have been 
randomly assigned between the groups, and the researchers’ only tests for effects following 
one change at a time, is in any case open to question.  Society is not like the topic area of some 
well-defined branch of natural science. Society is highly dynamic and highly ramified and 
complicated.  How researchers could know with greatest clarity the errors they have committed 
(when they think that a change that they can make will prove salutary and in fact it produces 
worse ill effects) ostensibly would be for one change only to occur at a time.  Society, however, 
won’t allow for this anyway, even if the social engineer wants to follow such a one-change-at-
a-time experimental method.  Society will change at a significant pace and quite complexly, 
whether the social engineer orchestrates change or not. 
Irzik rightly points out that this approach of changing as few variables as possible is especially 
applicable in experimental designs using controlled variables and randomisation. It is also 
applicable where systematic tests can be carried out in classical experimental studies designed 
to isolate the separate effect of one variable on another (Irzik 1985:3). Outside the special 
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context of controlled scientific experimentation, it is difficult actually to achieve this piecemeal 
approach that Popper recommended to us. Yet Popper’s piecemeal engineering approach could 
be combined with the techniques of regression analysis that social scientists use to carry out 
non-experimental research. The social scientists’ aim is usually to infer from statistical data 
how an observed change in one variable is related to the separate changes in other variables 
operating simultaneously on it (Irzik 1985:3). What this implies is that social scientists use 
regression analysis to gain an understanding of co-variation where they may not have full 
control of variables. Relatedly, then, piecemeal engineers could operate on more than one 
factor at once and potentially still learn from their mistakes. They would need to use statistics 
and regression analysis but by this means they could combine many-pieces-at-once piecemeal 
engineering with qualities of trial and error, learning from their mistakes in bits-and-pieces. 
The key issue, therefore, is limiting and controlling experimental variables so that causal 
factors can be identified. By identifying causes, the engineers can then attempt to have greater 
control of outcomes in later experiments. Irzik has helped me to see that this approach can, 
pace Popper, be many-pieces-at-once.  But I insist that the many-pieces-at-once piecemeal 
social engineer who is seeking to learn from mistakes made is no holistic designer or 
revolutionary conformist to the bulk of what Popper had in mind. 
Irzik has interpreted Popper’s piecemeal engineering as directly expressing scientific method. 
We must acknowledge however that, in every scientific inquiry, hypotheses or theories are 
tested in bundles. A given hypothesis or theory can be tested only by combining it with 
auxiliary hypotheses. (The French scientist and philosopher Pierre Duhem has importantly 
clarified and demonstrated the point in question about science. A standard illustration concerns 
the case of celestial mechanics in which where Uranus will be seen against the background of 
the fixed stars depends upon a complex of hypotheses. When scientists could not fit Uranus’s 
orbit into their Newtonian models they did not blame Newton’s laws, but rather they blamed 
some of the further needed assumptions that were required before they could predict Uranus’s 
motion at all. It was fruitful for them to adjust their auxiliary assumptions, for in the manner of 
their doing so, Neptune was discovered, that is, a planet was discovered whose gravitational 
influence on Uranus the earlier auxiliary hypotheses had simply not taken into account.) The 
auxiliary hypotheses at play in such inquiry need to be independently tested and testable. In 
testing these hypotheses scientists proceed through a piecemeal approach (and certainly not a 
wholesale approach) and this simply is the scientific method. 
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For all this, Shaw’s and Irzik’s interpretative claim that Popper’s piecemeal engineering 
expresses nothing but Popper’s conception of the scientific method misses some points. 
Although Popper’s piecemeal engineering uses conjectures and refutations, its orientation is 
social: piecemeal engineering seeks means to ameliorate an acknowledged social problem. As 
a method for solving social problems it concerns means/ends, and not hypotheses alone. By 
contrast Popper treats the testing of hypotheses in natural science as a purely intellectual 
concern. Any practical upshot would come later, as something fully separate, in Popper’s view, 
from the advancement of theoretical knowledge. Though the methodologies of natural science 
on the one hand and social engineering on the other hand look alike, they are on this point 
completely different. Though Popper used the word engineering to describe a systematic 
elucidation of measures for proper social reform, the term ‘piecemeal engineering’ is not 
synonymous with ‘the experimental process’ in natural science. The practical intent of 
piecemeal engineering is an inseparable part of its meaning. Piecemeal engineering, that 
Popper desired, is the actual manipulation of society under an aim that society shall be 
reformed.  
Moreover, we should be mindful of the fact that while there are well established laws of physics 
that the structural engineer or the physical scientist takes into account, there is much more 
controversy regarding the “laws of social dynamics” if indeed there can be any such thing. In 
fact, thoroughgoing laws of science responsible for making necessary scientific claims are not 
sufficient to understand the dynamics of the social environment. Although one would like 
hypotheses to be tested where possible, wanting as policy that society should be reformed in a 
given way itself has little to do with methodology in science. 
So for Popper, piecemeal social engineering is done in the real world in a particular, inevitably 
complex, social context. In this context the social engineer hypothesises that doing X is a way 
(or is the best way) to bring about end E. For example, end E might be to improve public health, 
and the hypothesis might be that this is best brought about by doing X, where, say, X = 
educating people about the effects of drinking untreated water. The point is that the engineer 
does not merely hypothesise, or adopt means for testing the hypothesis. On the contrary, the 
engineer also seeks to get something done, vis., to improve public health. 
The engineer’s means-end hypothesis is nevertheless open to test, and it might come out to be 
true or false. The ways that one might use to test such a hypothesis are more various than either 
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Popper, or with him Irzik, take into account. One way to test the hypothesis would use a control 
group that is randomly assigned and left innocent of X, with a contrasting experimental group 
subjected to X. This would be more like random clinical trials (RCT). With the data from such 
an RCT, one could effect a regression analysis, towards shaping a new hypothesis, should the 
originally proffered hypothesis fail. Since such RCT needs less stringent conditions than the 
conditions that either Popper or Irzik suppose would be demanded by piecemeal engineering, 
I believe that the spirit of Popper’s idea of piecemeal engineering would be satisfied, even if 
the one-piece-at-a-time circumspection in his approach is refused.  Many-pieces-at-once social 
reform can count as piecemeal engineering, I will insist. 
Piecemeal Social Engineering as a Method of Changing Society 
As a method of changing society, Popper’s piecemeal social engineering involves performing 
small scale reforms aimed at determining how public policies can produce demonstrated social 
benefits when the principle of negative utilitarianism is applied.  Negative utilitarianism 
involves the view that the aim of public policy is to alleviate indisputable suffering rather than 
to promote happiness. Whatever happiness even amounts to is subject to dispute. Partly for that 
reason, the means to bring better happiness about would be contentious, and would not easily 
be susceptible to empirical test. These are reasons why Popper considers the (positive) 
utilitarianism of Mill to be potentially a vehicle for dogmatism. Popper advanced negative 
utilitarianism as a way to steer between dogmatism and scepticism (or moral nihilism). 
Negative utilitarianism requires us to promote the least amount of evil or harm within the means 
by which we seek to address the greatest amount of suffering for the greatest number. Popper’s 
idea is that governments should respond piecemeal to recognised social ills – to whatever is 
widely acknowledged to be harmful to the people. So a government’s application of piecemeal 
methods will be trial-and-error attempts to mitigate these acknowledged harms; and when those 
urgent evils of society are dealt with piecemeal, it is with a view to best learning from one’s 
mistakes. 
Any revolutionary attempt to restructure society through large-scale social planning Popper 
viewed as a pernicious consequence of historicism. Conversely, Popper viewed the preference 
for piecemeal social engineering as protection against totalitarianism.  Whereas historicism and 
holism/large-scale social planning or utopian social engineering all define direct roads to 
totalitarianism in Popper’s view, commitment to piecemeal social engineering as a model for 
120 
 
social reform confers safety from that eventuality. Precisely by fostering criticism, the 
prescription to do social engineering piecemeal is opening of society rather than closing of it. 
Utopian/holistic/large-scale social planning, Popper claimed, requires the centralised rule of a 
few, the suppression of dissent and, ultimately, the use of violence instead of reason to settle 
the disputes that arise in the pursuit of the ultimate goals of the large-scale planners. The way 
that Popper rejected such totalitarian ways draws inspiration from the conservatism that the 
piecemeal approach signifies.  Popper’s reasons for conservatism or against revolutionary 
fervour in social reform are essentially Burkean. In favouring the Burkean point of view, which 
emphasises caution in making social changes, Popper foreswore revolutionary behaviour in 
politics. The particular qualities of Popper’s liberalism all have a basis in this Burkean view. 
Piecemeal social engineering, Popper argued, gives room for democratic ideals, the tolerance 
of dissent and the use of reason and compromise to settle political disputes (Popper 1945: 157-
168). 
Popper provided three basic arguments against utopian/holistic social engineering. These 
arguments can be found in both The Open Society and Its Enemies vol. 1, chapter 9, entitled: 
“Aestheticism, Perfectionism, Utopianism”32, and The Poverty of Historicism section 21, titled: 
“Piecemeal versus Utopian Engineering”. 
The first is that the utopian’s aim is to restructure the “whole of society in accordance with a 
definite plan or blueprint” (Popper 1957: 66). Popper’s position is that unlike a piecemeal social 
engineer who looks at the social issues and senses that the best method of re-designing society 
is addressing those issues in small adjustments and re-adjustments with the possibility of 
further improvements, the utopian’s attempt at using a definite plan or blueprint to address 
social issues as whole requires “a strong centralised rule of a few, and … therefore is likely to 
lead to dictatorship” (Popper 1945a: 140). 
The second argument results from the first. As a result of the dictatorship arising from the 
implementation of the definite plan or blueprint of the utopian, the difficulty would be to 
measure effects of the transformation agenda within the society. Since dictatorship does not 
take kindly to criticism, “the benevolent dictator will not easily hear of complaints concerning 
                                                 
32 In the original version of The Open Society and Its Enemies, chapter 9 was entitled: “Aestheticism, Radicalism, 
Utopianism”. However, in the fifth edition of the book (1966) Popper changed the titled to: Aestheticism, 
Perfectionism, Utopianism. The ideas in both versions remain unchanged.    
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measures he has taken” (Popper 1945a: 140). Rational criticism or feedback on the measures 
of the dictator’s social reform is discouraged and complaint would be suppressed at all cost. 
The piecemeal engineer, on the other hand, understands his fallibilism. “The piecemeal 
engineer knows, like Socrates, how little he knows” (Popper 1957: 67). He understands the 
importance of rational criticisms and feedback. He understands that there are unintended 
consequences that arise out of a holistic social reform. Consequently, he knows that the best 
way to achieve an expected result is to address reforms step by step, trial and error, bits and 
bits in order to avoid unintended consequences of any reform. 
The third argument against Utopian engineering also results from the second and the first. This 
is what Popper refers to as “the problem of dictator’s successor” (Popper 1945a: 141). Popper’s 
concern with the Utopian engineer in this regard is that, in all of the benevolent dictator’s doing 
to suppress rational criticism and critical feedback on the reforms he has undertaken, it is 
improbable or virtually impossible that he will attain the height to which he had set for himself 
to realise the ends of his reform during his lifetime. The difficulty for the Utopian engineer 
then becomes the ability to find “an equally benevolent successor” (Popper 1945a: 142). The 
shame is that the successor may not be too keen or very much disposed to pursuing the same 
ideal or disposition as the predecessor, and then all the suffering imposed on the people for the 
sake of the ideal may not have worth their sacrifices. 
With Popper’s arguments (which clearly set apart piecemeal social engineering from utopian 
social engineering), I think Popper is right that the open society, where piecemeal social 
transformation holds sway, is far superior to tribal or closed totalitarian regimes. To Popper, 
tribal or closed societies very often base their social transformation agenda upon utopian/holist 
social engineering of remodelling the whole of society at one sweep. This view underwrites 
Popper’s anti-utopianism and his negative utilitarianism. With the principle of negative 
utilitarianism, Popper’s aim is that the amelioration of suffering of the citizenry can be better 
achieved through a bits-and-pieces approach. This is why he favoured changes in piecemeal 
fashion backed by a trial and error method to avoid the unforeseen side effects of any large-
scale change.  
Although Popper’s approach signifies a careful setting down and articulation of clear goals in 
the social transformation process, the viability of piecemeal social engineering in changing 
society needs to be questioned. Unlike in natural science where there is the possibility of 
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controlling and manipulating as few variables as possible, it is quite a difficult task to have 
adequate social science knowledge to inform us of a major and simultaneous experimentation 
and to be able to monitor all causes and effects. The difficulty in monitoring a strong causal 
nexus in the society results from the complexities of social relations. One of these complex 
interactions is how the “free Market” can be skewed by government intervention. However, 
according to Popper, government intervention is not always wrong as long as it is within the 
confines of law (Popper 1945a: 125). 
Although sociologists often attempt to explain social causes and effects in terms of changing 
variables, developing an empirical basis for the presumed social causal nexus is hard. This is 
because the task of confirming that an effect is a result of a cause in social relations requires 
that we isolate one cause and one effect, and confirm beyond reasonable doubt that the effect 
is as a result of the particular cause. To achieve success in such confirmation would mean that 
any noticeable effects require bold significant causes. In other words, given the complexities 
in society, it would require a significant change (cause) to achieve noticeable consequences 
(effect). The reason is that the “magnitude and the scope of the change to be introduced in 
changing society 33 cannot be decided in an a priori way, but depends on the nature of the case” 
(Irzik 1985: 5). For this reason, it would be difficult to see what effect small piecemeal 
institutional changes can have in achieving noticeable consequences in changing society.  
Towards Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-once’? 
In my own evaluation of Popper’s piecemeal social engineering, notwithstanding my criticisms 
noted in the preceding section, I largely endorse Popper, albeit that I consider that social 
engineering must often be mounted many-pieces-at-once. I have considered reasons why 
many-pieces-at-once social engineering can still be piecemeal social engineering. As a result 
of the complexities of social interaction, the magnitude of the situation often requires that social 
reform be undertaken in a more radical manner. This radical (or many-pieces-at-once) social 
engineering is plausible when we consider that the causal nexus in social relations depends on 
the ‘logic of the situation’ or the existence of real social-causal mechanisms linking cause to 
effect. In other words, since social cause and effect are determined by how people’s behaviour 
                                                 
33 Emphasis is mine. 
123 
 
affects the course of events, then the degree of social reforms would be determined by the 
consequences of social situation. 
I agree with Popper that piecemeal social engineering would promote necessary institutional 
checks and balances. I also agree that it would make the government more responsible to the 
people, increase equality and help a government respond to recognized social ills – to whatever 
is widely acknowledged to be harmful to the people, by making only small quantitative changes 
by trial and error. The modification I make to Popper is to argue that social reform may need 
to be many-pieces-at-once social engineering depending on the nature of the circumstances. In 
fact, what Popper termed as the ‘logic of the situation’ is apt in this circumstance and can be 
used to justify the concept of ‘many-pieces-at-once’ piecemeal social engineering. Consistently 
with Popper’s view that the ‘logic of the situation’ means that different circumstances will 
determine the type of piecemeal engineering required. In some circumstances A, X piecemeal 
engineering may be adopted, in B circumstances, Y piecemeal engineering may be adopted, 
and in C circumstances, Z piecemeal engineering may be adopted and so on. So the logic of 
the situation is about piecemeal engineering (in kind or degree or numbers such as a different 
policy to address security issues or tackling security issues as well as health or economic issues 
simultaneously). The situation analysis can allow social reform to be considered in terms of 
the magnitude of the case or reforms needed at every point in time. The logic of the situation 
requires that we analyse the situation that makes an agent act the way they act before we pass 
value judgements. In this case, the magnitude of the case would determine the scale and the 
speed of social engineering that is required; it may either be piecemeal or ‘many-pieces-at 
once’ social engineering. 
Popper was emphatic that social institutions should be altered in a piecemeal fashion only so 
as to avoid the perils of a holistic reconstruction of a society in one sweep. However, he was 
not naïve that reforms may require a more drastic social reform. He was only being cautious of 
a radical holistic social reform process. Clearly, with the description of piecemeal social 
engineering that Popper gave in The Poverty of Historicism, it appears that as a backdrop to his 
work on piecemeal social engineering, there is an assumption about the kind of society in which 
the people whom he was addressing lived. In a lecture, “Freedom: A Balance Sheet” Popper 
stressed that “Western democracies are the best of which we have knowledge. . . never before 
was there a society in which common men were so much respected as in ours, in which there 
were so few who are downtrodden and insulted” (cf. Shearmur 1996: 32). It appears that 
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piecemeal social engineering only seems most sensible where societies are already deeply 
developed and ideals of moderate liberal political thought are well established. It also appears 
that the pre-conditions of applying piecemeal social engineering are that the society itself 
would be liberal and economically developed. The assumption here is that since the society 
that Popper is addressing is already developed, all that is required is the making of small 
adjustments and readjustments which can be continually improved upon.  Consequently, if we 
accept this assumption that piecemeal social engineering works better in a society that is 
already significantly developed, it therefore implies that the piecemeal social engineering 
approach may not accommodate the worst-off/most impoverished kinds of society even if they 
are liberal. By this estimation, piecemeal social engineering may be best suitable only for 
developed societies, and appears to ignore the challenges to social transformation facing less 
developed societies. 
Although the above assumption may not be what Popper intended, even when he appeared to 
have said that Western societies are the best in this respect, he did not say they were the only 
ones. This implies that less developed non-Western societies can also adopt piecemeal 
strategies. Even if it appears that there is a disparity regarding to which societies piecemeal 
social engineering is most applicable, it does not imply that reforms in both developed and less-
developed societies do not have to go on many-pieces-at-once. The magnitude of social reforms 
to be undertaken in developed societies may differ and be less thoroughgoing from that which 
is needed in less-developed societies. A one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal method may be 
appropriate for a society which is already developed for instance, in urban transportation, 
medical care and health technology, telecommunication and information systems, road 
infrastructures, power and energy, and standard educational system. However, the case is most 
certainly different in a society that requires a faster approach than what the one-piece-at-a-time 
piecemeal method (that Popper endorses) can offer in response to the challenges of 
development and modernisation.  
The fact here is that Popper’s piecemeal social engineering is intended to improve public 
policies and to promote the values of freedom, individual rights, individual self-determination 
and tolerance as they become the key features of an open society or liberal democracy in 
developed societies. However, Popper offered no explanation of how piecemeal social 
engineering can help social reform and promote efficient public policy in other democratic 
societies where corruption and underdevelopment still hold sway, like societies in Africa. In 
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other words, piecemeal social engineering seems quite inadequate to deal with the scale of 
problems facing less developed nations which have not gone through the same process of social 
change or evolution that led to the rise of the Western liberal individualist – market model of 
society.   
I acknowledge that the democratic and fallibilist aspect of Popper’s piecemeal social 
engineering would go a long way in defining the path that ideal social transformation ought to 
take. While one is not in doubt that piecemeal social engineering can suitably address social 
problems the slow progress it may record is contentious. My contention is however that making 
small quantitative changes may be too slow for a society that requires a radical transformation 
in order to keep pace with the rest of the developed world. The process may be too slow to 
significantly contribute to radical institutional change. The case is strong, and I rehearse this 
argument also for developed societies that also need to address, for instance, the insatiable and 
enormous social problems of urbanisation, mass transportation, road traffic jams and smog, 
medical care and educational systems. My position here is that the piecemeal social engineering 
that Popper’s liberalism endorses may delay progress and limit social change to a snail’s pace.  
Consider the following examples of social problems: It remains to be seen if the appeal to 
making small changes involved with seismic retrofitting, for instance, for a city which needs 
rapid development would yield a great number of supports for the approach. Similarly, a 
piecemeal response by a government to high unemployment, hunger and poverty in a society 
would not only fail to alleviate immediate short-term crisis, its long-term problem may become 
hard to manage. Taking a piecemeal engineering method to address security issues such as 
counter-piracy, such as the Somalia piracy crisis, instead of a comprehensive intervention 
would not only under-address the problem; it may generate new and greater problems. A 
society, for instance, which needs to establish infrastructural projects such as a high speed train 
system to improve transportation for its growing population, wind or nuclear energy for power, 
and improved healthcare technology, would rather consider a radical engineering approach, 
when if this is done rapidly it might also bring about tangible benefits to the economy. China, 
Japan and South Korea34 are examples of emerging economies that are making rapid progress 
in manufacturing and factory automation, whose economic growth can be said to have been 
                                                 
34 These emerging economies are certainly also generating massive social and environmental problems at the 
same time as extremely rapid economic growth is pursued. Adequate solutions to addressing these environment 
issues can also be addressed ‘many-pieces-at-once’ depending on the magnitude of the situation. 
126 
 
assisted by ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering. In general, piecemeal social engineering 
is likely to lead to numerous problems such as inefficiencies, slow information transfer, high 
cost of services, unreliability, and consequently, delays in social transformation.  
The thesis that I defend, therefore, is that social change should be managed many-pieces-at-
once. I endorse Popper’s piecemeal social engineering, provided that included under it is 
critical, tentative, non-dogmatic, many-pieces-at-once social engineering. Many-pieces-at-
once social engineering is a more realistic description of how liberal governments in a 
democratic society work. Governments do not just sit down and undertake only one reform or 
adjustment at a time. Governments are made up of different departments and ministries — all 
of which undertake all kinds of reforms. Some may undertake bank reforms, others education 
reforms, legal reforms, sports reforms, health reforms. All of which can go on simultaneously 
insofar as they are undertaken by different departments of government. This approach is many-
pieces-at-once. The piecemeal approach considered from the point of view of each department 
is one-piece or two-piece reform and from the point of view of society it is many-pieces-at-
once reform. Popper’s phrase “piecemeal” can be used as a placeholder in the sense of a 
fragmented approach that is for any kinds of reforms that are adjustments in every facet of 
society — adjustments that change the society’s “content/substance” rather than adjustments 
that are intended to change its “structure /foundation”. In a many-piece-at-once approach we 
can have one-piece, two-piece, three-piece, many pieces and lots of pieces. In this approach to 
reform of, say, a building (a bungalow, let us say), one can change the roof, plumbing and 
electrical. If one changes just the roof it is one-piece engineering, and if one changes the roof 
plus the plumbing it is two-piece engineering, if one changes the roof, plumbing, electrical it 
is three-piece social engineering, and if one changes the roof, plumbing, electrical, ceiling, 
parts of the wall then it is many pieces engineering. These are changes that target the “content” 
or “substance” of the building, and not the structure or foundation of the building. Even if one 
decides to do a wholesale change, (not one-piece, two-piece, three-piece, many pieces and lots 
of piece) by taking the entire building (bungalow) down and starting from the foundation, and 
by erecting another building (a skyscraper, etc.), this is changing the “structure” of the society, 
one still needs to change it many-pieces-at-once in order to mitigate any unintended 
consequences. So, it is a different building entirely or perhaps with more floors, rooms, 
compartments and with different foundation. This does not require any wholesale change or 
revolution. The planning and strategy that are involved in changing the structure of society also 
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require many-pieces-at-once. The examples of China, Japan and South Korea, which are 
instances of emerging economies who are making rapid progress in manufacturing and factory 
automation,  are countries that have changed the structure and content of their societies been 
assisted by ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering. These countries or economies did not go 
through a wholesale reform or revolution. The structure or foundation of these societies were 
not changed (in one fell swoop), rather it is their “contents or substance” that were changed or 
are being changed.   
With many-pieces-at-once social engineering, like Popper’s piecemeal social engineering, 
while there may be costs from this in terms of how feasible it is to learn from mistakes along 
the way, the scale of the problems may require this approach. The magnitude of the problem, 
for instance, in the recurring problems of poverty, injustice, electoral fraud, unemployment, 
diseases, corruption, police brutality, bad leadership, lack of the development of science and 
technology and general underdevelopment that confront most developing nations, particularly 
in Africa, would require faster, more sweeping political change than can be done in bits-and-
pieces. However, vigilance is needed, in agreement with Popper, to detect whether the 
measures work, and whether they work without side-effects that are as negative as the ills 
redressed. Caution is also required to see that this radical socio-economic and political change 
is not informed by large-scale social planning as it may lead to totalitarianism. It is essential 
that piecemeal engineering that addresses many problems simultaneously is still accountable 
to the people’s assessment, rational criticism and feedback regarding whether the reforms 
work. The need for critical feedback that Popper stressed where everyone would have a say, 
including ordinary people, as well as including the elites, is important for the evaluation of how 
the reforms work. The evaluation may perhaps be difficult to accomplish, but the possibility of 
criticism must remain, in a way that is precluded when totalitarian regimes prosecute utopian 
central management of everything in society. 
Conclusion 
I conclude by noting that the notion of ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering that I defend 
is distinct from the idea of large-scale reform. Although one can have rapid social change where 
there is good evidence regarding the means-ends effect sought, for instance, about having a 
comprehensive reform of the health system or the introduction of social security or pensions 
for all, the results of such in large-scale social planning would be difficult to monitor. Through 
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Popper’s conjecture and refutation approach one could pick the right variables to change to 
promote social ends, one can monitor the extent of reforms even when it is done ‘many-pieces-
at-once’ over a long period. Where there are mistakes along the way one is able to retrace and 
correct such mistakes. No matter how rapid the reforms undertaken by ‘many-pieces-at-once’ 
social engineering the effects are better mitigated than the unintended consequences that large-
scale planning would bring about.  
In order of words, if for instance, we say that the notion of:  
‘Many-pieces-at-once’ piecemeal social engineering= A.  
Effects of reforms= B 
Unintended consequences= X  
The argument is that it is still possible to monitor the significant consequences of (B) within 
the context of (A). However, in the process of monitoring the significant consequences of (B) 
there may arise some inadvertently damaging (X). The only way one may identify the 
unintended consequences (X) is by careful monitoring of means-end hypotheses linking A and 
B.   
My way of thought is that ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering can be suited to a number 
of different political positions. It can be either right or left wing. It could be very liberal or 
communitarian, capitalist or socialist, but may not be communist since it is not intended to be 
carried out as a result of a revolutionary dictatorship or large-scale central planning.  
The concern is that large-scale planning or central decision-making is usually insensitive to 
individual autonomy, socio-cultural and also environmental factors. The conception of having 
a more localised level of decision making which interconnects with some level of individual 
autonomy would promote a critical rationality where critical feedback arises from monitoring 
effects of piecemeal, but ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social reform. This process ensures that there 
is an adequate demarcation between individual autonomy, which allows individuals to present 
their views and give critical feedback, and the autonomy of the state in carrying out the societal 
reforms it is constitutionally empowered to implement. The concern about large-scale social 
planning or centralised policy is that there are usually a small number of people that design 
plans or reforms that are meant to affect the entire citizenry. Since central planners or large-
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scale social planners are usually dictators who do not take kindly to criticism, as I mentioned 
earlier regarding Popper’s second argument against utopian social engineering, the reform 
loses the critical rationalism which is available from the citizenry. The critical feedback that is 
available from all those people that actually engage with their world is not entertained. So there 
cannot be a critical rationality if there is no freedom. It is on that basis that I examine in the 
next chapter Popper’s conception of freedom. 
In all of this, I emphasise that the notion of ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering as a 
modification to Popper’s piecemeal reform questions all forms of large-scale social planning 
or central decision making which suppress the possibility of individual autonomy and critical 
feedback from citizens. Among other things, ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering 
emphasises a structure which has links to different levels of autonomy, and that each level is 
allowed to implement its function without impediments or external constraints. Individuals 
have their particular duties to the state, and even within the state, local government roles are 
different from those of the central government.   
More often than not, both in democratic and non-democratic societies, the central governments 
have effective control of local governments.  The rationality of large-scale planning or 
centralised decision making is the need for strong leadership. However, the downside is that 
central governments usually do not possess the very competence and information about local 
issues. Admittedly, there is need for strong leadership or coordination in government whether 
at the central or local level. However, the extent to which such coordination is one of an 
intelligent social level, and the extent to which it is dictatorship of one small part of the 
rationality, is disputable. Whichever side the argument goes, no rationality of centralised 
decision making which promotes large-scale social planning at the expense of individual 
freedom and critical feedback is correct. A valid argument is one that promotes a kind of 
reform, such as the ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering, which is based upon freedom, 
critical feedback and critical rationalism in the sense that allows the mitigation of unintended 
consequences that may arise out of the very social reform.  
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Chapter Seven: On Karl Popper’s Concept of Freedom: 
Individual and Social Aspects      
The freedom we enjoy extends also to ordinary life; we are not suspicious 
of one another, and do not nag our neighbour if he chooses to go his own 
way ... But this freedom does not make us lawless. We are taught to respect 
the magistrates and the laws, and never to forget that we must protect the 
injured. And we are also taught to observe those unwritten laws whose 
sanction lies only in the universal feeling of what is right. 
                                       (Popper 1945a, chapter 10: 163)                        
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I examined Popper’s piecemeal social engineering as an alternative to 
utopian/large-scale social planning. Utopian/large-scale social planning, Popper claimed, 
requires the centralised rule of a few, suppressing dissent and, ultimately, producing the use of 
violence to compel public acceptance of the goals and policies of the large-scale planners. 
Piecemeal social engineering, on the other hand, enhances tolerance of dissent not less surely 
than utopianism produces intolerance. Piecemeal social engineering requires use of reason to 
dissolve political disputes. It typically produces compromise. Consequently, piecemeal social 
engineering fosters democratic ideals (Popper 1945a: 157-168). I argued in the previous 
chapter that Popper’s conclusions are sound and that they follow even if one understands 
piecemeal social engineering to include a concerted, many-pieces-at-once, enhanced-pace 
approach that nevertheless is a far cry from totalitarian, large-scale or utopian planning. I agree 
with Popper that totalitarian societies, by their nature, are accompanied by large-scale planning. 
Conversely also, dedication to large-scale planning paves the way for totalitarianism to 
develop. Insistence upon piecemeal social engineering is the way to maintain democracy and 
freedom. With Popper, my previous chapter maintained that only by sustaining freedom can 
people hope to remain secure. 
The present chapter concerns what Popper meant by ‘freedom’. I will again argue that Popper 
achieved a balanced perspective. On a common liberal understanding, freedom is largely a 
negative concept, concerning absence of coercion or constraint. To adopt this concept is to 
steer clear of an opposing positive concept of freedom. This may seem reasonable in exactly 
the way that it is reasonable to be shy of utopianism, or shy of large-scale planning, or shy of 
totalitarianism. Popper is often understood, very much for this reason, to have himself cleaved 
to the negative concept of freedom. I do not agree with this, at least not wholly. There is a way 
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to balance between the negative and the positive concept of freedom, and I think that Popper 
discovered that way. His concept of freedom concerns not merely absence of coercion or 
constraint, for it also concerns community of criticism. Popper’s concept of freedom is not 
wholly individualistic, for it trades in the communitarian or intersubjective requirements for 
critical reflection. On the other hand, criticism is a substantially negative concept rather than a 
positive one, and consequently Popper did not fully uphold the positive concept of freedom, 
either. On the positive concept, freedom is from acting consonantly with values, consonantly 
with values that one has rationally authored for oneself. The point of view in question is that 
values are richer than desires, and that values obtain at all only when, by rational reflection, 
one has faced down what is hapless or disorderly about one’s desires, and one has worked up 
in place of that haplessness and disorder instead harmonious and well considered overall forms 
of desiring, forms of desiring that represent what one will then remark as the desires of one’s 
own ‘truest’ self.  That is to say, one has in this scenario not merely responded to one’s desires 
as givens, but one has carefully considered what, on reflection, best deserves to be desired.  One 
has, in other words, thoroughly investigated for oneself what has value and why.  Only then 
are there values that one possesses and that are truly one’s own.  If one has truly authored one’s 
own values in some such way, then only to the extent that one can act consonantly with those 
values does one count as “free” in the sense of positive freedom.  Freedom on this positive 
conception will require not merely the latter opportunity, to act thus consonantly with the 
values that one has authored, but also the former opportunity, to reflect sufficiently deeply, 
rationally, and well, that one has truly authored for oneself one’s own values. 
Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) has famously argued (Berlin, 1969) that it is dangerous for political 
philosophers to extol the positive concept of freedom. The question whether one has authored 
one’s own values partly concerns whether one has reflected for oneself rationally and well. That 
is an evaluative question. However, one may ask who will do the evaluating. Berlin suggests 
that proponents of the positive concept of freedom typically have fixed ideas concerning what 
alone it could possibly be to have truly authored values or thence what alone it could possibly 
be to be free. They have arrogated to themselves the task of doing the evaluating. Berlin 
suggests that the adoption of the positive concept of freedom as a central normative concept 
for a philosophy of politics steps us dangerously towards totalitarianism. Naturally Popper is 
just the sort of philosopher to be sensitive to this worry and to have anticipated it in his own 
writing. Yet Popper does not withdraw quite, as Berlin does, to the endorsement just of the 
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negative concept of freedom. Popper adopts a balanced position, I will argue, a position that 
relates freedom not only to the individual but also to the community, and achieves its rebuff of 
totalitarianism by its emphasising the critical function of reason.  
My way to argue that Popper produced and defended a concept of freedom that is balanced 
between individual and social aspects is to say that Popper’s concept of freedom is not quite 
the negative concept of freedom, that concerns mere absence of coercion or constraint, or thus 
the mere ability to do as one desires, and also is not quite the positive concept of freedom either, 
that concerns the ability to act consonantly with one’s own values. Instead Popper’s concept of 
freedom represents a careful balance between the negative impulse and the positive one.  
Why the negative concept of freedom is inadequate is that desires often are inculcated rather 
haplessly. To sustain persons’ opportunity to do as they desire represents very shallow 
provision for their freedom if those persons have picked up their desires haplessly, without any 
reflection. Many persons are, for example, creatures of advertising. The particular desires that 
they possess have been put into them, by ads. If they had seen different advertisements, then 
the desires that they would possess would be different. What they desire has little to do with 
what, as it were, they truly are in themselves. Whether creatures of advertising in any deep 
sense do even possesses a self is moot. They are in fact very shallow, and that is why there 
seems such scant reason to label them free. Even though nothing constrains them from doing 
as they desire, they do not seem to possess any very significant freedom. 
One thing to note about the positive concept of freedom is that it is communitarian. Yes, 
whether I am free concerns whether I have authored my own values, just as it also concerns 
whether now I have opportunity to act consonantly with those values of my own. This seems 
an individual matter. However, it is not at all strictly an individual matter. I cannot truly author 
my own values without engaging critically with others. Reflection that is thoroughgoing cannot 
be accomplished altogether in the crucible of an individual mind. We need one another to 
reflect with, we need examples of which we can be either positively impressed or critical, we 
need critical appraisal by others of the way we ourselves are, in order to progress at all in 
reflection.  The community precedes the individual so far as criticism and rational reflection is 
concerned. In previous chapters, I have remarked already that Popper is fully switched on to 
all these points. Popper recognises that criticism is a community’s task. 
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Positive freedom is a rich concept that quite likely does possess the danger that Berlin ascribes 
to it.  One needs to back away sufficiently from the danger, but also to insist on greater richness 
than inheres in the negative concept. Perhaps it is enough to insist that the community precedes 
the individual so far as criticism is concerned. Perhaps the negative idea of criticism softened 
by the recognition of criticism’s inherently intersubjective character can help us to discover a 
middle ground between the negative concept of freedom and the positive concept of freedom. 
We would need to remark merely that what one truly desires one discovers to some degree only 
through critical reflection. So freedom to do as one desires is made to be a little thicker, by this 
need for critical reflection. Moreover, the fact that critical rationality requires community 
shows that freedom is to some degree a communitarian not a merely individualistic concept. 
At any rate, these are the points for which I will argue in the present chapter. 
Popper can seem cheerfully to endorse the bare negative concept of freedom. However, I think 
that this is an illusion. Popper also accepts cheerfully (as a point of his “methodological 
individualism”) that there is nothing sui generis about the social that does not simply express 
what individuals are like (Popper 1945: 86-89). Popper’s philosophy can thus seem very 
individualistic. Yet Popper also equally cheerfully accepts the converse, that there is nothing 
sui generis about the individual that does not simply express how communities as such work 
as they do. Individuals can possess critical rationality only if their communities function to 
produce that kind of individual. You do not get critical rationality except in communities that 
work that way. The negative concept of freedom is on its face closer to Popper’s concept of 
freedom than is the positive one. Yet when we consider Popper’s critical rationalism, and its 
communitarian as well as individualistic aspects, then Popper may be made out as lifting quite 
away from either the negative or the positive concept of freedom, to something in the middle, 
and balanced. 
The balanced idea of freedom that I credit to Popper is in my view crucial to understanding 
Popper’s defence of liberal politics. There are certain peculiar features that characterise 
Popper’s form of liberalism — features such as: piecemeal social engineering; negative 
utilitarianism; limited government interventionism; and, interpersonal rational respect based 
on mutual criticism. My thesis as a whole argues that Popper’s liberal politics have a 
communitarian aspect. His philosophy is not wholly individualistic. Popper’s political 
liberalism differs from other forms of liberalism. Although, like other liberals, Popper anchored 
his liberal ideals on the principle of freedom, this chapter argues that Popper’s liberal idea of 
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freedom entails two aspects: the individual and the social. The argument brings the 
individualistic core of Popper’s political philosophy into a social realm. This discussion draws 
explicitly on the themes of both individualism and communitarianism from Popper’s 
philosophy of science. The basic insight here is that just as Popper achieves various kinds of 
balance in his philosophy of science, all such balance is further replicated in Popper’s political 
philosophy, where there is a corresponding explicit individualism and yet also an implicit social 
element.  
Some commonly held views about Popper’s critical rationalism, particularly his liberal political 
philosophy, emphasise that Popper’s philosophy is founded only on the principle of 
individualism. This counteracts the position of the enduring social element that I argue for in 
this thesis. The concept of “social freedom” that I further defend in this chapter is an attempt 
to unite two ideas that are in seeming tension with one another, the one Popper’s explicit 
emphasis upon individual liberty, and the other Popper’s often implicit invoking of social 
interaction, for example from his emphasising intersubjective criticism. 
Popper’s Apparent Individualism 
As previously discussed, the most commonly held notion of Popper’s critical rationalism is that 
it is individualistic. Scholars who claim this pick up upon Popper’s own concepts of 
methodological individualism and ethical individualism. These individualistic concepts do 
undeniably feature prominently in Popper’s philosophy. Individualism seems core to Popper’s 
philosophy until one registers Popper’s continual invoking of a social aspect. Since Popper 
used methodological individualism as a critique of holism or methodological collectivism, and 
developed ethical individualism as a theory which emphasises individual liberty, Popper’s 
overall philosophy can seem essentially individualistic without any social element. Yet the 
truth about Popper is richer than this, and more interesting. 
Popper did strongly oppose holism35 or methodological collectivism. That is to say, Popper 
opposed the doctrine that society as a whole is more than the sum of its parts (Agassi 1960:244). 
Popper recommended in its place both methodological individualism — “the doctrine that all 
                                                 
35 Holism is a concept in Popper’s philosophy of the social sciences that emphasizes the study, control and 
reconstruction of society ‘as a whole’. However, Popper remarked that it is a mistake to attempt to regulate the 
whole of social life because it would be an engagement in large-scale or collectivist planning. Such large-scale or 
collectivist planning is a utopian dream, as acts of total control of social situations may lead to totalitarianism. See 
Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (1957.        
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social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be 
understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of human individuals, and 
that we should never be satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called ‘collectives’” (Popper 
1945b: 91) — and, ethical individualism — the view that choice of moral values is an 
individual prerogative. 
The methodological individualist proposes that the social sciences should attempt to explain 
social phenomena only with reference to individual actions and dispositions. To Popper, 
methodological individualism is “democratic individualist” in nature. By contrast, holism or 
methodological collectivism entails elements of “collectivist nationalism” (Popper 1957: 148). 
Popper feared that belief in the reality of so-called “collective spirits” would lead to injustice 
against and suffering of the individual, since individual interests are liable to be sacrificed for 
the benefit of city, state or nation, as evident in the writings of Plato and Hegel (Gorton 2006: 
20). 
Ethical individualism is a similar second strand of liberal politics in Popper’s thought. It 
emphasises the well-being of the individual as of paramount moral concern. In consequence, 
individuals should be protected from injustice and exploitation (Shearmur 2008a: 52).  
Popper’s methodological orientation to the individual and his ethical orientation to the 
individual are linked (Gorton 2006:20). For, just as Popper criticises holism for its totalitarian 
tendency and for how it therefore threatens the well-being of the individual, so Popper’s 
opposing methodological individualism is mandatory ethically, not merely mandatory on 
methodological grounds alone (Stokes 1998: 80).   
With the above description, it is apparent that Popper used both concepts of methodological 
individualism and ethical individualism only as a theoretical basis for his criticisms of holism 
or methodological collectivism. Popper merely did this in order to reveal the potential dangers 
in theorising a collectivist ideology that renders individual rights and freedom susceptible to 
being subjugated to totalitarian rule. Popper was not averse to a communitarian ideology that 
upholds not only individual freedom but also community values.  It is on this basis that I 
maintain that as methodological individualism addresses the nature of research in the social 
sciences in relation to human individual choices and actions, and ethical individualism 
responds to the ethical obligation of liberal politics to attach importance to the individual, they 
both have implications for the concept of freedom in Popper’s liberal politics. However, they 
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do not suffice in capturing the total configuration of Popper’s philosophy as the call for 
openness and intersubjective criticism in Popper is of a social kind. The point here is that 
Popper’s understanding of openness of the quality of a society is not merely of an individual 
envisioning a life of pure egoism. The openness of society embodies individuals who are 
socially embedded with others in the society, whose goals, aspirations and self-determination 
are socially interdependent upon one another. This is why for Popper critical rationalism is 
intersubjective and mutual, and to that extent social.  In the light of these points, although 
Popper may have explicitly endorsed individualism (both methodological and ethical) his 
actual position on individualism is balanced with a social element. Without the implicit social 
element Popper’s critical rationalism becomes less comprehensible. The point to remark here 
is that Popper’s critical rationalism expresses the capacity for individual self-determination or 
the ability of an individual to perform an action without being impinged upon by another. This 
is the individualistic aspect. However, the features of intersubjectivity and critical feedback 
from others in Popper’s critical rationalism ultimately constitute a social element. One can then 
categorically say that openness of society in Popper’s critical rationalism has a balanced 
individual and social element.  
So, in discussing the concept of freedom in Popper, I argue that there is room for the “social”36 
in Popper’s liberal politics beyond the pervasive individualism. The moral core of his critical 
rationalism encourages the process of openness to criticism which entails both individual and 
social aspects. Although Popper was critical of holist or collectivist doctrines which often 
accompany the idea of the community, he did not discredit the values of social relation that 
foster community togetherness. What many scholars, such as Fred Eidlin (1942- ), see as the 
blind spot in Popper’s political thought- “the problem of community” (Eidlin 1997: 2), is a 
mistaken interpretation of the key values of the community and the roles of social institutions 
in Popper’s critical rationalism. Popper identified rationality with openness to criticism; and 
every individual is a participant in this business of objective criticism. However, objectivity, 
rather than being an individual attribute, is regarded as a social product — a product of critical 
discussion (Shearmur 1996: 111). The underlying fact is that Popper’s individualism is a 
commitment which begins an analysis from the position of the individual rather than the 
                                                 
36 For discussions on the social elements in Popper’s philosophy see Popper “Language and the Mind-Body 
Problem:  A Restatement of Interactionism”. Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 
VII (1953): 101-1071953. See also Bryan Magee, Karl Popper. London: The Viking Press. 1973: 64-65. 
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community. Such a commitment does not in any way entail a disregard of community values 
of social relation or any selfless voluntary action that would benefit the community. In fact, 
such commitment gives credence to the role that social institutions play, directed by community 
values, “to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the freedom of man” 
(Popper 1945b: 238). 
In arguing for a balance of relations, within the context of Popper’s idea of freedom, between 
liberal politics and community values in politics, I defend a thesis on social freedom. This 
position on social freedom is aimed at providing an alternative basis for grounding the social 
character of freedom in Popper’s political philosophy. This delineates a conception of freedom 
that applies both individual and social aspects of Popper’s critical rationalism. The objective is 
to eliminate the misrepresentation of Popper’s idea of individual freedom as featuring only the 
individual without the social. It is also to enhance Popper’s project of an open society and 
establish that his conception of freedom does not inhibit its application within the context of 
the community. This is to the effect that social freedom does not undermine both the capacity 
of individuals to pursue self-determination and the progress of the community that enhances 
individual well-being. The inclusion of a social dimension to freedom highlights the value of 
social cohesion where the will of the individual is to some degree harmonised with the will of 
others in terms of social goals and values. Thus, this results in a two-dimensional approach: (1) 
the internalisation of the will of the individual towards harmonisation with the will of others, 
(2) the internalisation of social goals and values towards the protection of the will of the 
individual, their lives and property. These two dimensions project a political philosophy that 
understands that there is nothing sui generis about the social that cannot, under one form of 
analysis, be reduced to the individual, and vice versa — there is nothing sui generis about the 
individual that cannot, under another form of analysis, be reduced to the social. 
Popper on Freedom 
At the core of most liberal philosophies on freedom is an attempt to discover the conditions 
under which external constraints upon the individual can be minimised (Levy 1978: 153). This 
liberal view aligns very well with Berlin’s concept of negative freedom. As previously 
mentioned, Popper did not endorse only the negative concept of freedom because he as well 
understood that it is hardly possible for individuals to author their own values without truly 
engaging critically with others. This is a communitarian impulse, which reflects the 
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intersubjectivity in rational reflection, and the inevitability of critical appraisal by others of the 
way we ourselves are in social interaction. In this respect, Popper found a middle ground 
between the negative and positive concepts of freedom. In fact, Popper’s concept of freedom 
is a balance between negative freedom and positive freedom. It is a balance between elements 
of individualism and communitarianism. It is a balance which operates at a more sophisticated 
level than the level of Berlin’s article on negative and positive freedom, and that helps to 
explain why individual freedom is partly a product of the social in Popper. Popper’s concept 
of freedom requires that individuals can act consonantly with values of their own, bearing in 
mind both the emphasis in this upon the individual, and yet also that individuals cannot author 
their own values without engaging critically with others. Popper did not close down onto any 
one view what a rationally well worked out system of values is like. On the contrary, he roundly 
emphasised the need for society to be open. Popper’s concept of freedom is because of this not 
any completely positive concept. Criticism is after all a negative tool. That critical reflection 
with others is necessary if individuals are to act freely in fulfilment of their self-determination, 
and this leaves open what any person values will upon such reflection turns out to be. Popper 
requires only that an individual’s actions are carried out in consideration of the freedom of 
others within the social environment. Tolerance is to be extended to every last attitude apart 
from intolerance. With this submission, Popper’s conception of freedom can be termed “social 
freedom”, meaning freedom of individuals within an open, critical society.  This concept 
captures both the explicit individual aspect and implicit social or communitarian element that 
are encapsulated in Popper’s philosophy.   
Even with this communitarian element in Popper, one thing is clear: Popper expressed aversion 
for any collectivist or socialist ideology that erodes the freedom of the individual for the sake 
of the group or the collective. Although Popper may have acknowledged the sense of equality 
that collectivist or socialist ideology aims to achieve, he was critical of the utopian dream of 
an egalitarian society that usually characterises socialism. According to Popper: 
If there could be such a thing as socialism combined with individual 
liberty, I would be a socialist still. For nothing could be better than living 
a modest, simple and free life in an egalitarian society. It took some time 
before I recognised this as no more than a beautiful dream; that freedom 
is more important than equality; that the attempt to realise equality 
endangers freedom; and that, if freedom is lost, there will not even be 
equality among the unfree. 
                                                                           (Popper 1974: 36)  
139 
 
Popper’s political liberalism defended intellectual openness by focusing on the protection of 
individuals: for instance, the individual’s right to information; the right to self-expression; and, 
a key interest in self-determination in his or her society. By this, the liberal principle of 
individual freedom, in Popper, presupposes the ability of the individual in an open society to 
make significant personal decisions within a social universe of choices that are free from the 
pervasive atmosphere of taboos characteristic of archaic as well as totalitarian societies (Levy 
1978: 153). This depends not only on freedom of information and right to self-expression, but 
also on an individual’s being well-educated as emphasised by Mill in his On liberty (Mill 
1859:83). Certainly, for Popper, freedom depended on the individual engaging in critical 
thinking and rational criticism. In his view, the idea of freedom of thought and expression 
which require individuality and intersubjective criticism remains the foundation of an open 
society. Individual freedom of thought and free discussion are the ultimate liberal values which 
do not really need any further justification. They are the values which ultimately allow the 
“transition from the tribal or ‘closed’ society,’ . . . to the ‘open society’ which sets free the 
critical powers of man” (Popper 1945a:1). They constitute the path which upholds individual 
freedom and allows the individual to engage critically with others. This path enhances the 
freedom to criticise and permits the growth of knowledge through error elimination. It enables 
a society to be modified by the value of openness, and the tendency for societies to be closed 
or bounded is transcended. 
Popper’s view of what freedom entails starts with the fundamental premise that the individual 
is of primary importance. Although Popper places great importance upon freedom of the 
individual from external constraints (negative liberty), yet also he considers significant that 
individuals may act in the realisation of their full potential, and in this connection he affirmed 
a modest form of positive freedom that concerns the ability to act consonantly with one’s own 
values. The attempt is to have a reflection that is thoroughgoing with a critical appraisal by 
others. The argument here is that Popper’s concern about freedom is not just merely about 
absence of constraint. Popper thought that freedom is not just merely about one’s being 
prevented by other persons from doing what one could otherwise do. One’s own freedom, to 
Popper, is from authoring one’s own values by critically engaging with others, and is from 
possessing the ability (unopposed by any overriding societal constraints) to do as one then 
desires. This is “open society freedom”, and represents Popper’s concept of “social freedom” 
as I have construed that. Freedom for Popper is on the one hand individual, as it relates to one’s 
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personal desire to perform an action, along with one’s being able to perform such action in 
relation to how it affects others. Yet freedom for Popper is on the other hand social, as it relates 
to one’s having engaged critically with one’s fellows, and by dint of this, to one’s having 
authored for oneself one’s own values. These conceptions impose in a unique way the usual 
liberal demand for toleration, of any position but an intolerant one. They impose this demand 
by the way they demand intersubjective critical engagement. Only persons who listen to 
opposing points of view with a willingness rationally to engage with them can be free in 
Popper’s understanding of the term. So a high degree of toleration is required by the demand 
for people to be free. Popper’s position on freedom places individual freedom on the pedestal 
of the social, in the guise of intersubjective critical engagement. Popper relates freedom not 
only to the individual but also to the community. 
Facing obstacles to pursuing one’s interests or desires can lead to a sense of frustration. Popper 
provides a helpful example; ‘should we prevent a pianist from practicing, or prevent his 
neighbour from enjoying a quiet afternoon’? Both instances of prevention engender a feeling 
of frustration; their level of frustration reflects the extent to which the two individuals (the 
pianist and the neighbour) experience this as an obstacle to attaining satisfaction or as contrary 
to what either of them desires or wants to do. To both, the only freedom that matters is the 
freedom to do what they desire to do or what they believe they have a right to do. This sort of 
freedom is of the negative kind, and merely to emphasise it is not entirely Popper’s position on 
freedom. Popper’s response to this, is that there is an a priori principle in real life which 
demands limitations to the freedom of each individual and how it can be minimised and made 
equally applicable as much as possible (Popper 1963: 351). This principle is an appeal to 
existing traditions and customs, to a traditional sense of justice and, above all, to a ‘moral 
framework’ (corresponding to the institutional ‘legal framework’) of a society which sees 
individual’s freedom from the basis of critical reflection and engagement with others. This 
moral framework serves as the basis which makes it possible to reach a fair or equitable 
compromise between conflicting interests within the social milieu where this is necessary, such 
as the case of the pianist and the neighbour (Popper 1963: 351). 
The basis upon which Popper laid the moral framework of freedom is in the requirement to 
come to terms with the fact that our freedom is indeed limited by a concern for the reasonable 
freedom of others, requiring toleration that is effectively codified by morality. This limitation 
impresses upon one the reasonableness in engaging with others. This is in order to fully 
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appreciate the degree to which one can exhibit actions that one desires to do that are at par with 
actions that others also desire to do. It is within this limitation and critical engagement with 
others that persons are free. Popper’s conception of freedom quite recapitulates an argument 
from tolerance. Tolerating all but the intolerant and being similarly tolerated by others while 
regarding criticism as no mark of intolerance and instead as vital to freedom is quite the way 
in the first place to be free. 
Argument from Tolerance 
It is within the spirit of Popper’s idea of individual freedom that there be reasonable limitation 
of the mere ability to do as one desires by placing comparable significance upon what others 
desire to do. Already within the very idea of individual freedom, Popper’s idea of tolerance 
becomes relevant. Tolerance is the moral framework which Popper addressed in terms of 
individual differences. Tolerance is required when individual actions resulting from their 
freedom impinge on freedom of others. This comes to play in reaching a compromise when 
conflicts arise between two or more people whilst observing individual freedom. For Popper, 
therefore, the idea of tolerance is the seed out of which grows the idea of respect for human 
freedom and convictions, and out of which thus also grows the idea of the dignity of all men 
(Shearmur and Turner eds. 2008b:271). It is the idea that by tolerating actions of which one 
does not necessarily approve one is showing respect for the dignity of other men. In other 
words, tolerance involves disapproving, and perhaps also criticising, what another person 
believes or does, but nevertheless not acting against them because of this disapproval, and 
treating the criticism of them if any both as tentative, and if on the mark, as a gift.  
From the above considerations, one can deduce that Popper’s ideas of freedom and tolerance 
are not exclusive but complementary, and they work together to enhance the values of an open 
society. The basis of Popper’s liberal tolerance framework is that when one is free to perform 
an action, what one desires to do does not necessarily have to impinge on the freedom of others. 
The point of liberal tolerance is to provide grounds for cooperative action with those for whom 
we do not necessarily share the same substantive ethical values and commitment. The liberal 
idea is that there is an overall, general moral framework allowing social cooperation, but that 
individuals and groups within the society can hold different substantive specific ethical (moral) 
frameworks.  
142 
 
In granting freedom and tolerance as the liberal values of an open society, Popper did not, 
however, view either as unlimited. He averred that even if we guarantee individual freedom to 
all those who are prepared to reciprocate, we must not include in this guarantee those who 
seriously propagate intolerance (Shearmur and Turner eds. 2008b:273). Popper remarked that 
intolerance should not be tolerated:  
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we 
extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant; if we are not 
prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the 
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.  
                                                         (Popper 1945b:543)  
Popper’s argument that intolerance should not be tolerated is convincing in the light of the fact 
that an unlimited tolerance is antithetical to the exercise of freedom. This point can be 
strengthened with an argument which justifies, for instance, a government action against a 
group of individuals pursuing democratic government with the intention of thereafter 
establishing an intolerant and totalitarian religious state. Since no responsible state would 
tolerate such nefarious activities even if a case of an exercise of individual freedom is 
established, a state must ensure that a tolerant society is defended. This argument aligns 
favourably with Popper’s liberal idea of government interventionism which is aimed solely at 
the protection of the individual. 
Moreover, a more cogent point is that there is no obligation on the part of the tolerant to tolerate 
the intolerant. This suggests that it is within the purview of the state to determine the extent to 
which an individual is able to tolerate the intolerant. There may, however, be another factor, 
besides just being able to determine the extent to which we express our freedom to tolerate the 
intolerant or otherwise, which would suggest why an open society is devoid of anarchy. The 
theoretical supposition would have been the extent to which the tolerant should go before they 
can decide to take up arms against anyone regarded as intolerant. Popper sought to address this 
concern through the establishment of legal institutions of the state that would implement the 
necessary laws for the protection of the individual.  
One of the duties of the state is to ensure that society tolerates its ‘lunatic fringe’ as much as 
possible. An open society (a liberal democratic state, in this case) will attempt to restrain the 
bully from bullying his neighbour, and it will see in the state, the guarantor of the right of 
everybody to be protected from being bullied or compelled, not only by those who happen to 
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be powerful, but also by those who attempt to seize power in order to establish a tyranny 
(Shearmur and Turner eds. 2008b: 240). The state, to Popper, exists only for the protection of 
individual freedom and, because all power is dangerous, state intervention in social and 
economic life should be “limited to what is really necessary for the protection of freedom” 
(Popper 1945a:110). More importantly, is the need of the state to educate its people so that they 
can fulfil their potentials.  
In many respects, Popper’s idea of freedom can be defended on deontological grounds. As with 
deontological moral theory, Popper’s idea of freedom also stipulates a certain kind of duty 
which guides and assesses our choices of which actions we ought to perform. While 
emphasising moral obligation and right action, it also focuses on the dignity of persons to be 
respected and protected, as long as one is neither prevented from exercising one’s freedom nor 
does one act in a way that will impinge on freedom of others. The former requires the exercise 
of individual freedom; the latter requires the element of critical engagement with others.  These 
considerations reflect the balanced element of the individual in relation to the social in Popper’s 
form of liberalism. They reflect the essential features of an open society, that is, a tolerant 
society — a society which tolerates the peculiarities of the individual and, more especially, in 
which critical thought is tolerated (Shearmur and Turner eds. 2008b:136).  
While the above description is appealing, the assumption that liberal philosophy in Popper’s 
open society requires only individualism (suggesting that improvements are impossible without 
it), is, I argue, objectionable. The significant objection that Popper made against the holism of 
Plato and Hegel relates to their emphasis on the “whole” over its part, that is, the community 
over the individual. This emphasis, which erodes individual rights to make free choices towards 
the progress of society, may lead to totalitarianism. Although Popper’s concern is telling it does 
not disregard the values of social interaction and cohesion that the community fosters unto the 
individual.  
So, over against a standard expectation that Popper’s liberalism only upholds values that have 
individual principles, I argue that the core of his critical rationalism encourages the process of 
openness to criticism which entails both individual and social aspects. The central theme of 
Popper’s critical rationalism enunciates “an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments 
and to learn from experience” (Popper 1945b:225). The individual and social aspects  of 
Popper’s critical rationalism require that every participant in the game of critical discussion be 
144 
 
prepared to listen to criticism, to be able to accept criticism to practice self-criticism, and to 
engage in mutual criticism with others (Gattei 2002:247). Consequently, once a conducive 
subjective attitude is established by individuals, reasoning is conceived as a social process of 
inter-subjective confrontation (Gattei 2002:247). This social process of inter-subjectivity aids 
the way that individuals relate their experiences, and how experiences inherently transcend the 
individual’s sphere towards interpersonal relations. This analysis makes the case that the 
rational individual is necessarily committed to engaging others on certain terms (including 
tolerance and openness to criticism), insofar as freedom is tied up with rationality, then freedom 
is social. This argument is apt for a justification of the thesis on social freedom in the way that 
freedom entails the capacity of the individual to self-determination as well as the social process 
of interpersonal relations. This reflects the complementarity of both individual and social 
aspects of Popper’s critical rationalism as they enhance his project of an open society.  
The case for social Freedom 
The traditional liberal understanding of freedom centres on the ideas of individual liberty, 
individual rights and in connection with rights to egalitarianism. In this respect, the 
individualist and egalitarian elements in these strands justify an ethical primacy of the 
individual against the pressures of collectivism (Gray 1995:73). Classical liberalism is 
grounded in this primacy of the individual. Such a liberal philosophy presupposes that the 
ontological state of the individual is solitary, and consequently suggests an autonomous 
development of the individual away from the influence of the community. Evidently, such a 
notion of individualism gives rise to values that emphasise self-expression, independence and 
personal achievements. The conclusion which this suggests is that we can only coherently talk 
about the egocentric aspect of individualism, together with its focus on the uniqueness of the 
individual. This in turn suggests that individualism weakens both social interconnectedness 
and community spirit. In all these suppositions, the notion of individualism appears to be a 
flawed classification, with grave implications for how it portrays the “self” as an atomised 
individual, disconnected from the social and political identities that affect his or her personal 
choices and decisions.  
Like many liberals, Popper also entrenched his liberal philosophy in the importance of the 
individual; yet averred a vital epistemic value obtained through the social conduct of 
individuals (Gattei 2002:247). Both the individual and social aspects of Popper’s critical 
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rationalism underscore the seamless connection between his philosophy of science and political 
philosophy. This is discerning of an intimate connection between Popper’s contributions to 
philosophy of science and to political philosophy, points that I have earlier stated.  
In politics, critical rationalism stipulates a set of principles which are epistemological in nature 
that prescribe the social and political rules for the human cooperation necessary for knowledge 
(Gattei 2002:247). This methodology depends for its implementation upon inter-subjective and 
interpersonal relations that transcend the individual level and concern the social. It involves “I-
thou”37 relations among individuals. It promotes the human social relationship necessary for 
the development of society. This argument defeats the general conception, held by Eidlin and 
others, that Popper’s political thought creates a dichotomy between the individual and the 
community. On the contrary, Popper’s political philosophy considers perfectly centrally a 
tension between the nature and freedom of the “self” and the role of the community in the life 
of the “self”. Shearmur buttresses as follows the point of view that in Popper’s political thought 
social interaction precedes political activity and defines its purpose: 
The . . . agenda that [Popper] commends to us as a goal of political activity 
are ... products of the actions of individual members of society, acting in 
their various social and institutional settings…. While each of these people 
must play a part if the goals that Popper is commending to us are to be 
achieved, what he is discussing are the by-products of interactions 
between many different people. 
                (Shearmur 1996: 7-8)  
In Popper, the relationship between the individual and the social, that is, the relational 
embeddedness of the “self” with others is grounded in both epistemological and ethical 
principles. Both principles underlie the essentials of the individual and social aspects of 
Popper’s liberal idea of freedom.  The idea of freedom involves, among other things, toleration. 
It is the idea which discerns the ability for mutual learning in the interest of truth. By so doing, 
each learns to tolerate others and also to recognise others as potential equals. To presume the 
potential unity and equality of all persons is prerequisite if persons are to discuss matters in a 
rational fashion (Popper 1992: 199). This prerequisite is therefore based on both 
epistemological and ethical principles that depict the main ideas of how individuals become 
                                                 
37 This is a concept originally used by Martin Buber (1878-1965) in his book, I and Thou (1937) to describe 
necessary mutual relationships for authentic existence among human beings. For more information, see Kenneth 
Kramer and Mechthild Gawlick (2003), Martin Buber’s I and Thou: Practicing living dialogue. New Jersey: 
Paulist Press.  
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socially embedded with others as they engage in mutual criticism based on a rational 
understanding of mutual respect, unity and tolerance. Such a rational undertaking of mutual 
understanding is a social product — a product of critical rationalism. 
Thus, Popper’s liberal idea of individual freedom must be understood in the light of the 
argument that individual freedom is entrenched with others in the society, and the individual is 
not necessarily free from cultural and ideological influences of their community. This point 
seems to align with merits inherent to the idea of the relational embeddedness of the self that 
communitarians defend.  
Contemporary communitarians, such as, Michael Sandel (1953- ), Michael Walzer (1935- ), 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1929- ) and Charles Taylor (1931- ) have well-articulated arguments about 
the relationship that exists between the individual and society. The arguments of the 
communitarians draw on two methodological claims: (a) ontological or metaphysical claims 
about the social nature of the self; (b) normative claims about the value of the community (Bell 
2012: n/p). Ontologically, communitarianism explicates the communal/social nature of the 
“self”. Communitarians emphasise that the self cannot exist outside the context of community, 
as the consciousness of the self is constituted  by its interaction, interconnectedness and 
interrelationship with others. This socio-ontological dimension of the “self” promotes the idea 
of the self in relation to others.  
Although these communitarian arguments are consistent with the individual and social aspects 
of Popper’s idea of individual freedom, Popper’s philosophy differs essentially from that of the 
communitarians when they suggest that individuals have no personal freedom to act on their 
own initiative unless they act for the common benefit of the community. In fact, the 
communitarian discussion on freedom raises a fundamental question about the way in which 
personal decisions and achievements can be possible within a community that makes the 
individual seem unfree. Communitarianism emphasises the role of the community values to 
the determinant of individual autonomy and self-determination. The communitarian 
perspective on individual freedom proceeds on the assumption that freedom is about total 
suppression and subjection of every individual to the collective general will of J.J. Rousseau’s 
kind. When communitarianism constrains human freedom to an extent that blocks individuals 
from performing actions which they desire, this provides support for Popper’s critique of 
holists/collectivists ideologies. 
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In the light of my thesis that the liberal idea of freedom in Popper’s political thought entails a 
social dimension in spite of a pervasive individualism, I argue for a balance of relations, within 
the context of Popper’s idea of freedom, between liberal politics and community values in 
politics. An insight into both individual and social aspects of Popper’s liberal idea of freedom 
necessitates the task of reconceptualising this concept of freedom that clearly discerns the 
inherent elements of “I-thou” relations. This reconceptualising is anchored on a concept of 
social freedom which attempts to correct the misrepresentation of Popper’s idea of individual 
freedom as featuring only the individual without the social. Social freedom in this context 
grounds the basic norm at the core of the epistemological and ethical commitment of Popper’s 
critical rationalism as a social product. 
At its core, Popper’s critical rationalism requires effective social processes and institutions.  
However, the concern about the social aspect of critical rationalism, on the one hand, regarding 
the consolidation of individual preferences in a pluralist liberal society needs consideration. On 
the other hand, the issue of collective agreement on common substantive moral and ethical 
commitments essential to communitarianism needs to be addressed in a way that ensures that 
individual personal freedom and liberty are not eroded by others within a social community. 
Clearly, our relationships with others very much do constrain our freedom, that is, if we define 
that freedom in the manner that sees freedom as the ability to pursue one’s desires.  However, 
if we do not qualify the rationality of those desires through a substantive theory of morality 
that incorporates a tempering assessment of the rationality of those desires within the wider 
context of communal good, then we may have a clash between individual freedom and the 
demands imposed by the duties of relationships of the communal good. In the traditional 
society, as MacIntyre emphasised, the duties imposed by those socially defined roles, fathers 
and university lecturers set strong ethical parameters within which the individual can operate 
(MacIntyre 1984: 147).  Liberal individualism and the concept of negative freedom have served 
to throw those traditional roles and corresponding duties into question. In so doing, liberal 
individualism has served to progressively erode communal values, and while upholding the 
value of individual expression.  There is a tension here, and this is what critical rationalism 
addresses in establishing Popper’s communitarian essence through the social aspect in his idea 
of freedom. 
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The emphasis on the social character of Popper’s liberal idea of freedom is to redefine the 
concept of freedom in contrast to the reductionist view that is commonly held to be the case. 
The aim is to aver that the Popperian idea of freedom also entails an aspect of the social. 
Popper’s liberal idea of freedom should not disallow ideologies which promote community 
values of social relations. Popper only intended his work on politics as “a defence of freedom 
against totalitarian and authoritarian ideas, and a warning against the dangers of historicist 
superstitions” (Popper 1976: 57). His defence of freedom is not intended to disregard 
community value of social cohesion. 
Although what freedom entails in Popper’s writings appears only to concern the well-being of 
the individual, my defence of social freedom in Popper’s politics is based on the recognition 
that Popper’s idea of freedom is broader and can be extended to address the social aspect. This 
is an attempt to reconstruct Popper’s argument on freedom in its strongest form and to present 
a coherent concept of freedom that accommodates both individual and social aspects. In the 
individual aspect, Popper’s liberal idea of freedom maintains the character of freedom to do 
what one desires to do or believes one ought to do. This is a model of freedom which abhors 
infringements on individual freedom, upholds freedom from external constraints on human 
actions, and emphasises self-dignity and self-respect. For the social, freedom in Popper is 
definitive of social interaction and social groupings. It is freedom seen from the perspective of 
social interdependence with others. Both individual and social aspects of Popper’s liberal idea 
of freedom encapsulate into what I defend as social freedom.  
In the broad perspective of Popper’s idea of freedom, this thesis on social freedom respects the 
concept of individual freedom and so respects individual self-determination but emphasises 
relations within and responsibilities to the social environment. This position can be termed to 
mean that the freedom to express one’s personal desire to perform an action, and the powers 
and abilities to perform such action must be considered in relation to how it impinges, it profits, 
it benefits or how it is detrimental to others. As such, freedom is interdependent upon others 
within one’s social environment. This idea of social freedom is central to the idea that the 
individual ‘self’ makes meaning only within their intricate relationship with the community. 
This relationship characterises what can be termed the ‘social individual’ (Mulhall and Swift 
1992: 13). The social individual establishes the necessity of a social background to grounding 
claims to and exercising one’s freedom. The social individual requires that every person is 
socially constituted and our essence is derived from the existence of the community. This gives 
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rise to upholding the social dimension of the individual, and the condition that each individual 
is decisive of the choices she makes within a social environment. 
In all of this, the task of the concept of social freedom is to elaborate on the epistemological 
and ethical/methodological issues that underpin Popper’s liberal idea of freedom. These issues 
underscore the justification of a synthesis of two fundamental aspects of Popper’s liberal idea 
of freedom under consideration: individual freedom and freedom exercised in relation to others. 
These aspects are to be synthesised into a coherent concept of social freedom. Social freedom 
ensures that the basic freedom of every individual is observed for as long as this freedom is 
exercised in consideration or in relation to others. While the expression ‘self in relation to 
others’ codifies the values inherent in the social we-community, the idea that the individual is 
free to exercise their freedom without impinging on the freedom of others elucidates individual 
self-determination. This conclusion explicates the social freedom discourse in a manner that 
allows both individual and social aspects of Popper’s idea of freedom to be articulated jointly, 
in a fashion which reinforces commonality of purpose within the normative framework of the 
discourse. With this commonality of purpose, the liberal values of openness, tolerance, 
individual freedom and engagements in mutual criticism with others with which Popper 
anchored the philosophy of critical rationalism can continue to enhance the open society 
precisely in Popper’s understanding of that term. 
Conclusion 
In so arguing for social freedom I am motivated by Popper’s liberal idea of freedom. Popper’s 
liberalism defends intellectual openness by focusing on the protection of individuals; for 
example, in individuals’ rights to information, to self-expression and to a key role in self-
determination. These are also ideals that are to be recognised as a by-product of the social. 
However, emphasising the individualistic aspect of Popper’s liberalism alone potentially 
denigrates the social aspect of Popper’s politics, particularly where the ambient ethics, to the 
extent that social institutions function, is itself social. Both the individualistic and social aspects 
of Popper’s liberalism are essential. A liberal idea of freedom in Popper must be accompanied 
by the essentials of both individual and social aspects. These essentials result into the concept 
of social freedom that this dissertation defends in a sense that can enhance the political 
openness of mutual criticism and interaction with others that Popper’s political thought 
upholds. Therefore, social freedom, in the broad context of Popper’s idea of freedom, is to 
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protect the principle of intricate relationships that an individual has with others, and to argue 
that the relationships do not, in any way, erode an individual’s personal freedom and liberty.  
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Chapter Eight: Beyond the politics of Liberalism 
Before we as individuals are even conscious of our existence we have been 
profoundly influenced for a considerable time (since before birth) by our 
relationship to other individuals... We are social creatures to the inmost 
centre of our being. The notion that one can begin anything at all from 
scratch, free from the past, or unindebted to others, could not conceivably 
be more wrong. 
                               (Popper cf. Magee 1973: 64-65) 
Introduction 
The evaluation of Popper’s liberal politics in chapters 6 and 7 offers a nuanced assessment of 
his liberal ideas of piecemeal social engineering and his defence of individual freedom. For 
piecemeal social engineering in chapter 6, the concept finds a ready application in contexts 
where there is a significant agreement concerning to which type of societies it is best suited, 
such as in most Western societies that are already considered to be developed.  Societies that 
are less developed appear to require faster, more sweeping, political change than could be 
achieved by one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal social engineering. In that case, the question of why 
social reform should be piecemeal is fundamental. However, chapter 7 considers the reason. 
This concerns the central liberal idea of freedom but acknowledges both the individual and 
social aspects. One can understand in terms of the problem that collectivist ideologies pose for 
individual freedom why social reform must be piecemeal, even if the extent and pace of change 
that is manifestly required argues that reform of this kind be mounted many-pieces-at-a-time. 
There is much to be admired in Popper’s political philosophy, particularly his insistence on 
piecemeal engineering as a model for social reform and his defence of individual freedom. 
However, questions of practical applicability can be raised about how reforms in Popper’s 
liberal politics would fare in non-liberal societies. While these concerns have been identified 
and modifications prescribed in chapters 6 and 7, I return to these because of the acknowledged 
weaknesses in Popper’s liberal political philosophy. I argue that a better reasoned 
understanding of some enduring Popperian strengths is needed. By a consideration of 
Popperian weaknesses and strengths, I will develop different way of thinking of liberal politics 
towards determining what social policies it would be wisest to adopt in non-liberal societies.   
Looking beyond the received view of Popper’s form of liberalism, according to which Popper’s 
liberalism is informed by altogether individualistic principles, and studying instead or in 
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addition a dimension of Popper’s liberalism which is social in nature, I have argued, in chapter 
7, that Popper achieves a balanced understanding both of the nature of freedom and what is 
involved in order to protect freedom. In this chapter I extend this discussion, in order to 
consider the theoretical basis upon which societies that are non-liberal in nature can learn 
important lessons from Popper given the balance in his position on liberal thought. Such non-
liberal societies are in their communitarian orientation not on that account untouched by 
Popper’s insights.  On the contrary, in arguing that Popper’s own philosophy was trending 
towards a liberal-communitarian one, by emphasising the social dimension of liberalism, and 
by justifying my arguments with theories of the social character of the self and the social nature 
of the human consciousness, I show how happily thinkers in non-liberal societies can pick up 
Popper’s insights and usefully work with them. This is in a bid to establish a political 
philosophy that makes good sense of social and intellectual conditions, for instance, in Africa, 
that is attuned to important strands of intellection on that continent, and that nevertheless uses 
Popper to reconsider the key liberal concepts of justice, rights, freedom and equality. In this 
connection, I will sketch the perspective of Will Kymlicka (1962- ) on liberal-
communitarianism which takes cultural membership of individuals to their communities as 
central. Rather than following Kymlicka in relying upon culture, I defend a position on the 
inherently social nature of human beings as the basis for a social dimension to the liberal-
communitarian political philosophy. The conclusion of this chapter is that a liberal-
communitarian philosophy, as a way of thinking beyond the politics of liberalism, can enhance 
Popper’s project of an open society. My thesis is that liberal-communitarianism does not 
undermine the capacity of individuals for self-actualisation but rather promotes the “I-thou” 
human social relationships for the progress of society.  
Beyond Popper’s Liberalism: The Social Dimension  
A fundamental factor in Popper’s liberalism, as with all other forms of liberalism, is the 
insistence that individuals are the primary variables in any rational (scientific or political) 
inquiry (Sassower 2006: 48). Yet, Popper differed from other liberals because of his insistence 
on the epistemic value of social conduct among individuals. No doubt, Popper was critical of 
collectivist ideologies; first, because of their inclination to sacrifice individual freedom and 
rights, for the good of the whole; second, because of the totalitarian tendencies they portend. 
Popper’s form of liberalism holds that the choice of moral, social, political and scientific values 
depends entirely on the individual. However, the question of how individuals interact with each 
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other within social and political institutions, scientific community and legal structures in the 
society (Sassower 2006: 49), he addressed by a recourse to the social process of inter-subjective 
interaction and mutual criticisms underlying his philosophy of critical rationalism.  
Although the notion of individualism in Popper is often emphasised, I have also stressed the 
social aspect of his liberal politics. The underlying basic understanding of Popper’s political 
liberalism presupposes that individuals are free to choose their own values and ends, in 
particular because the choices they make help them towards an individualised understanding 
of the world they live in. Yet they depend on socially shared dispositions and responses for 
their ability to live in a social community (Pettit 1998:169).  
The social dimension in Popper’s liberal politics can be used to understand the values of the 
open society establishing meaning within social environments and being ever enhanced by 
social interactions. This social dimension to liberalism differs essentially from the notion of 
collectivism of which Popper is critical. The inclusion of a social dimension to liberalism 
highlights the value of social cohesion where individual will is harmonised with the will of 
others. This dimension foregrounds the emphasis on absolute individualism which does not 
consider the social dimension of “I-thou” social relations in politics. This inherent value of 
social relations among individuals is what Philip Pettit (1945- ) conceptualises as social holism: 
the idea that individuals are not entirely free-standing, for, they depend upon one another for 
the possession of some property that is central to the human being” (Pettit 1998:170).  
Like Popper, Pettit condemns the effect of forcing the societal will on the individual, which 
collectivism entails. However, while the social aspect of Popper’s liberalism is merely implicit, 
Pettit explicitly argues for the necessity of a social dimension in the fulfillment of individual 
aspiration. With Pettit’s concept of social holism, individualism is not compromised; yet, social 
relations are recognised as essential for a human being to become an individual personality. 
The concept of social holism provides no threat to individualism as characterised in Western 
liberalism in terms of freedom, rights and equality (Esfeld 2001:43). This argument that there 
are no threats to individualism in liberal politics at the inclusion of a social dimension, can be 
established on the grounds that there are certain psychological properties of the individual; 
such as needs, wants and the desire for self-actualisation; the fulfilment of which is achieved 
only through the social. These properties of the individual are intertwined with the nature of 
the human person which is a process, motivated toward a balanced social relationship with the 
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others. This process, therefore, is inclined toward a form of solidarity based on community of 
interests, goals, objectives and standards. In this way, this process promotes the self-
actualisation of the individual that fulfils to an ever compounded extent the individual’s 
capacities for development; at the same time, this process maintains a balance where both 
individuals and society are mutual beneficiaries.   
The analysis on the social dimension to Popper’s politics can be further strengthened and 
justified based on the argument concerning the social nature of the human mind. The capacity 
of the individual mind both to abstract physical and mental states and to empathise with other 
people is itself profoundly social in how it is realised and in what it is for it to be fulfilled. Any 
individual’s mental capacity itself reflects the social nature of the human mind, for mental 
capacity is shaped, and normally functions, in continuous interaction with other people (Riitta 
and Kujala 2009:454). The capacity of the human mind to cognise consciousness and make 
individual choices is dependent on the capacity of others also to make choices. This dependence 
on others has implications for social interactions among people, and this ultimately implies that 
“thought in the ordinary human form is essentially a social activity” (Pettit 1993:342). In this 
general sense, the human mind is a social mind. It exists rightly at the level of individuals but 
it functions optimally at the level of social interaction among people. This is the assumption 
that Pettit termed the “common mind” whose contents and functions are ‘common’ to the extent 
that if one individual is ‘minded’ this entails that others are ‘minded’ too; there can be no mind 
in this common sense, without there being a society of minds (Pettit 1993:342).  
There are three basic assumptions generated from the arguments above: first is the position that 
individual self-determination is of utmost importance in the sense that individual basic rights 
and liberties are inviolable; second is the argument that social interactions in terms of “I-thou” 
relations are necessary to what constitutes a human being (in respect of how humans are 
ontologically dependent on others to constitute a social community); third is the argument that 
since there is no threat to individualism in the spirit of what Popper’s liberal arguments uphold 
a social context of liberalism is plausible in the sense that it aligns well with communitarian, 
ethical, political ideology of being.  
On the above showing, we can talk of Popper’s form of liberalism as possessing an essential 
social dimension that is consistent with those features of freedom, rights and equality at the 
centre of the Open Society. This further establishes that Popper’s liberal politics entails both 
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individualist and social aspects. I maintain that this then brings into the discourse of Popper’s 
liberalism a new way of thinking that addresses the socio-political concerns of non-liberal 
societies; to the extent that the social is harmonised with the individual in contemporary 
political philosophy. Communitarianism seems, to me, the most impressive political 
philosophy which addresses those non-liberal concerns, and often reveals itself in relations to 
community, social relations and culture. The social dimension that is fundamental to 
communitarianism when harmonised with liberal individualism would give us a liberal-
communitarian order. Such a liberal-communitarian philosophy would consider social relations 
as a condition necessary to understand the nature of social explanation and bring about a good 
political standing for non-liberal societies; yet, would be far from compromising individualism. 
It would, however, in part, differ from the liberal view about the nature of community and 
culture that is associated with Kymlicka which, no doubt, has a commitment to the individual 
but takes the cultural membership of every individual to be central.  
Differentiating the Social Dimension from the Cultural 
The arguments above seek to establish grounds for a social dimension to liberalism and how 
liberalism can be harmonised with communitarianism in a sense that allows the values of 
Popper’s open society to be achieved. From this account, a justification of why Popper’s 
liberalism is also accompanied by the social, owing to the inherent social nature of human 
beings, is established.  
In spite of the above consideration, many accounts such as the one by Kymlicka provide an 
alternative underpinning through cultural membership of individuals. To detail Kymlicka’s 
position on culture as a justification for liberal-communitarianism is crucial for this study. I 
discuss the implications of his position for political philosophy in order to argue that culture 
narrows but at the same time strengthens the potentiality of extending liberalism to societies 
that are non-liberal. A liberal-communitarianism is possible that speaks well (and in spirit quite 
as Popper might himself speak) to the needs of these societies. At the same time my discussion 
is meant to complement Kymlicka’s, and by use of Popper, to show a better way. Kymlicka’s 
account about culture gives the impression that culture is an all-purpose condition without 
saying what grounds or generates this condition. This is different from my own arguments on 
the social dimension to politics which justifies in a somewhat Popperian way the position of 
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liberal-communitarianism, by using the conception of the inherent social nature of human 
beings.  
Kymlicka’s argument emphasises culture as a basis for political alignment within a 
multicultural society. His argument for incorporating cultural membership into the liberal 
framework is that cultural membership provides the social context within which liberal self-
understandings of agency and individual autonomy may be developed (Peetush 2003: 299). 
Kymlicka is specifically interested to develop a comprehensive Western liberal philosophy that 
would deal with the issues of cultural diversity within a society that is multicultural. He is 
interested to develop a theory of cultural pluralism that approaches “the challenge of 
multiculturalism” from a Western liberal perspective (Kymlicka 1995: 2, 9). His interests lie 
in the way liberals ought to respond to non-Western national groups and ethnic minorities 
(Peetush 2003: 291).  
In this, Kymlicka seeks to align with liberalism a form of extreme communitarianism which 
emphasises culture rather than the moderate form of communitarianism that I advocate quite 
because of the way in which it stresses social relations. Kymlicka articulates a form of liberal-
communitarianism which exemplifies the importance of cultural membership to the exercise 
of individual freedom and choice. However, Taylor has criticised Kymlicka’s focus on 
individual freedom as bolstered by cultural membership as being too individualistic and so 
insufficiently communitarian. Taylor’s criticism is that in spite of Kymlicka’s articulation of 
the need to entrench an integral and undamaged cultural language with which one can define 
and pursue his or her conception of the good life, Kymlicka’s focus is the need to guarantee 
individual choices, and not with the survival of the various cultures (Taylor 1994: 40, 58). 
Taylor offers a perspective on liberal-communitarianism that is deeply rooted in the substantive 
content of cultures themselves (Burke 1999:123). 
Taylor’s perspective is not without its own theoretical issues and concerns38.  Acknowledging 
it, but also setting it to one side, I want to consider Kymlicka further, and to discuss a number 
of issues that are problematic about Kymlicka’s conception of cultural membership. First is the 
usage of the term ‘culture’ for bridging the liberal-communitarian challenge of individual 
autonomy and community belongingness. Kymlicka seems to have considered culture to 
                                                 
38 For discussion on these concerns see John Francis Burke “Reconciling Cultural Diversity with Democratic 
Community”, 1999. 
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include consistently known behaviours and attitudes which a certain people exhibit often within 
a certain geographical realm. These behaviours and attitudes of a people are seen in terms of 
how the people classifies its experiences and how its members communicate these experiences 
socially. However, Kymlicka fails to acknowledge the cultural complexities that are involved 
within heterogeneous populations with very many different social outlooks, tribal diversities 
and, often times, ethnic incompatibilities. The idea of cultural membership which Kymlicka 
proposes is fraught with issues of ethnicity, tribalism and nationalistic rivalry. With issues such 
as these, there is the tendency for the state to witness political instability, economic depression 
and social disintegration. This is why I maintain here that the term ‘culture’ is not suitable for 
addressing the challenge of a liberal-communitarian political philosophy. This indicates that 
Kymlicka’s approach does not adequately address the current contemporary liberalism-versus-
communitarianism debates as it relates to cultural issues such as the questions of conservatism 
and the rights of internal minorities, for instance, women, children and sexual minorities.  
Although Kymlicka develops a liberal theory of minority rights originally for Western 
democracies and its attendant multiculturalism, he wishes also to see if such a Western model 
of minority rights would be acceptable within a society that is strongly communitarian. He 
makes a distinction between two group rights, namely external protection, that is, the need for 
minorities to have certain protections against the exercise of majority power, and internal 
restrictions, that is, the conception that individual members of the minority group should not 
be restricted in their freedom to question and revise group tradition and practices. In both cases, 
Kymlicka’s submission is that liberal theory of minority rights requires equality between 
groups (external protection) and freedom within groups (internal restriction) (Kymlicka 1995: 
152). It is with this conception of minority rights that Kymlicka articulates his liberal view as 
it relates to the issue of rights for cultural communities. He contends, however, at the same 
time, that liberalism deals with issues such as the value of individual liberty as well as the issue 
of cultural membership within a multicultural society. Liberalism addresses issues concerning 
cultural and minority rights. Kymlicka avers that culture is very important both to the 
development of internal minorities within a multicultural society as well as for individual self-
reflection. Thus, culture reflects the basis of the liberal framework that kymlicka provides as 
grounds for communitarianism. 
Second is the issue of internal minorities within cultural communities. This issue is culturally 
specific and it often poses a challenge to egalitarian liberals and multicultural theorists as 
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regards how to promote rights and equality within minority groups. Both egalitarian liberal 
advocates of multiculturalism and strict communitarian defenders of culture usually aim at a 
more inclusive approach to rights and equality, except for the challenge of an acceptable 
standard for minority rights. The dilemma is how to justify the standard of rights and equality 
for minority groups, for instance, for a society which extends special protection and 
accommodation to patriarchal cultural communities, within a liberal egalitarian society that 
sees gender equality as a fundamental value (Song 2010: n/p). For Kymlicka, the rights of 
internal minorities or ‘group-specific’ rights are in line with liberal framework of justice, 
equality and individual rights. Kymlicka argues that minority groups, especially national 
minorities such as the Canadian Quebecois or the New Zealand Maori deserve special rights 
from their states by nature of the uniqueness of their history, common culture, common 
language, ability to govern themselves through indigenous institutions, and most especially 
their cultural group’s original presence when the land or state was founded (Kymlicka 1995: 
70). 
Third, the “cultural” factor which Kymlicka uses at the centre of his thesis casts a shadow of 
doubt on his distinctions of the two kinds of group rights. His original intension was to ensure 
that the rights of minority groups to retain their cultural membership remain strong within a 
multicultural society. However, with the modification of his initial conception of culture from 
“a people” or “a nation” or “a group” to that of “societal culture”, which he conceives as being 
typically associated with national groups (Kymlicka 1995: 75-76), this conception becomes 
too nationalistic in nature, suggesting that a people need to identify with an ethnic nationality 
or tribe to be able to survive politically. Indeed, this might not be right as a matter of fact. For 
one thing, the minority cultural rights that Kymlicka advocates become eroded as the internal 
minorities lose their cultural identity at the expense of societal culture. Moreover, this 
conception seems inappropriate within a multicultural society which is expected to recognise 
minority cultures and rights as the case may be.       
Above all, with Kymlicka’s emphasis upon cultural membership comes the difficulty of 
identifying how liberals can (or ought to) accommodate the demands of indigenous 
communities to be able to organise themselves according to their more communal self-
understandings (Peetush 2003: 298). The difficulty here is how liberals can accommodate a 
people who desire the freedom to be able to live and organise themselves according to their 
own self-understandings and in some ways counter-liberal cultural views of life. The argument 
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is that there are deep cultural differences even among communitarian societies, and that 
Kymlicka’s concept of cultural membership and his distinction of internal restrictions from 
external protections of group minority rights fail to address the situations (a) where the 
prevalent ethical and political values are communitarian but the people are not alike in their 
communitarianism; and (b) where the level of individual freedom that some minority group is 
willing to grant is on its face counter-liberal, just as is the extent of the minority group 
members’ dedication to the community to which they belong.  
In spite of the above criticisms, what Kymlicka offers is a significant and commendable attempt 
to align a sophisticated form of liberalism with the issue of rights for minority and cultural 
community. He has challenged the assumed conception that liberalism, with its emphasis on 
individual autonomy, cannot be linked with the values of community belongingness. More 
importantly, the liberal account he provides explicitly expresses a commitment to individual 
liberty which is bolstered by cultural membership and community rights. He is one of the most 
recent pioneers to provide justifications for bridging the divide between liberal individualism 
and political communitarianism.  
Liberal-Communitarianism: A New way of Thinking 
The contention between the politics of individual rights and freedom, and the politics of the 
common good has always centred on attempts to strengthen arguments of one against the other. 
This is the heart of the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. Rawls, and, more 
specifically for this purpose, Popper are liberals who favour individualism over collectivist 
ideologies such as communitarianism. Communitarians, such as Taylor, MacIntyre, Sandel and 
Walzer, argue in defence of shared cultural values, traditions and norms that are said to ensure 
community belongingness in politics. Communitarians advocate the entrenchment of a cultural 
community as a foundation for political community and as a basis for political rights. 
The response to the question of why both liberals and communitarians need always be in 
conflict with one another informs the philosophical justification of this thesis on liberal-
communitarian philosophy. The arguments supporting how this new combined liberal-
communitarian thinking can be realised as a sustainable political philosophy begin by my 
recognising the implicit social dimension to liberal politics. The uniqueness of this new 
thinking is that it is rooted in the social nature of human beings and the social dimension this 
brings into politics. At the same time, this liberal-communitarian ideology exemplifies a new 
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thinking in political philosophy which seeks to address, in a new light, those normative 
concepts of freedom, rights, justice and equality in line with contemporary political realities. 
Undoubtedly, significant insights can be drawn from Kymlicka and other communitarians, 
such as Taylor, in this liberal-communitarian philosophical stance, particularly their arguments 
that strengthen the importance of community values to in the achievement of individual self-
determination. However, this dissertation draws more on the individual and social aspects of 
Popper’s liberalism for providing inspiration, though implicit, for the establishment of a liberal-
communitarian philosophy. More explicitly relevant is Pettit’s concept of social holism which 
lays emphasis on the “I-thou” level of human relations and interactions as the basis for ensuring 
political rights, freedom and justices.  In all of this, what the liberal-communitarian philosophy 
seeks is a synthesis of two contentious political philosophies. Therefore, the demand of a social 
dimension to both the politics of liberalism and communitarianism needs to be clearly 
illustrated to support these contentions.  
The first contention is that Popper’s form of liberalism is a strand which constitutes both 
individual and social aspects. This is remarkably different from all other forms of liberal 
ideologies that portray a philosophy of individualism which emphasises individual autonomy.  
The social elements in Popper are derived from the inherent principles in his critical rationalism 
which creates the basis for linkage with other non-liberal ideologies that emphasise social and 
community togetherness. 
For liberals, other than Popper, the focus is with individual freedom in terms of protection from 
external constraints. These liberals see the primacy of individualism as embodying values 
whose essence hammers out the “principle of self-interest” or “I do what I want” or “I do what 
I think is best for my self-interests”. This is the central element of most liberal philosophy, and 
is in line with Ayn Rand’s (1905-1982) objectivism which sees objective moral judgement as 
the pursuit of one’s rational self-interest (Abele 2012: n/p).  
The liberal conception of rights and freedom considers that the capacity of the individual to 
determine what is rational as well as the ability of the individual to pursue self-interest are 
constitutive of objective moral behaviour. This conception stands in conflict with valuing social 
relations in such a way as embraces the idea that the individual’s interests and accomplishments 
flourish with others within a social community. Thus, the thesis on the social dimension, which 
is an aspect of Popper’s form of liberalism, views such a liberal stance of absolute individuality 
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without recourse to the values inherent in the social as merely a conceptual abstraction.  In 
order words, the concept of individualism which is detached from the importance of social and 
community values and instead adheres to individual self-actualisation is rightly considered as 
an abstraction that has no connection to the real world. The following thought experiment may 
help to describe such abstraction more clearly. 
Suppose, for example, that I am an individual whose orientation about life is to be self-
independent and rational about all things that I do, and that I have had the misfortune to find 
myself on an island alone with two others after the plane we were in crashed into the sea. 
Without similar experience of living in the wild, there is no guarantee of my survival; either by 
social interaction with the two others or by living alone according to the capacity of my rational 
objectivity. It is in this circumstance possible that I will die. Quite possibly however my 
chances for survival are better if I seek social interaction with the two others. By no means 
must the individualist live alone in order to be rational. Furthermore, the individualist may 
choose to cooperate for the purposes not only of his own survival but also for the purposes of 
mutual survival, taking into account that if everyone survives, then he also does. This is 
consistent with commitment to selfish individualism. These all are valid notions. However, 
suppose that the freewill that I possess to choose whether or not to interact with the two others 
is at the same time sufficient for my self-survival; or suppose, oppositely, that my capacity to 
survive on the island or even in the larger civilised society does not lie in my being 
individualistic. In the understanding that interacting with others need not be enough to 
undermine my individuality- it becomes implausible in every sense of reasoning to continue to 
lay hold unto my lifelong orientation about individualism, whereas my individualism is not 
threatened, but I need others to be able to fulfil my capacity for self-interested goals. 
What the above scenario clearly expounds is that the individualists could chose to cooperate or 
not, but their survival may necessarily require cooperation and social interaction.  The necessity 
for cooperation becomes more evident with the argument that each individual might have 
individual capacities which were necessary for survival but not sufficient unless combined with 
the abilities of the others.  
With this point noted, individualism then becomes a merely conceptual abstraction in both 
normative and theoretical thinking when it ignores the values of the inherent social nature of 
human beings and the social character of our minds. This social dimension underpins the 
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factors determining why humans usually find the need to form political organisations, socio-
cultural groups and even political communities. Relying only on such abstraction, which fails 
to adequately represent the social conditions under which individual self-determination gains 
meaning may be a source of incoherence in the liberal theory of individual liberty. 
In this connection, and in agreement with the inherent social element in Popper’s liberalism, it 
can be argued that the fulfilment of an individual’s self-desire is primarily dependent on the 
social conditions of a given community; that is, a community sets the conditions within which 
we can pursue effective action. However, this requirement does not undermine individuality; 
it only promotes the “I-thou” relations among people. 
The important element deducible from the hypothetical three persons’ island above is that 
survival on the island depends on the social relations among crash survivors; not on a person’s 
particular culture or on any individual’s self-interest. It is the social interaction among the three 
that may ensure their survival. From this inference, the inherent social aspect of Popper’s 
liberalism is seen to underpin the emergence of a coherent liberal concept that derives support 
from both the nature of the social character of the self and the social nature of human 
consciousness. This revised conception promotes a significant degree of inter-subjectivity. The 
essence of inter-subjectivity here lays emphasis on the intrinsic social nature of the self. Inter-
subjectivity in social relations among people stresses that the individual’s experience or 
consciousness is a product of social interaction with others. Inter-subjectivity, seen in this way, 
relates to subjective (the self) experiences and to how those experiences inherently transcend 
the individual’s sphere of solipsism through the sphere interpersonal relations. This is in the 
sense that the social nature of the self enables an intermingling of ideas among people which 
results in the provision of an enabling environment where freedom and other self-desires can 
attain fulfilment (Ukpokolo 2011: 240).  
On the second contention, as I have argued in chapter 7 and extend upon here, the ontological 
or metaphysical claims about the social nature of the self, and the normative claims about the 
value of community make intelligible the idea that the self cannot exist outside the context of 
community, as the consciousness of the self is constituted  by its interaction, interconnectedness 
and interrelationship with others. This is also very true about the social evolution of language.  
In his article “Language and The Mind-Body problem: A Restatement of Interactionism”, 
Popper further buttressed the essence of the necessity of social interaction by arguing against 
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the possibility of a physicalistic causal theory of the human language (Popper 1953, ff. 1962: 
293). To Popper, any causal physicalistic theory of human language is a theory of two lower 
functions of language: the descriptive and argumentative (Popper 1953, ff. 1962: 295). These 
two can be found in animal languages. However, the theory of the higher function of language 
is the argumentative and critical. It is with this higher function of language that man is 
attributed.   
With the argumentative and critical higher function of language, Popper remarked that the so-
called problem of other minds is solved. Since a physicalistic causal theory of higher function 
of human language is impossible we must attribute mental states to humans. According to 
Popper, if we talk to people and argue with them, then we “cannot but attribute to them 
intentions, and this means, mental states” (Popper 1953, ff. 1962: 297). In arguing with people 
it becomes evident that other minds exist. We do not argue with a thermometer or a machine 
(Popper 1953, ff. 1962: 296). So if other minds exist and we argue with them, clearly language 
is a social affair. Therefore, a doubt cast upon the existence of other minds, become a self-
contradiction when it is formulated in a language (Popper 1953, ff. 1962: 297). 
So, the existence of other minds in Popper’s theory of Language and Interactionism further 
demonstrates the implicit but necessary social and communitarian elements in his philosophy. 
Thus, the contending social aspects of Popper’s politics of liberalism is consistent with the 
communitarian argument on the nature of the self in relation to the community, which is about 
how the existence of the community mirrors the consciousness of the self. In that respect, we 
cannot meaningfully talk of an individual without the consciousness of other individuals in the 
community. Thus, once we admit the consciousness of an individual self we have to admit the 
existence of other consciousness. The individual is immaterial; its consciousness is 
meaningless unless it is enhanced by its interconnection with others. The self-community 
relation is mutually inclusive and logically symmetrical because both have necessary relations 
to each other. Both constitute parallel elements, each corresponding to the other. For every 
individual being there is a correspondence, a parallel in the community. The self and the 
community exist by an interaction, a social interaction that promotes a social order. 
The socio-ontological explanation of communitarianism above defeats liberal philosophy’s 
commitment to an abstract individualism that bears no connection to the community. It faults 
liberals’ dedication to individual freedom over community freedom and to individual rights 
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over common good. Communitarians criticise liberals for their universalising logic of 
individual rights and individual freedom that have undermined family and social ties in civil 
society by rendering superfluous obligations to communities, by actively discouraging private 
efforts to help others (Bell 2012: n/p). Communitarians further berate liberals for their 
libertarian stance on individual freedom which encourages the erosion of social responsibilities 
and valued forms of communal life (Bell 2012: n/p). Communitarians, most often, reproach 
liberals, for instance, for unregulated free-market capitalism which tends to undermine the 
family, disrupts local communities and corrupts the political process, instead of enhancing 
communal benefits (Bell 2012: n/p). 
Communitarian aspirations regarding the relevance of the community in the self-fulfilment and 
determination of individuals have appeal.  In fact, communitarian arguments for community 
belongingness find favour among those who argue that the group mind (community) is essential 
for the actualisation of the necessary social conditions for groups as well as individuals to meet 
their needs and foster the common good (Ukpokolo 2011:238), it raises concerns over the costs 
to the basic civil and political liberty of each individual in the group. The concern that 
communitarianism may descend down the trail of totalitarianism that Popper’s political 
philosophy attempts to resist is a significant challenge. The possibility of such a slide toward 
totalitarianism comes when “some group of individuals or community leaders attempts to 
super-impose their own personal feelings and ideas and disregard those of the group or of other 
members” (Ukpokolo 2011: 238).  
In all of this, the politics of liberal-communitarianism underscores a new thinking in political 
philosophy which accords a more essential social dimension to liberal politics. The liberal-
communitarian order would have a bearing on the benefits of economic efficiency in private 
enterprise and would abate the tendency toward totalitarianism by the degree of openness and 
accountability that liberalism represents while at the same time drawing on the communitarian 
ideal of social cohesion which is indispensable to personal development and societal reforms. 
It is a socio-political order that ensures that both the individual and the community are mutually 
involved in the process of societal development. This socio-political order is then fortified in 
its readiness to address the issue of freedom and equal basic rights in such a way that can put 
a stop to political and economic inequalities in the society. This is imperative in keeping with 
those features of freedom, rights and equality that Popper describes in his Open Society, and is 
meant to help realise greater openness of society. 
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At the political level, liberal-communitarianism is to be seen in terms of entrenching the 
common spirit in social and political organisation as well as strengthening popular participation 
in policy formulation and state management. With popular participation citizens are able to 
directly express their views on the political, social, economic and environmental issues 
affecting them. Jürgen Habermas’ (1929- ) idea of the public sphere is relevant in this regard 
since as “ . . .  the vehicle of public opinion it puts the state in touch with the needs of society” 
(Habermas 1989:31). Most importantly, popular participation in politics does not compromise 
the critical attitude in politics that Popper describes, rather it enriches it. Popular participation 
in politics in terms of discursive democracy is critical in its orientation to establish power 
structures, including those that operate beneath the constitutional surface of the liberal state as 
it encourages citizen participation in public decision-making, and strengthens commitment of 
government officials to public accountability (Dryzek 2002:2). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the prospects for a liberal-communitarian philosophy 
with aims and objectives that enhance Popper’s project of the open society – to the effect that 
this liberal-communitarianism does not undermine both the capacity of individuals to self-
determination and the progress of the community that enhances human relationships. It is with 
this suggestion that I talk of liberal-communitarianism as another way of expressing the desire 
to enhance the socio-political nature of human relationships across the plurality and difference 
of our ways of being, self-understandings, cultures, traditions, and so on.  
The discussion of liberal-communitarianism as a political philosophy engages us directly with 
all the particularities of human experience within contemporary socio-political order. In other 
words, it presents the truth of the present socio-political reality where the question of what 
kinds of politics other than liberalism is possible where it is apparent that liberalism has failed, 
and where communitarianism offered as an alternative may not be appropriate to a political 
culture which so greatly celebrates individualism. It is based on these factors that I have tried 
to talk of liberal-communitarianism not merely as a conceptual abstraction but as practicable 
new thinking in political philosophy, of those notions of freedom, right and equality. Although 
these notions are commonly seen as essentially linked to individualism within liberal thought, 
they must also be considered in terms of enhanced relationship towards others in the 
community.  
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Looking at those peculiar notions of freedom, right, and equality as they are seen in the general 
liberal project, I have attempted to consider these notions also within the sphere of enhanced 
social and community togetherness. This differs essentially from the approach that ultimately 
grounds freedom, right and equality only upon individualism.  The significance of considering 
these notions, even though they are individualistic in nature, is to reappraise them in a manner 
that brings to fore the essential elements of the individual and the social in Popper’s critical 
rationalism. A detailed analysis of each of these notions as they apply in the liberal-
communitarian philosophy is not the focus in this chapter. However, it is important to have 
mentioned them as they are the essential features of achieving the open society. 
In conclusion, the explicit individual and implicit social elements in Popper’s critical 
rationalism require that the communitarian essence, often neglected in Popper’s philosophy, is 
developed. This is what this dissertation seeks to achieve in a way that ensures that Popper’s 
liberal politics is no longer seen as inconsistent with notions of the common good and enhanced 
community values for the well-being of individuals. Most importantly, Popper’s idea of the 
social in science and in politics, and his arguments about the social evolution of language that 
relates to the existence of other minds in his interactionism does seem to me in many ways 
telling about the communitarian essence of his philosophy. This social essence in Popper 
motivates my argument about the prospects for a liberal-communitarian philosophy with aims 
and objectives that enhance his project of the open society.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have examined and critically discussed the 
encompassing philosophy of Popper’s critical rationalism. I remarked the fact that critical 
rationalism characterises both Popper’s philosophy of science and his political philosophy. In 
philosophy of science, critical rationalism is the theory of falsification as it relates to how 
knowledge can be rationally and empirically criticised or put to the test of refutation. In political 
philosophy, critical rationalism deals with critical feedback from those that are affected by 
social policies. Certainly, the ideas regarding critical rationalism that Popper addressed in both 
his philosophy of science and his political philosophy contain mutually supporting 
characteristics. Surely, there is some value in Popper’s attempt to extend lessons from science 
to politics; the benefit may be as much in understanding what the strengths and deficiencies 
are in his philosophy of science and seeing how they influence his political philosophy both 
for good and ill. 
Central to the consideration of the mutually supporting characteristics in Popper’s philosophy 
of science and political philosophy are the balanced elements of both the individual and the 
social aspects. The individual aspect of Popper’s philosophy is commonly held to be the core 
of his philosophy. By contrast, I have emphasised the need to appreciate an implicit social 
element in Popper. The point here is that as much as there is an explicit individualism that 
seems to openly characterise Popper’s philosophy, there is also an implicit social aspect that is 
ultimately communitarian both in his view of science and in his view of politics. These 
individual and social elements form the nucleus of what Popper’s critical rationalism 
encompasses. This point I have made many times in this dissertation.  
The starting point for this dissertation was an examination of Popper’s intellectual biography. 
I examined the origins of both his philosophy of science and political philosophy, and how the 
key personal commitments and life experiences as well as how those intellectual experiences 
helped to shape the moral core of the development of his philosophy of critical rationalism. 
Within the development of his thinking, the issue of boldness came together with courage for 
Popper as this is seen in his audacity to have rejected the seemingly settled philosophies of 
Plato, Hegel and Marx. However, of significant value in Popper’s boldness on how some 
formerly received norm or idea can be replaced, is a conservatism that behooves one to be on 
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the one hand critical, and yet on the other hand anti-revolutionary. Popper proposed that we 
should be bold in both conjecture and criticism but piecemeal in method. 
The succeeding chapters on philosophy of science centred on the critical examination of the 
conceptual and theoretical issues that were raised against Popper’s theory of falsification and 
his insistence on a non-inductive account of corroboration for scientific hypothesis. A critical 
examination of Popper’s idea of how science progresses in chapter 2 demonstrates his 
commitment to falsificationism and corroboration of theories over against the concept of 
hypothetico-deductive confirmation. In that chapter, arguments were given to explain why 
Popper was mistaken to have emphasised only the corroboration of theories and thus rejected 
the notion of confirmation. The notion of confirmation, he thought, was too closely allied to 
the idea of the inductive or probabilistic support that a theory can receive from evidence. 
However, one of the positions that I have taken to support the argument that a theory can also 
be confirmed by evidence is drawn particularly from the history of science. This support for 
confirmation of theories rests primarily on how laws can be said to confirm higher level laws; 
thus Galileo’s laws of free fall and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion confirmed Newton’s 
more general laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation not only in that the latter laws 
entail the former laws but also that in a ‘bootstrap’ way the former laws together with some 
further quite innocuous seeming conceptual assumptions constrain the interpretation of 
empirical evidence in a way that allows the latter, more encompassing laws to be deduced. The 
theory of ‘bootstrap’ evidencing of theories is deductivist in a way that Popper should 
commend, but also points past hypothetico-deductivism, and towards the conception of 
‘evidence for’ that officially Popper eschewed.   
The conclusions that can be drawn about the legitimacy of evidence for theories (that the 
‘bootstrap’ theory shows can be a richer and better defensible concept than that of hypothetico-
deductive confirmation that Popper rejected) are often strongly determined by what scientists 
actually do on a purely pragmatic level. This brings to light some apparent technical difficulties 
in falsification; in such a way that scientists often protect a theory from falsification, and this 
protection does not necessarily make the theory unscientific. The case that readily comes to 
mind is how some scientists held onto Newton’s theory and protected it from been falsified in 
the light of apparent problems with the orbit of Uranus and the Newtonian understanding of 
the solar system. The prioritised need to attend strictly to the rule of falsifying a theory, as 
Popper prescribed, would have led those scientists to immediately abandon Newton. However, 
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what those scientists did was to try to produce a reason why the motion of this planet was not 
conforming to the predictions of Newton’s theory. They postulated a new planet pulling Uranus 
out of its orbit, and after careful observation, planet Neptune was discovered (Scherzer 2011: 
9).  
The argument here is that failure to falsify a theory is not unscientific. The failure can be 
scientifically productive. The main point of note is that it is difficult to determine when 
scientists precisely can stop to protect theories they believe in from been falsified. It is precisely 
for this reason that one can argue that if scientists had always attended strictly to the 
methodology of falsificationism then theories that are today generally considered as good 
examples of scientific theories would never have been developed. They would have been 
rejected immediately at birth since even at birth every one of them showed some kinds of 
anomaly. In any instance of a scientific theory classic upon its first formulation, it is possible 
to find observable statements that are generally accepted at a time but may be considered 
incompatible with the theory. In the case that a theory is shielded from falsification scientists 
often adduce evidence to make its truth improbable. This aligns with the argument on 
hypothetico-deductive confirmation as it allows evidence to increase the probability of a 
theory’s truth as well. 
The core of the argument that I provided is that I reposition Popper’s philosophy of critical 
rationalism so as to establish why well hypothetico-deductive corroborated theories can also 
be confirmed. I partly use the non-hypothetico-deductive idea of a ‘bootstrap test’ in order to 
accomplish this. The reasons why confirmation is possible are two: (a) ‘bootstrapping’ points 
past ‘guesswork’ to a kind of ‘detective work’ in science that at its best can roundly over-
determine choice of theory in light of evidence and can at the same time instance a particularly 
severe kind of theory testing; (b) a hypothesis under such severe bootstrap testing can be 
probabilified by evidence39. This second point makes the case that the testing of hypotheses 
and the legitimate processes of scientific inquiry can be conducted through a plurality of 
methods. This explains why Popper’s critical rationalism has been known to embrace a 
plurality of ideas, as I have argued more broadly in Chapter 3.   
In spite of these well-founded criticisms of Popper’s philosophy of science there are still many 
positive lessons to be drawn from Popper. I showed how one regains Popper’s conjecture-and-
                                                 
39 See elaborate discussions of this in chapter 2 
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refutation standpoint by stepping up from either ‘bootstrap’ or Bayesian conceptions to a 
suitably higher perspective upon how by these methods evidence plays against theories.  These 
positives concerning Popper’s philosophy sufficiently effectively demonstrate the significance 
of Popper’s critical rationalism that I seek to retain his hypothetico-deductivism. First, I 
endorse Popper’s criticism of verificationism. Verificationism seeks to explain the difference 
between science and non-science in terms of the idea of meaningfulness and meaninglessness, 
using the idea of empirical verification. Popper insightfully rejected the positive notion of 
empirical verification in favour of the largely negative notion of empirical criticism or 
falsification. For Popper, scientific method proceeds with the formulation of hypotheses which 
can be proven incorrect by empirical falsification. The theory of falsification delimits what is 
scientific, but does not delimit what is meaningful.  Popper insightfully rejected the whole 
attempt to demarcate science from non-science in terms of a theory of meaning.  His conjecture 
and refutation conception of scientific theories shows how scientific knowledge is acquired 
through severe testing and eventual corroboration. A theory being tested that predicts what is 
contrary to observation is falsified. A theory that is open to refutation but remains unfalsified 
remains corroborated for future tests. This is a process of scientific knowledge that Popper 
described as akin to Darwinian natural selection. 
Popper’s critical rationalism concerning science and Popper’s generalised attitude of criticism 
inspires his view of appropriate social and political reforms. Popper drew lessons from 
philosophy of science for political philosophy, in ways that make critical feedback an attitude 
on the part of everyone in an open society to take criticism seriously and act on it. This attitude 
does seem to me not in all ways mistaken, and on the contrary seems to me in many ways 
telling and right. For me, the key lessons are in the role of a critical rationality, effectively 
directed through a (scientific) community of inquiry, which forms both the individual and 
social elements that I have retained and deployed in this dissertation on political philosophy.   
Although I have variously discussed the problem with the seemingly pivotal (and 
metaphysical) role of individualism in the social domain by many liberals  and ostensibly found 
in Popper, I have argued in virtually all the chapters in this dissertation that Popper in fact 
implicitly subscribes to a metaphysics of interpersonal connectedness which I readily endorse. 
It is with these liberal individual and social aspects of Popper’s critical rationalism together 
that I think society can best move forward. In particular by a conceptual engagement of liberal-
communitarian philosophy as a new way of thinking in political philosophy, I believe I can 
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help Popper speak helpfully to the situation of nations such as those in Africa that are 
developing, troubled, not essentially liberal, yet are for all these reasons especially needing to 
mobilise learning by criticism. 
Several scholars, including Kymlicka, have also discussed such a liberal-communitarian 
engagement in political philosophy, their arguments emphasising culture as a basis for political 
alignment. In particular, Kymlicka locates the basis of liberal-communitarian philosophy 
within the principle of specific cultural membership of individuals. Instead, the liberal-
communitarian philosophy that I defend considers the universal social element inherent to 
human interaction and interpersonal relationship. Popper is important to the development of 
this new thinking in political philosophy because of the explicit individualism and implicit 
social dimension in his politics of liberalism.  
Popper’s critical rationalism and his politics of liberalism are integral to the liberal-
communitarian philosophy. The rationalism of liberal-communitarianism challenges both 
liberals and non-liberal societies to aspire to intellectual openness. A communitarian society 
can be liberal in its institutions and become intellectually open in the way Popper prescribed 
for liberalism. How Popper’s form of liberalism can be applied to a society that embraces the 
idea of common good and community belongingness over against the idea of the self is the 
challenge that liberal-communitarianism addresses. This is seen in a balance or an equation 
between Popper’s liberal politics and a moderate communitarian ideal without the collectivism 
that may seem to worry it. Popper was critical of collectivist ideologies but I have provided 
theoretical justifications and reasonable arguments on why Popper’s form of liberalism can be 
suitably synthesised with the idea of social relations and community belongingness. With this 
in mind, I demonstrated that my argument on liberal-communitarian philosophy was a new 
form of political philosophy. Its ultimate aim is to enhance Popper’s open society while at the 
same time entrenching values of social and community togetherness by which the 
communitarian spirit is known.   
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